immediate cautionary instruction in District of Columbia

1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen

1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su

1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen

1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su

1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen

1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su

2001A bright-line rule had developed that “the trial court is required to give an immediate cautionary instruction when a party impeaches its own witness with prior inconsistent statements, stating that the jury may consider the prior statements only in evaluating the witness’ credibility.” Id. 13 *306 This principle was reaffirmed in Jones v. United States, 579 A.2d 250, 252-53 (D.C.1990): “a sua sponte cautioning instruction is required when a party, surprised by its own witness, impeaches the witness with a prior inconsistent statement” (citations and internal quotations omitted).

2001In United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 217, 440 F.2d 241, 245 (1971), the court held, in sweeping terms, that “whenever evidence is admitted only for a limited purpose, it is plain error, in the absence of manifest waiver, to omit an immediate cautionary instruction.” However, this holding, decided on January 27, 1971, and thus otherwise binding on us under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), was rejected by the en banc court in (Linwood) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084 , 1087 n. 4 (D.C.1978) (noting that the holding had been restricted significantly by subsequent D.C

2001In United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 217, 440 F.2d 241, 245 (1971), the court held, in sweeping terms, that “whenever evidence is admitted only for a limited purpose, it is plain error, in the absence of manifest waiver, to omit an immediate cautionary instruction.” However, this holding, decided on January 27, 1971, and thus otherwise binding on us under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971), was rejected by the en banc court in (Linwood) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084 , 1087 n. 4 (D.C.1978) (noting that the holding had been restricted significantly by subsequent D.C

1997Hampton, like Sterling, argues for reversal because the trial court did not give an immediate cautionary instruction on the limited use of the impeachment evidence. “[A] cautionary instruction ‘is required when a party, surprised by its own witness, impeaches the witness with a prior inconsistent statement_’” Byers, supra, 649 A.2d at 285 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084 , 1087 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (en banc)).

1997Hampton, like Sterling, argues for reversal because the trial court did not give an immediate cautionary instruction on the limited use of the impeachment evidence. “[A] cautionary instruction ‘is required when a party, surprised by its own witness, impeaches the witness with a prior inconsistent statement_’” Byers, supra, 649 A.2d at 285 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084 , 1087 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (en banc)).

1989As Justice Holmes put it three quarters of a century ago in Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 481 , 34 S.Ct. 148, 152 , 58 L.Ed. 319 (1913): It would be absurd to upset a verdict upon a speculation that the jury did not do their duty and follow the instructions of the court.

1989As Justice Holmes put it three quarters of a century ago in Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 481 , 34 S.Ct. 148, 152 , 58 L.Ed. 319 (1913): It would be absurd to upset a verdict upon a speculation that the jury did not do their duty and follow the instructions of the court.

1985Id. at 454-55 .

1985Id. at 454-55 .

1985Accordingly, although an immediate cautionary instruction would have been appropriate, United States v. Williams, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 190 , 556 F.2d 65, 67 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2936 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977), this case is not analogous to United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 109-111 , 509 F.2d 428, 442-43 (1974), where the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about defendant’s efforts to retain counsel and emphasized that fact in closing argument, and, here, it was not reversible error to refuse such instruction.

1985Accordingly, although an immediate cautionary instruction would have been appropriate, United States v. Williams, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 190 , 556 F.2d 65, 67 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2936 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977), this case is not analogous to United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 109-111 , 509 F.2d 428, 442-43 (1974), where the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about defendant’s efforts to retain counsel and emphasized that fact in closing argument, and, here, it was not reversible error to refuse such instruction.

1985Accordingly, although an immediate cautionary instruction would have been appropriate, United States v. Williams, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 190 , 556 F.2d 65, 67 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2936 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977), this case is not analogous to United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 109-111 , 509 F.2d 428, 442-43 (1974), where the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about defendant’s efforts to retain counsel and emphasized that fact in closing argument, and, here, it was not reversible error to refuse such instruction.

1985Accordingly, although an immediate cautionary instruction would have been appropriate, United States v. Williams, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 190 , 556 F.2d 65, 67 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2936 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977), this case is not analogous to United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 109-111 , 509 F.2d 428, 442-43 (1974), where the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about defendant’s efforts to retain counsel and emphasized that fact in closing argument, and, here, it was not reversible error to refuse such instruction.

1985Accordingly, although an immediate cautionary instruction would have been appropriate, United States v. Williams, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 190 , 556 F.2d 65, 67 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2936 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977), this case is not analogous to United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 109-111 , 509 F.2d 428, 442-43 (1974), where the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about defendant’s efforts to retain counsel and emphasized that fact in closing argument, and, here, it was not reversible error to refuse such instruction.

1983Further, any prejudicial impact of Detective Schwartz's comment could have easily been cured by an immediate cautionary instruction to the jury which was refused by defense counsel despite the trial court's continuing reminders during the trial of the availability of such an option. [3] We contrast the situation here with that in Lucas v. United States, 436 A.2d 1282 (D.C.1981), which appellant asserts is virtually the same as the present case.

1983Further, any prejudicial impact of Detective Schwartz’s comment could have easily been cured by an immediate cautionary instruction to the jury which was refused by defense counsel despite the trial court’s continuing reminders during the trial of the availability of such an option. 3 We contrast the situation here with that in Lucas v. United States, 436 A.2d 1282 (D.C.1981), which appellant asserts is virtually the same as the present case.

1976See also Robinson v. United States, D.C.App., 317 A.2d 508 (1974), where lack of a limiting instruction was upheld with respect to a prior criminal act of some substantive relevance; Watts v. United States, D.C.App. (en banc), 362 A.2d 706 (1976, n. 11); and Tuckson v. United States, D.C.App., 364 A.2d 138 (1976, n. 7).