statutory or regulatory standard in District of Columbia

2019First, Ms. Civic relies on the following language from our decision in Ceco Corp. v. Coleman, 441 A.2d 940, 946 (D.C. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted): The general rule in this jurisdiction is that “where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiff’s position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish [the plaintiff’s] relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.

2001The general rule in this jurisdiction is that “where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiffs position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.” Ceco Corp. v. Coleman, 441 A.2d 940, 945 (D.C.1982) (quoting Richardson v. Gregory, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 266 , 281 F.2d 626, 629 (1960)).

2001The general rule in this jurisdiction is that “where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiffs position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.” Ceco Corp. v. Coleman, 441 A.2d 940, 945 (D.C.1982) (quoting Richardson v. Gregory, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 266 , 281 F.2d 626, 629 (1960)).

2001The general rule in this jurisdiction is that “where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiffs position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.” Ceco Corp. v. Coleman, 441 A.2d 940, 945 (D.C.1982) (quoting Richardson v. Gregory, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 266 , 281 F.2d 626, 629 (1960)).

2005“The general rule in this jurisdiction is that where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiffs position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.” Chadbourne v. Kappaz, 779 A.2d 293, 295 (D.C.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1273 (D.C.1987) (“The rule that violation of an ordinance intended to pr

2001See also Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268 (D.C.1987).

2006It is true that “where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiffs position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute [or regulation], unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.” Chadbourne v. Kappaz, 779 A.2d 293, 295 (D.C.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2005“The general rule in this jurisdiction is that where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiffs position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law.” Chadbourne v. Kappaz, 779 A.2d 293, 295 (D.C.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1273 (D.C.1987) (“The rule that violation of an ordinance intended to pr

1982See Hecht Co. v. McLaughlin, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 385-86 , 214 F.2d 212, 215-16 (1954).

1982See Hecht Co. v. McLaughlin, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 385-86 , 214 F.2d 212, 215-16 (1954).

1978Judge Youngdahl accordingly chose to apply what he called “the majority rule”: [A] proper charge to the jury . should clearly state that a violation of a traffic regulation is only one factor to be considered in determining whether minor plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence and that the jury should consider whether minor plaintiff exercised reasonable care in light of his age, education, training, and experience. [Herrell v. Pimsler, supra at 1171 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).] 3 We agree with Judge Youngdahl’s formulation; it reflects the only feasible way to evaluate negligen