Romero motion in California

2026(People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) Based on the record before it, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion.

2026Analysis We review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, which requires the defendant to show the sentencing decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 , 377 (Carmony).) We presume the trial court considered all relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.

2026Thus, the Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of a harsher sentence and requires the court to explicitly articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a harsher sentence by granting the Romero motion.” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428 .) When determining whether to dismiss a strike, a court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the schem

2026On the date set for sentencing, the court asked Barron’s counsel, “You are making an oral motion under People versus Romero to strike one or more of those strike convictions; is that correct?” Counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” Counsel argued, “The base terms of the charges for which Mr. Barron was convicted carry life and are high enough to protect the public and to satisfy the victim’s family that Mr. Barron is paying a serious price for the loss of their loved one’s life.” Counsel asked the court to “exercise [its] discretion under Penal Code 1385,” and to strike Barron’s strikes and “sent

2026Jay confirmed he wanted an opportunity to be released and to 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). 2 demonstrate through his behavior on release that his anticipated Romero motion should be granted.

2026When discussing Soto’s motion to dismiss his strike prior under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 , defense counsel argued that the strike prior would double Soto’s punishment and, “[i]f the court is inclined to do that, the defense would object under the Eighth Amendment under cruel and unusual punishment.” After the court denied the Romero motion, defense counsel asked the court to “run as many counts as it can concurrent and give a sentence that would not violate the 13 Eighth Amendment under cruel and unusual punishment.” But when a defendant has a prior strike under

2026(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“the fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on the violence and potential violence of appellant’s crimes does not mean that it considered only that factor”].) Accordingly, “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all of the relevant factors and properly applied 3 We use Osuna’s age at the time of the prior convictions, as do the parties, because the record does not reflect his age at the time he committed the offenses. 18 the law.” (Brugman, at p. 638; accord, Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.

2025Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an 10 impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) That is the case here: the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant partial relief on his Romero motion.

2023On this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude Fonseca “ ‘failed or refused to learn his lesson’ ” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 ), and his recidivism placed him well within the spirit of the Three Strikes law (Gaston, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 320 ; id. at p. 322 [“[T]he record is barren of any attempts by [defendant] to ‘root out’ such destructive drug dependency.”]; see, e.g., People v. Barrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 541 , 5 552–553 [affirming a denial of a Romero motion because the trial court properly considered the “appellant’s lengthy history of substance abuse” and

2022(See People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 344 [reversing an order granting a Romero motion based on the nonviolent nature of the current offense because “the nonviolent or nonthreatening nature of the felony cannot alone take the crime outside the spirit of the law”]; see also People v. Poslof (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 92, 108 [even though the current crime, failing to register as a sex offender, was nonviolent, denial of the Romero motion was not an abuse of discretion]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 321 [although the current crime of car theft was “not as serious as many fe

2026(Bernal, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170; see People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 , 1141 [“remoteness of prior strikes alone is not sufficient to take a defendant out of the spirit of the Three Strikes law”]; cf. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [trial court abused discretion in granting Romero motion, despite defendant’s youth at time of prior strikes, because defendant persisted in criminal activity].) Moreover, “judicially mandating the predominance” of these factors would “eviscerate[ ] the trial court’s discretion” under Romero.

2026(See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 , 861 (Mendoza) [trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to strike conviction committed 30 years earlier when the defendant was 19 years old].) Appellant relies on People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 , in which the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s Romero motion.

2025In granting the Romero motion, the trial court cited “remoteness.” However, as we have seen, remoteness, by itself, cannot be the basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction. (§ 667(c)(3); People v. Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 342 .) It is true that a remote conviction may be dismissed if it is followed by a long crime-free period evidencing rehabilitation.

2024In granting the Romero motion, the trial court cited “remoteness.” However, as we have seen, remoteness, by itself, cannot be the basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction. (§ 667(c)(3); People v. Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 342 .) It is true that a remote conviction may be dismissed if it is followed by a long crime-free period evidencing rehabilitation.

2026(In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [“While a 15 court must explain its reasons for striking a prior [citations], no similar requirement applies when a court declines to strike a prior”]; accord, Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) Where, as here, the record is silent, “ ‘[e]rror may not be presumed.’ ” (People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073 , 1097.) Rather, “ ‘a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.; accord, Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Where the record is silent” in a case involving a Romero motion, the court

2025(See In re Large, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 551 , see also People v Myers (1999) 9. 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“The court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.”].) Cervantes has failed to meet his heavy burden of showing the trial court’s denial of his Romero motion was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377) and we reject his claim to the contrary.

2026There was no “crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 .) Unfortunately, until recently, Norwood “has led a continuous life of crime after the prior” (ibid.) which supports the trial court’s decision to deny his Romero motion.

2025(See People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 .) This is because the remote nature of a strike may be justification for granting a Romero motion if the crime was followed by “a crime-free cleansing period 7 of rehabilitation after a defendant has had the opportunity to reflect upon the error of his or her ways.” (Ibid.) Here, the record of Burns’s convictions shows that he committed felonies while in prison, while on parole, and again while he was jail.

2026(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490 , 498-499, 501-502.) “[T]he presence of mitigating evidence is not enough to render the trial court’s decision an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160 , 1170.) We review an order on a Romero motion for an abuse of discretion.

2025(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 503 .) 8 The standard for ruling on a Romero motion, and for our review, is “whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [a defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).) Our review is un

2026(In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [“While a 15 court must explain its reasons for striking a prior [citations], no similar requirement applies when a court declines to strike a prior”]; accord, Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) Where, as here, the record is silent, “ ‘[e]rror may not be presumed.’ ” (People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073 , 1097.) Rather, “ ‘a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.; accord, Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Where the record is silent” in a case involving a Romero motion, the court

2026(See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 , 857 [no abuse of discretion in denying Romero motion where trial court found the circumstances of the current offense were “ ‘reprehensible’ ” and the court “gave primary weight to Defendant’s extensive criminal history,” which reflected “a career criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a few years at a time”]; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608 , 640 (Brugman) [“Due to his continuous history of criminal conduct, [defendant] ‘appears to be “an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Stri

2026(See People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102 , 1113 [no abuse of discretion denying Romero motion despite defendant’s age and poor health where “the trial court considered the probation report, records presented by the defense, including [defendant’s] health records, and evidence presented at trial” and “noted [defendant’s] ‘lengthy’ and ‘fairly consistent’ criminal history and found he fell squarely within the three strikes law”]; People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906 [same, where “[d]efendant has manifested a persistent inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of

2026(See People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 906-907 (Philpot) [“extensive,” “serious,” and “continuous” 20-year criminal history and parole violations among relevant considerations supporting denial of Romero motion].) Regarding the October 13, 1994 home invasion that led to defendant’s present incarceration, the court described it as “about the most serious robbery one could have without actually shooting [a] person.” Defendant (along with Wilson) dressed as a utility worker, which persuaded M.O. (a 15-year-old minor) to answer the door.

2026As an initial matter, the trial court noted that, under People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 (Burke), the mitigating factors in section 1385, subdivision (c), do not apply to a Romero motion because the Three Strikes law does not concern enhancements.

2026(People v. Burke, supra, at p. 244.) The record shows the trial court considered the factors it was required to when it denied defendant’s Romero motion: the age of defendant’s prior strike, the nature and circumstances of the current offense, and defendant’s background, character, and prospects for rehabilitation.

2026(Id. at p. 1031.) The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Romero motion because the “defendant’s criminal behavior here resulted from a late- night, spontaneous altercation between an intoxicated and mentally ill homeless person and a group of youths,” the altercation was not “similar to [the] defendant’s prior strikes which . . . were characterized by either substantial violence or the deliberate entry into homes to steal,” and the defendant had a “‘history of homelessness, mental health issues, and alcoholism [which] most likely contributed to his a

2026(See People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 993 [“[T]he trial court considered a wide range of appropriate factors in [denying defendant’s Romero motion], particularly the nature and circumstances of appellant’s present and past convictions.”].) The trial court correctly noted that the amount of defendant’s prior strikes was “extreme and probably rare,” and the offenses were “serious and violent.” And as the trial court rightfully observed, defendant’s “extreme” conduct in committing his current offenses put “lives at risk.” It was thus well within the trial court’s discretion to concl

2024DISCUSSION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendant made his Romero motion pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a), which refers to the trial court’s power to dismiss a criminal action “in furtherance of justice.” The Supreme Court has held that this statute also provides “the lesser power to strike factual allegations relevant to sentencing, such as the allegation that a defendant has prior felony convictions.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504 .) 3 “It is well established that a defendant may appeal from the denial of relief under section 1385 on the ground that the trial court failed to properl

2023Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), grants trial courts discretionary authority to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 158 .) In Williams, the Supreme Court articulated the appropriate standard for ruling on a Romero motion: “[T]he court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the part

2026(See People v. 12 Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 .) Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in denying defendant’s Romero motion.

2026(People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978 .) The record indicates the court considered all the information presented to it relevant to its decision whether to strike Bustamante’s priors.8 7 We reject Bustamante’s claim that People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644-645 , overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069 , footnote 13, stands for the proposition that if a court breaks its silence by listing any reason for denying a Romero motion, it must then list each and every factor both pro and con that it considered.

2026(See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428 [“the Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of a harsher sentence and requires the court to explicitly articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a harsher sentence by granting the Romero motion”].) The parties agree, as do we, that the proper remedy is to remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing consistent with the “Three Strikes” law.

2026Thus, the Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of a harsher sentence and requires the court to explicitly articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a harsher sentence by granting the Romero motion.” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428 .) When determining whether to dismiss a strike, a court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the schem

2026(Id. at pp. 1002-1003.) In reversing and remanding the case for a new Romero hearing, the Court of Appeal concluded that “none of the facts . . .support the inference that [the defendant] failed to update his registration in order to obfuscate his residence or escape the reach of law enforcement.” (Cluff, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003 .) The court went so far as to say that “the trial court’s analysis became disconnected from 9 the evidence and entered the realm of imagination, speculation, supposition, and guesswork.” (Id. at p. 1002.) Cluff is inapplicable to the case at hand.

2026Defendant cites People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991 (Cluff) to support his contention that the court abused its discretion in denying the Romero motion.

2025As to the law, “although a trial court is required to state on the record its reasons for striking a prior conviction [citation], there is no similar statutory requirement of an on-the-record statement of reasons when a court declines to strike a prior.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560 .) In any event, moreover, the court expressly ruled on defendant’s Romero motion, stating directly that it struck the strike as to the assault count, but “not” for kidnapping for robbery.

2015(In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 546, fn. 6 ; see also In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560 .) As our high court has explained: “The absence of such a requirement [that the court set forth its reasons for refusing to dismiss a strike] merely reflects the legislative presumption that a court acts properly whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the three strikes law.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376 (Carmony).) The granting of a Romero motion is “subject to review for abuse of discretion.

2026“We presume the trial court has considered all relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary,” and that it “correctly applied the law.” (People v. Edwards (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 523 , 529.) McDoughtery does not argue that the trial court abused discretion by denying his Romero motion.

2025(See People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087 , 1099 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s Romero motion where the court “assessed the claimed mitigating factors and, finding one such factor, acknowledged its great weight but determined that other factors were collectively weightier”]; People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 , 861 [in ruling on a Romero motion, “trial judges [have] substantial leeway in determining the most significant facts in each case”]; see also People v. Edwards, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 529 [“Only in an extraordinary case—where the

2025(See People v. Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 206, 218 ; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [under full resentencing rule, trial court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of a defendant’s sentence during a resentencing and not just the portion reversed or vacated on appeal].)4 4 We conclude defendant’s Romero argument is moot as he will be permitted to file another Romero motion on remand.

2024(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances’”]; People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681 .) The record shows that 23 during resentencing, the trial court was unaware it had discretion to reconsider defendant’s Romero motion and therefore denied defendant’s request to do so.

2025Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the prior strike conviction and remand to afford the trial court the discretion to decide the merits of defendant’s Romero motion, “this time based on a correct understanding of the law.” (Dain II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 253.) 2 Previously at People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399 . 3 The Supreme Court’s grant of review in Dain II was “limited to the following question: ‘Did the Court of Appeal err in remanding the case with directions to reinstate the strike finding and to resentence defendant as a person who has suffered a prior strike convicti

2025(See People v. Dowdy 4 In his appellate briefing, defendant cites our prior opinion, People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399 , 411 (in which we held that section 1385(c) does not apply to a trial court’s decision whether to grant a Romero motion to dismiss a strike conviction), and he argues it was incorrectly decided.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [that defendant had “done little to address his substance abuse problems” supported denying Romero motion]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 [defendant’s failure to obtain “treatment for his mental health and substance abuse problems that he claims led to the crimes” weighed against striking prior offense]; People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511 [drug addiction not necessarily a mitigating factor when defendant has a long-term problem and seems unwilling to pursue treatment].) Finally, the trial court ackno

2023Lin’s prior strike was not remote (Cf. People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124 [30-year-old strike]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 [strike 25 years old by start of trial]; People v. Eribarne (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [29-year-old strike]; Lin performed poorly on probation (see In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 552 [affirming denial of Romero motion based on appellant’s poor parole and probation record]; see also People v. Finney, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p 1040 [affirming denial based partly on defendant’s “failed attempts on probation and parole”]; Peopl

2023(People v. Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453 , 463 [“ ‘[T]he appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” citing to People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 ; see also People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787 , 814 [“When a court is unaware of its discretion, the remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had been aware of its

2022(People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 .) Defendant seeks remand for reconsideration of his Romero request, arguing that “[o]n this record it cannot be said with confidence that the resentencing judge would have declined to strike one of the strike priors” and that “[t]he change in circumstances between the 2016 sentencing hearing and the 2021 resentencing warrant a reconsideration of the Romero motion.” But the trial court clearly indicated when it resentenced defendant on remand that it would not have stricken defendant’s pr

2026(See People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 (Rogers).) In particular, Rogers explained that “[b]ecause a trial court’s power under section 1385(a) to dismiss or strike a strike prior is independent of either the Three Strikes law or the subsequent 4 Reform Act, any exercise of that power at a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.75 does not offend either.” (Id. at p. 362.) Concurring with defendant that consideration of defendant’s Romero motion is appropriate, the People emphasize well-established law that “[t]he full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing

2026(See People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 (Rogers).) In particular, Rogers explained that “[b]ecause a trial court’s power under section 1385(a) to dismiss or strike a strike prior is independent of either the Three Strikes law or the subsequent 4 Reform Act, any exercise of that power at a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.75 does not offend either.” (Id. at p. 362.) Concurring with defendant that consideration of defendant’s Romero motion is appropriate, the People emphasize well-established law that “[t]he full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing

2025(People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 (Lee).) Regarding defendant’s first argument that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by determining his prior strikes were committed on separate occasions, defendant points to no authority requiring a trial court to rely only on facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt when considering a defendant’s Romero motion.

2025(People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 .) A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) “[T]he presence of mitigating evidence is not enough to render the trial court’s decision an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160 , 1170.) Where “ ‘the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling

2026(Cf. Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1099, quoting Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 642 [“when a defendant’s ‘two strikes [are] based on the same act . . . no reasonable person would disagree that [the] defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law’—specifically, its provisions prescribing indeterminate life sentences for persons with two prior strikes.”].) Other than his contention under Shaw, Leon makes no other argument that the trial court abused its discretion at the time of his sentencing by denying his Romero motion.

2026(Cf. Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1099, quoting Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 642 [“when a defendant’s ‘two strikes [are] based on the same act . . . no reasonable person would disagree that [the] defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law’—specifically, its provisions prescribing indeterminate life sentences for persons with two prior strikes.”].) Other than his contention under Shaw, Leon makes no other argument that the trial court abused its discretion at the time of his sentencing by denying his Romero motion.

2026(Bernal, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170; see People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 , 1141 [“remoteness of prior strikes alone is not sufficient to take a defendant out of the spirit of the Three Strikes law”]; cf. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [trial court abused discretion in granting Romero motion, despite defendant’s youth at time of prior strikes, because defendant persisted in criminal activity].) Moreover, “judicially mandating the predominance” of these factors would “eviscerate[ ] the trial court’s discretion” under Romero.

2026(People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160 , 1170 [presence of mitigating evidence is not enough to render trial court’s denial of Romero motion an abuse of discretion].) On the totality of the evidence before it, the trial court reasonably determined Celaya did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. “[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court. [Citations.] The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes

2026(See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 , 857 [no abuse of discretion in denying Romero motion where trial court found the circumstances of the current offense were “ ‘reprehensible’ ” and the court “gave primary weight to Defendant’s extensive criminal history,” which reflected “a career criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a few years at a time”]; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608 , 640 (Brugman) [“Due to his continuous history of criminal conduct, [defendant] ‘appears to be “an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Stri

2026(See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 , 861 (Mendoza) [trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to strike conviction committed 30 years earlier when the defendant was 19 years old].) Appellant relies on People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 , in which the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s Romero motion.