Perez claim in Indiana

2013The Indiana Supreme Court determined that the findings supplied by the Board did “not reveal the factual basis for the Board’s ultimate determination of Perez’s claim, which is the quintessential purpose of the requirement that administrative agencies enter specific findings of fact as part of their orders.” Id.

2004There our supreme court determined a finding of the workers compensation board was inadequate to support its conclusion that Perez was totally disabled: "It does not reveal the factual basis for the Board's ultimate determination of Perez's claim, which is the quintessential purpose of the requirement that administrative agencies enter specific findings of fact as part of their orders." (Emphasis supplied.) Our supreme court noted "as the General Assembly undoubtedly recognized in establishing the fact-finding requirement, specific findings of fact are essential to an effective system of admin

2020Whether a trial court should cite a guilty plea as a mitigating factor “is necessarily fact sensitive, and not every plea of guilty is a significant mitigating circumstance that must be credited by a trial court.” Cherry v. State, 772 N.E.2d 433, 436-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1257 (Ind. 1999), cert. denied (2000)), trans. denied. [9] Here, the record shows that Perez’s plea agreement was more likely the result of pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse because the evidence against her was overwhelming.

2020Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221 .

1981As Chief Judge Buchanan observed in Rivera v. Simmons Co. (1973), 157 Ind.App. 10, 13 , 298 N.E.2d 477, 479 , “The usurpation of the Board’s statutory duty [to make specific findings of fact] is not a legitimate function of judicial review.” Assuming arguendo that the Board’s “Summary of Evidence” provides a factual foundation sufficient for judicial review, the Board’s entry of a negative award on Perez’s claim is nevertheless contrary to law.

1981As Chief Judge Buchanan observed in Rivera v. Simmons Co. (1973), 157 Ind.App. 10, 13 , 298 N.E.2d 477, 479 , “The usurpation of the Board’s statutory duty [to make specific findings of fact] is not a legitimate function of judicial review.” Assuming arguendo that the Board’s “Summary of Evidence” provides a factual foundation sufficient for judicial review, the Board’s entry of a negative award on Perez’s claim is nevertheless contrary to law.

1981Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 242 , 359 N.E.2d 925 .

1981Perez v. United States Steel Corporation, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 242 , 359 N.E.2d 925 .

1981Hawley v. South Bend Dept. of Redevelopment, (1978) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 333 ; Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 .

1981Hawley v. South Bend Dept. of Redevelopment, (1978) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 333 ; Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 .

1981Hawley v. South Bend Dept. of Redevelopment, (1978) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 333 ; Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 .

1981The Court of Appeals also directed that, in view of the definition of “permanent total disability” adopted in its opinion, as well as the then-recent decision in Covarubias v. Decatur Casting, (1976) 171 Ind.App. 533 , 358 N.E.2d 174 , the Board should permit the parties to present additional evidence regarding Perez’s claim.

1981The Court of Appeals also directed that, in view of the definition of “permanent total disability” adopted in its opinion, as well as the then-recent decision in Covarubias v. Decatur Casting, (1976) 171 Ind.App. 533 , 358 N.E.2d 174 , the Board should permit the parties to present additional evidence regarding Perez’s claim.