contents claim in California

2025(StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 456, fn. 9 ; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 483 .) 21

2025(StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 456, fn. 9 ; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 483 .) 8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

1960(Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415, 418 [ 109 P.2d 29 ]; see also Wilkes v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 395-396 .) If a municipality may not impose more onerous conditions affecting the filing period allowed a claimant under the general law, it would reasonably follow that it may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.

1960(Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415, 418 [ 109 P.2d 29 ]; see also Wilkes v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 395-396 .) If a municipality may not impose more onerous conditions affecting the filing period allowed a claimant under the general law, it would reasonably follow that it may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.

1960(Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415, 418 [ 109 P.2d 29 ]; see also Wilkes v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 395-396 .) If a municipality may not impose more onerous conditions affecting the filing period allowed a claimant under the general law, it would reasonably follow that it may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.

1960(Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415, 418 [ 109 P.2d 29 ]; see also Wilkes v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 395-396 .) If a municipality may not impose more onerous conditions affecting the filing period allowed a claimant under the general law, it would reasonably follow that it may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.

2005(Id. at pp. 664-665.) We held that the Legislature had provided “a general scheme for the presentation of such liability claims to be effective throughout the state. . . . [W]ith respect to the subjects covered, the [state] statute occupies the entire field and it impliedly precludes control to that extent by municipal or local regulation.” (Id. at p. 666.) A municipality “may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.” (Id. at p. 667.) “[T]he provisions of that statute ‘are exclusive’ in regulating the presentation

1962The Eastlick decision was followed in Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal.2d 852, 858-861 [ 306 P.2d 789 ], where the court held that a city charter provision requiring the filing of claims could not be applied to an inverse condemnation proceeding because the Legislature had fully occupied the field of eminent domain, including the enactment of procedural measures and statutes limiting the time within which actions could be brought.

1994Petitioners base their argument upon a portion of footnote 12 on page 1069 of Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d, which states: “It should also be noted that the consumers of prescription drugs are afforded greater protection against defects than consumers of other products, since ‘the drug industry is closely regulated by the Food and Drug Administration, which actively controls the testing and manufacture of drugs and the method by which they are marketed, including the contents of warning labels.’ ” (Quoting from Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 609 [ 163 Cal.Rptr

1994Petitioners base their argument upon a portion of footnote 12 on page 1069 of Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d, which states: “It should also be noted that the consumers of prescription drugs are afforded greater protection against defects than consumers of other products, since ‘the drug industry is closely regulated by the Food and Drug Administration, which actively controls the testing and manufacture of drugs and the method by which they are marketed, including the contents of warning labels.’ ” (Quoting from Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 609 [ 163 Cal.Rptr

2014(People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1088 [evidence admitted on rebuttal only “to disprove a fact” introduced into evidence by the defense].) That the prosecution and defense did not learn of Arriola’s assertion until the trial was already underway, does not mean the defense is free to introduce evidence immune from impeachment on rebuttal.

2005Under power expressly granted to it by the Constitution, the Legislature has established a complete system of workmen’s compensation which obviously is a subject of state-wide concern, and it is well settled that in such matters the general law is paramount”]; Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 103-105 [“city ordinance attempting to make sexual intercourse between persons not married to each other criminal is in conflict with the state law and is void” given the “Penal Code sections covering the criminal aspects of sexual activity are so extensive in their scope that they clearly show an intention

2005Under power expressly granted to it by the Constitution, the Legislature has established a complete system of workmen’s compensation which obviously is a subject of state-wide concern, and it is well settled that in such matters the general law is paramount”]; Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 103-105 [“city ordinance attempting to make sexual intercourse between persons not married to each other criminal is in conflict with the state law and is void” given the “Penal Code sections covering the criminal aspects of sexual activity are so extensive in their scope that they clearly show an intention

2005(Id. at pp. 664-665.) We held that the Legislature had provided “a general scheme for the presentation of such liability claims to be effective throughout the state. . . . [W]ith respect to the subjects covered, the [state] statute occupies the entire field and it impliedly precludes control to that extent by municipal or local regulation.” (Id. at p. 666.) A municipality “may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.” (Id. at p. 667.) “[T]he provisions of that statute ‘are exclusive’ in regulating the presentation

2005(Id. at pp. 664-665.) We held that the Legislature had provided “a general scheme for the presentation of such liability claims to be effective throughout the state. . . . [W]ith respect to the subjects covered, the [state] statute occupies the entire field and it impliedly precludes control to that extent by municipal or local regulation.” (Id. at p. 666.) A municipality “may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.” (Id. at p. 667.) “[T]he provisions of that statute ‘are exclusive’ in regulating the presentation

2005(Id. at pp. 664-665.) We held that the Legislature had provided “a general scheme for the presentation of such liability claims to be effective throughout the state. . . . [W]ith respect to the subjects covered, the [state] statute occupies the entire field and it impliedly precludes control to that extent by municipal or local regulation.” (Id. at p. 666.) A municipality “may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.” (Id. at p. 667.) “[T]he provisions of that statute ‘are exclusive’ in regulating the presentation

2005(Id. at pp. 664-665.) We held that the Legislature had provided “a general scheme for the presentation of such liability claims to be effective throughout the state. . . . [W]ith respect to the subjects covered, the [state] statute occupies the entire field and it impliedly precludes control to that extent by municipal or local regulation.” (Id. at p. 666.) A municipality “may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim.” (Id. at p. 667.) “[T]he provisions of that statute ‘are exclusive’ in regulating the presentation

1982There is nothing before us which demonstrates that either Supervisor Edelman’s expression of opinion or prior knowledge caused his chief deputy to irrevocably close his mind to the contents of the hearing record (Trade Comm’n. v. Cement Institute (1948) 333 U.S. 683, 701 [ 92 L.Ed. 1010, 1034 , 68 S.Ct. 793 ]) or that the record before him was not the basis of his decision or that he brought pressure to bear on the decision of any other member of the board. *63 The cases cited by petitioner to establish administrative bias are readily distinguishable.

1982There is nothing before us which demonstrates that either Supervisor Edelman’s expression of opinion or prior knowledge caused his chief deputy to irrevocably close his mind to the contents of the hearing record (Trade Comm’n. v. Cement Institute (1948) 333 U.S. 683, 701 [ 92 L.Ed. 1010, 1034 , 68 S.Ct. 793 ]) or that the record before him was not the basis of his decision or that he brought pressure to bear on the decision of any other member of the board. *63 The cases cited by petitioner to establish administrative bias are readily distinguishable.

1980Adherence to those standards cannot, of course, absolve a manufacturer of liability to which it would otherwise be subject. ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 65 [107 *610 Cal. Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d 653 , 94 A.L.R.3d 1059 ].) But since the government plays such a pervasive role in formulating the criteria for the testing and marketing of drugs, it would be unfair to impose upon a manufacturer liability for injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not supply simply because it followed the standards of the industry. [27] IV (8) If we were confined to the theories of S

1980Adherence to those standards cannot, of course, absolve a manufacturer of liability to which it would otherwise be subject. ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 65 [107 *610 Cal. Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d 653 , 94 A.L.R.3d 1059 ].) But since the government plays such a pervasive role in formulating the criteria for the testing and marketing of drugs, it would be unfair to impose upon a manufacturer liability for injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not supply simply because it followed the standards of the industry. [27] IV (8) If we were confined to the theories of S

1979The majority's novel and unprecedented theory of waiver runs directly counter to the "`strong public policy in favor of arbitrations,'" very recently acknowledged by us. ( Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 , 552 P.2d 1178 ].) As we stated in Madden , "... arbitration has become an accepted and favored method of resolving disputes [citations], praised by the courts as an expeditious *432 and economical method of relieving overburdened civil calendars [citation]." (Pp. 706-707.) Surely we frustrate the goal of relieving our overburdened courts w

1979The majority's novel and unprecedented theory of waiver runs directly counter to the "`strong public policy in favor of arbitrations,'" very recently acknowledged by us. ( Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 , 552 P.2d 1178 ].) As we stated in Madden , "... arbitration has become an accepted and favored method of resolving disputes [citations], praised by the courts as an expeditious *432 and economical method of relieving overburdened civil calendars [citation]." (Pp. 706-707.) Surely we frustrate the goal of relieving our overburdened courts w

1973Petitioners argue there was no finding they were informed of the contents of the rule. *976 In Transport Clearings-Bay Area v. Simmonds (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 405, 427-428 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 116 ]. the court, quoting from earlier decisions, listed four essentials needed to prove estoppel and further observed that: “The burden is on the party asserting an estoppel to establish all of the elements constituting it. [Citation.] The doctrine of estoppel must be ap- - plied strictly and established in every particular.” First to be noted is the fact that, although petitioners filed various objections to

1973Petitioners argue there was no finding they were informed of the contents of the rule. *976 In Transport Clearings-Bay Area v. Simmonds (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 405, 427-428 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 116 ]. the court, quoting from earlier decisions, listed four essentials needed to prove estoppel and further observed that: “The burden is on the party asserting an estoppel to establish all of the elements constituting it. [Citation.] The doctrine of estoppel must be ap- - plied strictly and established in every particular.” First to be noted is the fact that, although petitioners filed various objections to

1970(Gen. see People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 135 [ 318 P.2d 828 ]; People v. Mummert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849, 855 [135 P.2d 665]; People v. Wood, 56 Cal.App. 431, 432 [ 205 P. 698 ].) Although defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury “as to specific intent necessary to aid and abet,” he did not request nor does he now indicate the contents of such instruction.

1970(Gen. see People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 135 [ 318 P.2d 828 ]; People v. Mummert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849, 855 [135 P.2d 665]; People v. Wood, 56 Cal.App. 431, 432 [ 205 P. 698 ].) Although defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury “as to specific intent necessary to aid and abet,” he did not request nor does he now indicate the contents of such instruction.

1970(Gen. see People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 135 [ 318 P.2d 828 ]; People v. Mummert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849, 855 [135 P.2d 665]; People v. Wood, 56 Cal.App. 431, 432 [ 205 P. 698 ].) Although defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury “as to specific intent necessary to aid and abet,” he did not request nor does he now indicate the contents of such instruction.

1970(Gen. see People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 135 [ 318 P.2d 828 ]; People v. Mummert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849, 855 [135 P.2d 665]; People v. Wood, 56 Cal.App. 431, 432 [ 205 P. 698 ].) Although defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury “as to specific intent necessary to aid and abet,” he did not request nor does he now indicate the contents of such instruction.

1970(Gen. see People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 135 [ 318 P.2d 828 ]; People v. Mummert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849, 855 [135 P.2d 665]; People v. Wood, 56 Cal.App. 431, 432 [ 205 P. 698 ].) Although defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury “as to specific intent necessary to aid and abet,” he did not request nor does he now indicate the contents of such instruction.

1970(Gen. see People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 135 [ 318 P.2d 828 ]; People v. Mummert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849, 855 [135 P.2d 665]; People v. Wood, 56 Cal.App. 431, 432 [ 205 P. 698 ].) Although defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury “as to specific intent necessary to aid and abet,” he did not request nor does he now indicate the contents of such instruction.

1961“It is elementary law that. *99 incompetent statements in an affidavit become competent evidence when admitted without objection . . . [Citations.]” (Vartanian v. Croll, 117 Cal.App.2d 639, at p. 647 [ 256 P.2d 1022 ].) In his reply brief plaintiff seeks to show that the question whether the contents of defense counsel’s letter were properly proved (by production of the document, etc.) was raised in the court below.

1961“It is elementary law that. *99 incompetent statements in an affidavit become competent evidence when admitted without objection . . . [Citations.]” (Vartanian v. Croll, 117 Cal.App.2d 639, at p. 647 [ 256 P.2d 1022 ].) In his reply brief plaintiff seeks to show that the question whether the contents of defense counsel’s letter were properly proved (by production of the document, etc.) was raised in the court below.

1949(See Wood v. Cox, 10 Cal.App.2d 652, 653 [ 52 P.2d 565 ], and cases there cited; 6 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (rev. 2d ed.) § 2591, p. 525; 14 Cal.L.Rev. 233; 1 Ops. of Atty.

1949(See Wood v. Cox, 10 Cal.App.2d 652, 653 [ 52 P.2d 565 ], and cases there cited; 6 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (rev. 2d ed.) § 2591, p. 525; 14 Cal.L.Rev. 233; 1 Ops. of Atty.

1949And in Knight v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764, 767 [ 160 P.2d 779 ], the court said that “[t]he rule of substantial compliance prevents the requirement of the impossible or absurd. ’ ’ From the contents of the claim and the fact that it was served upon Mayor Kline, we conclude that there was a suffi *528 cient compliance with the statute to charge him and the other four councilmen with the alleged liability.

1949And in Knight v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764, 767 [ 160 P.2d 779 ], the court said that “[t]he rule of substantial compliance prevents the requirement of the impossible or absurd. ’ ’ From the contents of the claim and the fact that it was served upon Mayor Kline, we conclude that there was a suffi *528 cient compliance with the statute to charge him and the other four councilmen with the alleged liability.

1936(Burns v. Cushing, 96 Cal. 669, 671 [ 31 Pac. 1124 ].) The second proposition presented by appellant is answered contrary to his position by subsection 8 of section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, where the claims arise out of transactions connected with the same subject of action.

1936(Burns v. Cushing, 96 Cal. 669, 671 [ 31 Pac. 1124 ].) The second proposition presented by appellant is answered contrary to his position by subsection 8 of section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, where the claims arise out of transactions connected with the same subject of action.