chancellor error in Mississippi

2014“However, where *242 the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error.” Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 283 (Miss.2004) (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (Miss.2001)).

2014“However, where the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error.” Id. (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (¶ 11) (Miss.2001)).

2014“However, where the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error.” Id. (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (¶ 11) (Miss.2001)).

2012“However, where the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error.” Id. (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (¶ 11) (Miss.2001)).

2004"However, where the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error." Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (Miss.2001) (citing Stroud, 689 So.2d at 757 (citing Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394, 397 (Miss.1993))). ¶ 5.

2002"However, where the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error." Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (Miss. 2001) (citing Stroud, 689 So.2d at 757 (citing Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394, 397 (Miss. 1993))). ¶5.

2007In arriving at a custody arrangement that is in the child's best interest, the chancellor must apply the factors from Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983).

2007In arriving at a custody arrangement that is in the child's best interest, the chancellor should apply the factors from Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983).

2023Ct. App. 2010); see also Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1121 (¶28) (Miss.

2018Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a chancellor was not in error for valuing marital assets solely from the parties' 8.05 financial statements, because the parties failed to provide the necessary evidence, and further holding that the former husband could not "now complain that the chancellor's valuations [were] unfair when no reliable evidence of the value of the property was presented at trial"); Dunaway , 749 So.2d at 1121 (¶ 28) (holding that, "[f]aced with proof that was far less than ideal, the chancellor made a valuation of the marital estate that finds some support in the record," and refusi

2014“However, where *242 the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error.” Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 283 (Miss.2004) (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (Miss.2001)).

2012Thus, “where the chancellor improperly considers and applies the Albright factors, an appellate court is obliged to find the chancellor in error.” Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 283-84 (Miss.2004) (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 946 (Miss. 2001)). ¶ 31.

2020In doing so, the chancellor applied the factors enumerated in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993), and concluded that Tony should pay Allison periodic alimony of $1,000 per month.

2008Further, the basis for the chancellor's award of alimony in addition to the property settlement was considered by the chancellor in her analysis of the Armstrong factors as one of the factors used to determine whether alimony should be awarded is the "assets of each party." Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993). ¶ 17.

2026As such, the chancellor abused his discretion 8 “[T]his Court on appeal, just as the chancellor in a hearing, is the superior guardian for a person under disability. . . .” Hill, 558 So. 2d at 858 . 10 by failing to adduce information on these important issues and by failing to include information about these issues in the Albright analysis and ultimate custody determination. ¶17.

2000Matter of Adoption of a Minor, 558 So.2d 854, 858 (Miss.1990) (holding that when matters before the chancery court concern the well being of a minor child and turn on his best interest, this Court will not remain silent on said matters not brought before or addressed by the lower court).

2023Accordingly, the subject property at issue in the Writs of Execution was free from any encumbrance resulting from the Writs of Execution at the time the stock transfer occurred, and [West Quality and Coastal] were free to acquire the stock at issue under the transactions of February 1, 2009. 1 After the remand of West I, a judgment was entered in Debbie West’s favor on May 9, 2008, in which the chancellor awarded $570,792 in past-due alimony and simple interest at 7 percent per year and $262,468.53 in attorneys’ fees. 7 Id. (alteration in original).

2017In addition, Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-1-41 (Rev. 2014) provides: In any action in which a court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, the court shall not require the party seeking such fees to put on proof as to the reasonableness of the amount sought, but shall make the award based on the information already before it and the court’s own opinion based on experience and observation; provided however, a party may, in its discretion, place before the court other evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount 17 of the award, and the court may consider such evidence in m

2022After determining what property was marital and then determining the value of the marital estate, the chancellor applied the factors in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994), and held that “Becky shall be entitled to 60 [percent] of the total value of the marital estate at issue . . . and Jason shall be entitled to 40 [percent] of the total value of the marital estate at issue.” In order to effectuate these percentages, the chancellor ordered Jason to pay Becky a lump sum of $24,487.31.

2020Prior to division, the chancellor must apply the factors established by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994). ¶34.

2015Our Court is bound to follow the well-settled law set forth by our supreme court: “[I]n the absence of rebutting the natural-parent presumption via clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral conduct detrimental to the child, and/or unfitness, ‘the court may not consider granting custody to a third party, including one standing in loco parentis.’” Waites, 152 So. 3d at 314 (¶19) (quoting Davis, 126 So. 3d at 37 (¶12)).

2015The chancellor stated at the hearing: “[T]he only way I could give [Daniel] custody would be to find [Sabrina] unfit and to give it to a third-party who is not the natural parent.” Yet he awarded custody of Justice to Daniel, a third party, without making any such findings, a fact that the majority acknowledges. : Our Court is bound to follow the well-settled law set forth by our supreme court: “[I]n the absence of rebutting the natural-parent presumption via clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral , conduct detrimental to the child, and/or unfitness, ‘the court may no

2015Our Court is bound to follow the well-settled law set forth by our supreme court: “[I]n the absence of rebutting the natural-parent presumption via clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral conduct detrimental to the child, and/or unfitness, ‘the court may not consider granting custody to a third party, including one standing in loco parentis.’” Waites, 152 So. 3d at 314 (¶19) (quoting Davis, 126 So. 3d at 37 (¶12)).

2015The chancellor stated at the hearing: “[T]he only way I could give [Daniel] custody would be to find [Sabrina] unfit and to give it to a third-party who is not the natural parent.” Yet he awarded custody of Justice to Daniel, a third party, without making any such findings, a fact that the majority acknowledges. : Our Court is bound to follow the well-settled law set forth by our supreme court: “[I]n the absence of rebutting the natural-parent presumption via clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral , conduct detrimental to the child, and/or unfitness, ‘the court may no

2014See Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994).

2012See Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994).

2013After a hearing, the chancellor applied the factors from Martin v. Coop, 693 So.2d 912, 916 (Miss.1997), and determined it was in the best interest for the Quarta-ros to be awarded visitation with Aeelynn and Ryver.

2011The chancellor applied the factors set forth in Martin v. Coop, 693 So.2d 912, 916 (Miss.1997) to evaluate the impact on the children.

2007In re M.L.W., 755 So.2d 558, 563 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). ¶ 17 Upon review of this case, A.C.W.'s arguments do not convince us that the chancellor was in error in failing to find clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of J.C.W.'s parental rights. ¶ 18 In regards to the abandonment issue, we do not find that J.C.W. had any settled purpose to forgo his duties or his claims to being H.D.W.'s parent.

2007In re M.L.W., 755 So.2d 558, 563(¶22) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). ¶ 17 Upon review of this case, A.C.W.’s arguments do not convince us that the chancellor was in error in failing to find clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of J.C.W.’s parental rights. ¶ 18 In regards to the abandonment issue, we do not find that J.C.W. had any settled purpose to forgo his duties or his claims to being H.D.W.’s parent.

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously and consistently held that "`constant arrearages in child support' *608 do not constitute abandonment or desertion." In Interest of J.D., 512 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.1987) quoting In re Adoption of A Female Child, 412 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Miss.1982); (citing Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984)).

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously and consistently held that “ ‘constant arrearages in child sup port’ do not constitute abandonment or desertion.” In Interest of J.D., 512 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.1987) quoting In re Adoption of A Female Child, 412 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Miss.1982); (citing Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984)).

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously and consistently held that "`constant arrearages in child support' *608 do not constitute abandonment or desertion." In Interest of J.D., 512 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.1987) quoting In re Adoption of A Female Child, 412 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Miss.1982); (citing Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984)).

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously and consistently held that “ ‘constant arrearages in child sup port’ do not constitute abandonment or desertion.” In Interest of J.D., 512 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.1987) quoting In re Adoption of A Female Child, 412 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Miss.1982); (citing Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984)).

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously and consistently held that "`constant arrearages in child support' *608 do not constitute abandonment or desertion." In Interest of J.D., 512 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.1987) quoting In re Adoption of A Female Child, 412 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Miss.1982); (citing Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984)).

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously and consistently held that “ ‘constant arrearages in child sup port’ do not constitute abandonment or desertion.” In Interest of J.D., 512 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.1987) quoting In re Adoption of A Female Child, 412 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Miss.1982); (citing Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984)).

2003See Blue v. Jones, 230 So.2d 569 (Miss.1970) (finding question of who were proper trustees, pastor and deacon of congregational church to be ecclesiastical that must be decided by congregation); Grantham v. Humphries, 185 Miss. 496 , 188 So. 313 (1939) (holding that "church authorities and such tribunals as they may set up for themselves are supreme in such matters.

2002See Blue v. Jones, 230 So. 2d 569 (Miss. 1970) (finding question of who were proper 6 trustees, pastor and deacon of congregational church to be ecclesiastical that must be decided by congregation); Grantham v. Humphries, 185 Miss. 496 , 188 So. 313 (1939) (holding that "church authorities and such tribunals as they may set up for themselves are supreme in such matters.

2001The Court of Appeals held that since she did not introduce fee statements, her testimony which only indirectly indicated her inability to pay her own fees was insufficient to allow the chancellor to apply the factors of McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982). *201 We disagree and hold that there was sufficient evidence for the chancellor to apply the McKee factors.

1999The Court of Appeals held that since she did not introduce fee statements, her testimony which only indirectly indicated her inability to pay her own fees was insufficient to allow the chancellor to apply the factors of McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982).

1998Brown, 465 So.2d at 1048 -49 (citing Walters, 383 So.2d at 829 ). ¶ 6.

1996Brown, 465 So.2d at 1048 -49 (citing Walters, 383 So.2d at 829 ). ¶6.

1983Still this Court affirmed stating Although we hold that the chancellor was in error [in assuming subject matter jurisdiction] Mississippi Constitution, § 147 (1890) prevents reversal solely on the ground of want of jurisdiction. . . . 352 So.2d at 1314 , 360 So.2d at 927 .

1983Still this Court affirmed stating Although we hold that the chancellor was in error [in assuming subject matter jurisdiction] Mississippi Constitution, § 147 (1890) prevents reversal solely on the ground of want of jurisdiction... . 352 So.2d at 1314 , 360 So.2d at 927 .

2025S.E.B. v. R.E.B., 67 So. 3d 14, 16 (¶8) (Miss.

2023“We cannot hold the chancellor in error for not considering an asset [or debt] if its present disposition or even its very existence was not established at trial.” Seghini v. Seghini, 42 So. 3d 635, 641 (¶20) (Miss.