Perez claim in Florida

1988The Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option to proceed in the face of prosecutorial or judicial error until a "scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 , 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 556 (1971), quoted in Dinitz, 96 S.Ct. at 1080 .

1988The Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option to proceed in the face of prosecutorial or judicial error until a "scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 , 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 556 (1971), quoted in Dinitz, 96 S.Ct. at 1080 .

1983See United States v. Perez , 9 Wheat. [579], at 580 [ 6 L.Ed. 165, at 166 ]. [Emphasis supplied by this court.] United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547, 556 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).

1983See United States v. Perez , 9 Wheat. [579], at 580 [ 6 L.Ed. 165, at 166 ]. [Emphasis supplied by this court.] United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547, 556 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).

2017In 2014, when the trial court held the evidentiary hearing and rendered its order, the case law held that a defendant seeking to withdraw or vacate a plea after sentencing must demonstrate that withdrawal or vacatur of the plea “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice,” Perez v. State, 118 So.3d 298, 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Scott v. State, 629 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)), and that the defendant “has the burden of demonstrating a manifest injustice through clear proof of prejudice.” Id.

2017In 2014, when the trial court held the evidentiary hearing and rendered its order, the case law held that a defendant seeking to withdraw or vacate a plea after sentencing must demonstrate that withdrawal or vacatur of the plea “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice,” Perez v. State, 118 So.3d 298, 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Scott v. State, 629 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)), and that the defendant “has the burden of demonstrating a manifest injustice through clear proof of prejudice.” Id.

2017In 2014, when the trial court held the evidentiary hearing and rendered its order, the case law held that a defendant seeking to withdraw or vacate a plea after sentencing must demonstrate that withdrawal or vacatur of the plea “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice,” Perez v. State, 118 So.3d 298, 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Scott v. State, 629 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)), and that the defendant “has the burden of demonstrating a manifest injustice through clear proof of prejudice.” Id.

2008Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Salnave v. Pub.

2007State v. Pasko, 815 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2006In Perez's motion to suppress, he asserted that his statements were obtained illegally because he was "coerced/forced or under duress at the times of the statements," and that he made the statements "without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and without the benefit of counsel." During the hearing on Perez's motion, his counsel made two specific assertions to the trial court: (1) that the statement "was given through misleading or confusing statements of Perez's rights" by the police in that he was misled regarding his custody status; and (2) "that the statement was obtained through

2006See Archer, 613 So.2d at 448 ; Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 338 .

2006In Perez's motion to suppress, he asserted that his statements were obtained illegally because he was "coerced/forced or under duress at the times of the statements," and that he made the statements "without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and without the benefit of counsel." During the hearing on Perez's motion, his counsel made two specific assertions to the trial court: (1) that the statement "was given through misleading or confusing statements of Perez's rights" by the police in that he was misled regarding his custody status; and (2) "that the statement was obtained through

2006See Archer, 613 So.2d at 448 ; Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 338 .

2006See Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 827 (Fla.2003); Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 433 (Fla.2001); Carter v. State, 687 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Lusk v. State, 531 So.2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). [10] The remaining aspect of Perez's claim implicates the Enmund/Tison analysis, see discussion supra pp. 365-72, along with the HAC question discussed infra pp. 378-82. [11] The trial court merged the pecuniary gain and in the commission of a robbery aggravators, considering them as a single aggravating circumstance. [12] Given our disposition of this case, it is unnecessary for us to condu

2006See Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 827 (Fla.2003); Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 433 (Fla.2001); Carter v. State, 687 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Lusk v. State, 531 So.2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). [10] The remaining aspect of Perez's claim implicates the Enmund/Tison analysis, see discussion supra pp. 365-72, along with the HAC question discussed infra pp. 378-82. [11] The trial court merged the pecuniary gain and in the commission of a robbery aggravators, considering them as a single aggravating circumstance. [12] Given our disposition of this case, it is unnecessary for us to condu

2006In Perez's motion to suppress, he asserted that his statements were obtained illegally because he was "coerced/forced or under duress at the times of the statements," and that he made the statements "without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and without the benefit of counsel." During the hearing on Perez's motion, his counsel made two specific assertions to the trial court: (1) that the statement "was given through misleading or confusing statements of Perez's rights" by the police in that he was misled regarding his custody status; and (2) "that the statement was obtained through

2006Moreover, when the statement was made, Perez's trial counsel objected and the trial court immediately gave a curative instruction at the defense's request in which the jury was instructed that the videotape of Perez's interview was "the best evidence" of what Mr. Perez had stated and the jury should "rely on your determinations about what is said off that videotape." Given the above, Perez's motion for a mistrial was properly denied. *365 Notwithstanding our conclusion above, we also note that the error, if any, resulting from the prosecutor's opening statement and the detective's testimony wa

2006See Nibert, 574 So.2d at 1062 ; Kight, 512 So.2d at 933 .

2006See Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 827 (Fla.2003); Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 433 (Fla.2001); Carter v. State, 687 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Lusk v. State, 531 So.2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). [10] The remaining aspect of Perez's claim implicates the Enmund/Tison analysis, see discussion supra pp. 365-72, along with the HAC question discussed infra pp. 378-82. [11] The trial court merged the pecuniary gain and in the commission of a robbery aggravators, considering them as a single aggravating circumstance. [12] Given our disposition of this case, it is unnecessary for us to condu

2003See Cox v. State, 819 So.2d 705, 712 (Fla.2002) (holding a trial court's decision regarding a motion for mistrial pursuant to a Richardson hearing is subject to reversal only upon a showing that it abused its discretion).

1998See Williams v. State, 674 So.2d 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Louis v. State, 567 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Romero v. State, 341 So.2d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1250 (Fla.1977).

1993Thomason, 594 So.2d at 312, 317-18 (Farmer, J., dissenting).

1993Thomason, 594 So.2d at 312, 317-18 (Farmer, J., dissenting).

1992See Robinson v. State, 603 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Johnson v. State, 603 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (the single-subject constitutionality argument will not be considered if the defendant would have been habitualized regardless of the affected amendments).