statutory or regulatory violation in New York

2019"Rather, the substantial case law that has developed on the subject holds that a plaintiff need only establish a practical or reasonable connection' between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury" ( id. ; see Mullen v Zoebe, Inc. , 86 NY2d 135, 140 ; Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp.

2017To satisfy the requirement of direct or indirect causation, “a plaintiff need only establish a ‘practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury” (Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 81 [2003]).

2019"Rather, the substantial case law that has developed on the subject holds that a plaintiff need only establish a practical or reasonable connection' between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury" ( id. ; see Mullen v Zoebe, Inc. , 86 NY2d 135, 140 ; Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp.

2010The arguments against basing section 205-a recovery on a section 27-127 violation ignore the legislative intent of broad protection of firefighters and also our statement in Giuffrida that "a plaintiff need only establish a `practical or reasonable connection' between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury" ( Giuffrida, 100 NY2d at 81 , quoting Mullen v Zoebe, Inc., 86 NY2d 135, 140 [1995]).

2017Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that there was no connection between the statutory violation at issue and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Menard v Highbridge House, Inc., 82 AD3d 532 [2011]; Kenavan v City of New York, 267 AD2d 353 [1999]).

2011Downey v Beatrice Epstein Family Partnership, L.P., 48 AD3d 616 [2008], Iv denied 11 NY3d 702 [2008]; Zvinys, 25 AD3d at 359 ; Kenavan v City of New York, 267 AD2d 353 , 356 [1999], Iv denied 95 NY2d 756 [2000]).

2010“Proving that the defendant’s violation was an ‘indirect cause’ does not require the same amount of proof as proximate cause in common-law negligence, but requires a practical or reasonable connection between the statutory or regulatory violation and the injury” (Aldrich v Sampier, 2 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2003]; see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d at 81 ; Williams v City of New York, 256 AD2d 332 [1998]).

2009“Proving that the defendant’s violation was an ‘indirect cause’ does not require the same amount of proof as proximate cause in common-law negligence, but requires a practical or reasonable connection between the statutory or regulatory violation and the injury” (Aldrich v Sampier, 2 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2003]; see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d at 81 ; Williams v City of New York, 256 AD2d 332 [1998]).

2014The plaintiff need only establish a “practical or reasonable connection between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury” (id. at 81 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clarke v Drayton, 83 AD3d at 762 ; Alcalde v Riley, 73 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2010]).

2014The plaintiff need only establish a “practical or reasonable connection between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury” (id. at 81 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Clarke v Drayton, 83 AD3d at 762 ; Alcalde v Riley, 73 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2010]).

2012It is, in any event, claimant’s burden to demonstrate how defendant ran afoul of governing regulations (see Geer v State of New York, Ct Cl, Mar. 9, 2000, McNamara, J., claim No. 100902, UID No. 2000-011-502 [claimant failed to rebut the presumption of absolute immunity]; Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765, 766 [3d Dept 2001] [affirming dismissal of wrongful confinement claim where “there is insufficient evidence in this record” to show a statutory or regulatory violation]).

2009Whereas ‘direct causation’ requires that the defendant’s conduct be a substantial causative factor (see Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507, 520 [1980]), an ‘indirect cause’ is simply a factor that — though not a primary cause — plays a part in producing the result. . . . “[T]he substantial case law that has developed on the subject holds that a plaintiff need only establish a ‘practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury (see Mullen v Zoebe, Inc., 86 NY2d 135, 140 [1995]; Zanghi, 85 NY2d at 441).” (Giuffrida at 80-81 .) There

2008To satisfy the “indirect” standard, a plaintiff need only establish a “reasonable or practical connection” between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury (Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d at 75 ; see Doherty v Sparacio, 35 AD3d 530 [2006]).

2008Here, in support of their respective motions for summary judgment, the defendants each demonstrated, prima facie, that Downey’s injuries were not proximately caused by their breach of the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and were not directly or indirectly caused by the alleged statutory and code violations (see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 75 [2003]; Doherty v Sparacio, 35 AD3d 530 [2006]; Zvinys v Richfield Inv.

2006Nor would a hot water temperature setting of 140 degrees violate defendant’s common-law standard of care, which requires the maintenance of reasonably safe conditions in the building (see Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]).

2003The plaintiffs concede that the New York City Police Department Administrative Guide and the Police Department Patrol Guide cannot serve as predicates for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e (see Galapo v City of New York, supra; see also Desmond v City of New York, 88 NY2d 455 [1996]), and therefore, the verdict cannot be sustained based upon the City’s alleged failure to comply with those requirements.

1993At most, due process requires a limited opportunity to respond to the charge within a reasonable time (Hewitt v Helms, 459 US 460, 466, 469 ) and five days is reasonable (see, supra, at 477).