Romero motion in California

2026(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 .) The party attacking the sentence must clearly show that 2 This court previously affirmed the denial of Norwood’s initial Romero motion. 7 the decision was irrational or arbitrary.

2026(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and circumstances of the prior strike conviction; and (3) the defendant’s “background, character, and prospects.” (Ibid.) The Three Strikes law establishes that not dismissing a prior strike conviction is the “norm,” and there is a “strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 .) A trial court’s decision to not strike a prior strike is review

2026(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and circumstances of the prior strike conviction; and (3) the defendant’s “background, character, and prospects.” (Ibid.) The Three Strikes law establishes that not dismissing a prior strike conviction is the “norm,” and there is a “strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 .) A trial court’s decision to not strike a prior strike is review

2026On the date set for sentencing, the court asked Barron’s counsel, “You are making an oral motion under People versus Romero to strike one or more of those strike convictions; is that correct?” Counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” Counsel argued, “The base terms of the charges for which Mr. Barron was convicted carry life and are high enough to protect the public and to satisfy the victim’s family that Mr. Barron is paying a serious price for the loss of their loved one’s life.” Counsel asked the court to “exercise [its] discretion under Penal Code 1385,” and to strike Barron’s strikes and “sent

2026The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Consider Limon’s Post-conviction Conduct At the resentencing hearing, Limon made a Romero motion (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 ) requesting that the court disregard his prior strike conviction for purposes of sentencing.

2026He also requests this court independently review the sealed transcript of an in-camera hearing and related materials to determine whether any discoverable material was improperly withheld from the defense. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). 2 For the reasons below, the court did not err by denying defendant’s Romero motion and declining to strike his prior strike conviction.

2026(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“the fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on the violence and potential violence of appellant’s crimes does not mean that it considered only that factor”].) Accordingly, “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all of the relevant factors and properly applied 3 We use Osuna’s age at the time of the prior convictions, as do the parties, because the record does not reflect his age at the time he committed the offenses. 18 the law.” (Brugman, at p. 638; accord, Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.

2025Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an 10 impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) That is the case here: the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant partial relief on his Romero motion.

2023On this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude Fonseca “ ‘failed or refused to learn his lesson’ ” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 ), and his recidivism placed him well within the spirit of the Three Strikes law (Gaston, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 320 ; id. at p. 322 [“[T]he record is barren of any attempts by [defendant] to ‘root out’ such destructive drug dependency.”]; see, e.g., People v. Barrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 541 , 5 552–553 [affirming a denial of a Romero motion because the trial court properly considered the “appellant’s lengthy history of substance abuse” and

2022(Gaston, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 .) The trial court’s discussion of proper considerations, along with the presumption that denial of a Romero motion is a proper exercise of discretion (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 ), convince us that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was not an abuse of discretion.

2025In granting the Romero motion, the trial court cited “remoteness.” However, as we have seen, remoteness, by itself, cannot be the basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction. (§ 667(c)(3); People v. Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 342 .) It is true that a remote conviction may be dismissed if it is followed by a long crime-free period evidencing rehabilitation.

2024In granting the Romero motion, the trial court cited “remoteness.” However, as we have seen, remoteness, by itself, cannot be the basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction. (§ 667(c)(3); People v. Strong, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 342 .) It is true that a remote conviction may be dismissed if it is followed by a long crime-free period evidencing rehabilitation.

2025(See Large, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 547, 553 [the trial court, even if “review[ing] the same information that had been available” at one Romero hearing, can take “a very different view” of the defendant at another hearing and reach the opposite conclusion, subject to review for abuse of discretion].) As we have noted in another context, “it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done” had it properly understood the scope of its discretion.

2025Although the trial court here did not explicitly consider Rodriguez’s age, “ ‘[e]rror may not be presumed from a silent record. [Citation.] “ ‘[A] trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073 , 1097; accord, Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Where the record is silent” in a case involving a Romero motion, the court is presumed to have correctly applied the law]; see In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [“While a court must explain its reasons for striking a prior [citations], no similar requirement ap

2026There was no “crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 .) Unfortunately, until recently, Norwood “has led a continuous life of crime after the prior” (ibid.) which supports the trial court’s decision to deny his Romero motion.

2025There was no “crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 .) Cruz “has led a continuous life of crime after the prior” (ibid.) which supports the trial court’s decision to deny his Romero motion.

2025(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 503 .) 8 The standard for ruling on a Romero motion, and for our review, is “whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [a defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).) Our review is un

2024(Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 503 .) 7 In view of the presumption against striking prior strike convictions, the defendant’s present and prior criminal convictions, as well as his background, character, and prospects, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion.

2022(See People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 344 [reversing an order granting a Romero motion based on the nonviolent nature of the current offense because “the nonviolent or nonthreatening nature of the felony cannot alone take the crime outside the spirit of the law”]; see also People v. Poslof (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 92, 108 [even though the current crime, failing to register as a sex offender, was nonviolent, denial of the Romero motion was not an abuse of discretion]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 321 [although the current crime of car theft was “not as serious as many fe

2022(People v. Poslof (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 92, 108 [defendant’s prior criminal behavior combined with “background, character, and 11. prospects” did not show he was outside the “spirit” of Three Strikes law and so trial court properly denied the defendant’s Romero motion].) III.

2026(See People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 906–907 (Philpot) [“extensive,” “serious,” and “continuous” 20-year criminal history and parole violations among relevant considerations supporting denial of Romero motion].) Regarding the October 13, 1994 home invasion that led to defendant’s present incarceration, the court described it as “about the most serious robbery one could have without actually shooting [a] person.” Defendant (along with Wilson) dressed as a utility worker, which persuaded M.O. (a 15-year-old minor) to answer the door.

2026Indeed, there is nothing.”]; Philpot, supra, at p. 907 [“seriousness of the present . . . offenses” among relevant considerations supporting denial of Romero motion].) The court acknowledged the October 13, 1994 home invasion occurred “a long time ago.” However, an analysis of the remoteness of criminal conduct “should consider 17. whether the defendant ‘was incarcerated a substantial part of the intervening time and thus had little or no opportunity to commit’ additional crimes.” (People v. Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374 , 390.) Such was the case here.

2024DISCUSSION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendant made his Romero motion pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a), which refers to the trial court’s power to dismiss a criminal action “in furtherance of justice.” The Supreme Court has held that this statute also provides “the lesser power to strike factual allegations relevant to sentencing, such as the allegation that a defendant has prior felony convictions.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504 .) 3 “It is well established that a defendant may appeal from the denial of relief under section 1385 on the ground that the trial court failed to properl

2023Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), grants trial courts discretionary authority to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 158 .) In Williams, the Supreme Court articulated the appropriate standard for ruling on a Romero motion: “[T]he court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the part

2026(See People v. 12 Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 .) Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in denying defendant’s Romero motion.

2026(People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978 .) The record indicates the court considered all the information presented to it relevant to its decision whether to strike Bustamante’s priors.8 7 We reject Bustamante’s claim that People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644-645 , overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069 , footnote 13, stands for the proposition that if a court breaks its silence by listing any reason for denying a Romero motion, it must then list each and every factor both pro and con that it considered.

2024(People v. Thomas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 211−212 [the trial court may consider the Cal. Rules of Court in determining whether to dismiss an action under § 1385]; People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004 [the trial court should consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances from the Cal. Rules of Court in exercising its discretion on a Romero motion].) The court rationally concluded defendant’s history of resorting to violence to resolve minor disputes posed an unacceptable danger to the public.

2023Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), grants trial courts discretionary authority to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 158 .) In Williams, the Supreme Court articulated the appropriate standard for ruling on a Romero motion: “[T]he court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the part

2025As to the law, “although a trial court is required to state on the record its reasons for striking a prior conviction [citation], there is no similar statutory requirement of an on-the-record statement of reasons when a court declines to strike a prior.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560 .) In any event, moreover, the court expressly ruled on defendant’s Romero motion, stating directly that it struck the strike as to the assault count, but “not” for kidnapping for robbery.

2015(In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 546, fn. 6 ; see also In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560 .) As our high court has explained: “The absence of such a requirement [that the court set forth its reasons for refusing to dismiss a strike] merely reflects the legislative presumption that a court acts properly whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the three strikes law.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376 (Carmony).) The granting of a Romero motion is “subject to review for abuse of discretion.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [that defendant had “done little to address his substance abuse problems” supported denying Romero motion]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 [defendant’s failure to obtain “treatment for his mental health and substance abuse problems that he claims led to the crimes” weighed against striking prior offense]; People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511 [drug addiction not necessarily a mitigating factor when defendant has a long-term problem and seems unwilling to pursue treatment].) Finally, the trial court ackno

2015(See People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511 [“drug addiction is not necessarily regarded as a mitigating factor when a criminal defendant has a long-term problem and seems unwilling to pursue treatment,” notwithstanding his having sought treatment after incarceration for the current offenses].) While defendant’s willingness to commit to treatment to address his longstanding drug problem is commendable, neither it nor the prospective opportunity to participate in the VA program were matters that compelled the granting of the Romero motion. c.

2024In our view, the remoteness of the 2011 strike was an 10 insufficient basis to dismiss the strike because Cervantez did not have “a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing dismissal of 20-year-old strike]; People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years old properly imposed].) At the hearing on the Romero motion, Cervantez contended he was first given heroin at the age of 11, witnessed a fatal shooting at 15, and was stabbed in the back at 19.

2024In our view, the remoteness of the 2011 strike was an 10 insufficient basis to dismiss the strike because Cervantez did not have “a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [reversing dismissal of 20-year-old strike]; People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750 [strikes 24, 15, and 10 years old properly imposed].) At the hearing on the Romero motion, Cervantez contended he was first given heroin at the age of 11, witnessed a fatal shooting at 15, and was stabbed in the back at 19.

2026Thus, the Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of a harsher sentence and requires the court to explicitly articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a harsher sentence by granting the Romero motion.” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428 .) When determining whether to dismiss a strike, a court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the schem

2026Under Romero, “a trial court may strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to . . . section 1385(a).” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 7 The rule of lenity, on which defendant relies, applies only to statutes containing “‘a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.’” (United States v. Castleman (2014) 572 U.S. 157 , 172–173.) 8 Cal.4th 148 , 158 (Williams).) “[T]he Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of a harsher

2025(See People v. Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 206, 218 ; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [under full resentencing rule, trial court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of a defendant’s sentence during a resentencing and not just the portion reversed or vacated on appeal].)4 4 We conclude defendant’s Romero argument is moot as he will be permitted to file another Romero motion on remand.

2024In May 2022, defendant filed a document entitled “Petition For Resentencing Pursuant To Proposition 47 and People v. Buycks [(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 ].” (Some capitalization omitted.) Relying on Buycks and language in this court’s Payne IV opinion, defendant sought reconsideration of his previously denied Romero motion.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [that defendant had “done little to address his substance abuse problems” supported denying Romero motion]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 [defendant’s failure to obtain “treatment for his mental health and substance abuse problems that he claims led to the crimes” weighed against striking prior offense]; People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511 [drug addiction not necessarily a mitigating factor when defendant has a long-term problem and seems unwilling to pursue treatment].) Finally, the trial court ackno

2023Lin’s prior strike was not remote (Cf. People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124 [30-year-old strike]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 [strike 25 years old by start of trial]; People v. Eribarne (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [29-year-old strike]; Lin performed poorly on probation (see In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 552 [affirming denial of Romero motion based on appellant’s poor parole and probation record]; see also People v. Finney, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p 1040 [affirming denial based partly on defendant’s “failed attempts on probation and parole”]; Peopl

2023(People v. Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453 , 463 [“ ‘[T]he appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” citing to People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 ; see also People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787 , 814 [“When a court is unaware of its discretion, the remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had been aware of its

2022(People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 .) Defendant seeks remand for reconsideration of his Romero request, arguing that “[o]n this record it cannot be said with confidence that the resentencing judge would have declined to strike one of the strike priors” and that “[t]he change in circumstances between the 2016 sentencing hearing and the 2021 resentencing warrant a reconsideration of the Romero motion.” But the trial court clearly indicated when it resentenced defendant on remand that it would not have stricken defendant’s pr

2023Lin’s prior strike was not remote (Cf. People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124 [30-year-old strike]; People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 837 [strike 25 years old by start of trial]; People v. Eribarne (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [29-year-old strike]; Lin performed poorly on probation (see In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 552 [affirming denial of Romero motion based on appellant’s poor parole and probation record]; see also People v. Finney, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p 1040 [affirming denial based partly on defendant’s “failed attempts on probation and parole”]; Peopl

2022Instead, preponderant weight must be accorded to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such as the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects.’” The trial court also cited People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108 (Solis), which involved, among other issues, the denial of an appellant’s “Romero motion to dismiss two of his three prior strike convictions.” (Id. at p. 1124, referencing People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 .) While commenting on So

2025(People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 (Lee).) Regarding defendant’s first argument that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by determining his prior strikes were committed on separate occasions, defendant points to no authority requiring a trial court to rely only on facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt when considering a defendant’s Romero motion.

2025(People v. Lee, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [the court has no “sua sponte investigational duty to ferret out facts 12 potentially supporting the defendant’s” Romero motion, and “the burden instead is on the defendant to provide the facts”].) On this record, the court could reasonably conclude that Velez had not addressed the longstanding substance abuse that motivated his criminal conduct, and his substance abuse therefore had little mitigating value for purposes of the Romero motion.

2026(Cf. Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1099, quoting Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 642 [“when a defendant’s ‘two strikes [are] based on the same act . . . no reasonable person would disagree that [the] defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law’—specifically, its provisions prescribing indeterminate life sentences for persons with two prior strikes.”].) Other than his contention under Shaw, Leon makes no other argument that the trial court abused its discretion at the time of his sentencing by denying his Romero motion.

2026(Cf. Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1099, quoting Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 642 [“when a defendant’s ‘two strikes [are] based on the same act . . . no reasonable person would disagree that [the] defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law’—specifically, its provisions prescribing indeterminate life sentences for persons with two prior strikes.”].) Other than his contention under Shaw, Leon makes no other argument that the trial court abused its discretion at the time of his sentencing by denying his Romero motion.

2023The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first day of the person’s 25th year of incarceration.”].) 13 The cases cited are as follows: People v. Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 960 ; People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 ; People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 582 ; People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026 , 1032–1033. 18. denied the Romero motion “irrespective of the ultimate sentence that one might receive given the Court’s ultimate ruling,” which as noted above was improper. ( Garcia, supra,

2020Sixth, citing Romero, People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 (Williams),5 and People v. Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 960 , defendant asks, “[W]here risk of danger is measured . . . what are the chances of me re-offending or posing an undue danger to society as I would be a senior up in years if I were to [serve] 12-13 more [years] in prison[?]” We understand defendant to contend that the trial court erred when it denied his Romero motion to strike his prior strike convictions. 5 Defendant’s letter brief cites only “People v. Williams.” We assume he is referencing Williams, supra, 17 Ca

2024(See People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930 , 944–945.) The People argue the trial court did not misinterpret the plea agreement, and they appear to suggest that the record instead reflects an understanding between the parties and the court that the court would 8 consider granting a Romero motion if Norton “t[ook] rehabilitating seriously.” While that may have been the case, the record is at least ambiguous as to whether the court believed it was required to sentence Norton to 32 months in prison if he was excluded from Veteran’s Court, especially considering the court’s stated reason for den

2021“Romero establishes that where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to impose sentence with full awareness of its discretion as clarified in Romero. [Citation.] Romero also clearly holds that remand is not required where the trial court’s comments indicate that even if it had authority to strike a prior felony conviction allegation, it would decline to do so.” (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 .) If a trial court relies on both permissible and impermissible facto

2025Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 , setting forth a statement of the case and one 3 potential arguable issue: whether the court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion and/or motion to strike the prior serious felony enhancement.

2024(Ibid.) Upon remand, the trial court denied defendant’s renewed Romero motion and imposed a new aggregate term of 109 years 8 months (reduced by two years for the stricken prior prison term enhancements) with credit for 2,875 days.3 Defendant filed the instant appeal, and his counsel filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record. ( Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 .) As our Supreme Court recently explained, Wende held that “Courts of Appeal must conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal wh

2026(See People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 993 [“[T]he trial court considered a wide range of appropriate factors in [denying defendant’s Romero motion], particularly the nature and circumstances of appellant’s present and past convictions.”].) The trial court correctly noted that the amount of defendant’s prior strikes was “extreme and probably rare,” and the offenses were “serious and violent.” And as the trial court rightfully observed, defendant’s “extreme” conduct in committing his current offenses put “lives at risk.” It was thus well within the trial court’s discretion to concl

2025But, when reviewing the trial court’s denial of a Romero motion, we must “view the totality of the trial court’s statement of reasons, not just one snippet.” (People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 993 .) “Isolated or ambiguous remarks by the trial court” will not overcome the presumption that a sentence is based on legitimate considerations.

2023(See People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 , 1140, 1143 [Romero motion improperly denied where defendant committed no serious crimes since remote strikes]; People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245 [pre-Carmony, affirming dismissal of strikes where current offense was minor].) In short, no abuse of discretion appears.

2022The issue in Bishop was whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a Romero motion by dismissing two of three prior strike convictions (all of which were 17 to 20 years old) before sentencing the defendant as a second strike offender for petty theft. ( Bishop, supra, at pp. 1247-1248 .) The issue here, in contrast, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a Romero motion, and the current felony offense was much more serious than petty theft. 19 facilities assessment (Gov.