chancellor error in Tennessee

1992In the recent case of Milligan v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 497 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn.App.W.S.1973) the Court of Appeals for the Western Section held that material misrepresentations made in an application for an automobile insurance policy could be relied upon by the insurance carrier.

1974In the recent case of Milligan v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 497 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn.App.W.S.1973) the Court of Appeals for the Western Section held that material misrepresentations made in an application for an automobile insurance policy could be relied upon by the insurance carrier.

1983Tenn.R.App.P. 36(b); Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Association, 58 Tenn. App. 636 , 436 S.W.2d 296 (1968).

1983Tenn.R.App.P. 36(b); Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Association, 58 Tenn. App. 636 , 436 S.W.2d 296 (1968).

2001This motion was denied, resulting in this appeal, wherein the Petitioner contends that the Chancellor was in error in dismissing his suit because he “failed to appear for the trial pursuant to notice.” The seminal case regarding inmate suits is Whisnant v. Byrd, 525 S.W.2d 152 (Tenn. 1975). wherein Justice Henry said the following (at page 153): We, therefore, hold that a prisoner has a constitutional right to institute and prosecute a civil action seeking redress for injury or damage to his person or property, or for the vindication of any other legal right; however, this is a qualified and r

1998According to the court “there was supporting evidence in the depositions entered in the record and a study of the exhibits themselves is sufficient to determine that the chancellor was not in error in admitting the bills ...” Id. at 460 .

1995This court further says in Dingus, supra, citing Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Rollins, 203 Tenn. 565 , 315 S.W.2d 1 , “In the Reynolds case this Court concluded that a court hearing a case for an increased amount of a previous compensation award was not authorized to correct mistakes in conclusions of fact drawn from evidence as to extent of disability which was considered at the original hearing.” However, in the present case we take note of the fact that the Chancellor hearing the Petition to Modify had the benefit of Dr. Barnett’s office notes pertaining to plaintiffs visits in March and April,

1995This court further says in Dingus, supra, citing Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Rollins, 203 Tenn. 565 , 315 S.W.2d 1 , “In the Reynolds case this Court concluded that a court hearing a case for an increased amount of a previous compensation award was not authorized to correct mistakes in conclusions of fact drawn from evidence as to extent of disability which was considered at the original hearing.” However, in the present case we take note of the fact that the Chancellor hearing the Petition to Modify had the benefit of Dr. Barnett’s office notes pertaining to plaintiffs visits in March and April,

1995Cummings & Co., 402 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting Nu-W ay Ice Cream Mach.

1991One of the principal cases upon which this court relied in Taff was, that of Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 498 (Mich.App.1983).

1989To allow a recovery by Winer, against Jahn, for accounting services rendered for the estate would permit him to do indirectly what this court held he could not do in Perlberg, 694 S.W.2d 304 .

1988Id. 65 S.W.2d at 579 .

1988Id. 65 S.W.2d at 579 .

1988Id. at 599 Under the facts in the case at bar and under the law applicable to such cases, we cannot say the chancellor was in error in finding Rite-Aid had the right to lease videotapes under the terms of its lease.

1986We are of the opinion that the doctrine of practical construction applies to this case, as discussed at length by our Supreme Court in Hamblen County v. City of Morristown, 656 S.W.2d 331 (Tenn.1983).

1983Our conclusion in this case, that the chancellor was in error, is controlled in large measure by an opinion of this Court written by now Presiding Judge Nearn, styled Dixie Rents, Inc. v. City of Memphis, et al., 594 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn.App.1979) cert. denied (1980).

1980No aspect of contract of employment is more basic than the right of the employer to expect employees will appear for work on the day and at the hour agreed upon.” On the Commissioner’s appeal in Thach v. Scott, 219 Tenn. 390 , 410 S.W.2d 173 (176) (Tenn.1966), the Court was of the opinion that the Chancellor was in error in reversing the action of the Board of Review and the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harbison, stated: “...

1980No aspect of contract of employment is more basic than the right of the employer to expect employees will appear for work on the day and at the hour agreed upon.” On the Commissioner’s appeal in Thach v. Scott, 219 Tenn. 390 , 410 S.W.2d 173 (176) (Tenn.1966), the Court was of the opinion that the Chancellor was in error in reversing the action of the Board of Review and the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harbison, stated: “...

1977In Bates v. Dennis, 30 Tenn.App. 94 , 203 S.W.2d 928 (1947), it was held: “If there was a valid executory contract between vendor and purchaser, then in the eyes of equity ownership of realty passed to the purchaser even though no deed was executed, and in that event the vendor would hold legal title on a naked trust which would follow it into the hands of the vendor’s heirs on the vendor’s death, under the maxim that equity regards that done which ought to have been done.” The Chancellor sustained the third ground of the motion to dismiss predicated on lack of sufficient ownership by plaintif

1977In Bates v. Dennis, 30 Tenn.App. 94 , 203 S.W.2d 928 (1947), it was held: “If there was a valid executory contract between vendor and purchaser, then in the eyes of equity ownership of realty passed to the purchaser even though no deed was executed, and in that event the vendor would hold legal title on a naked trust which would follow it into the hands of the vendor’s heirs on the vendor’s death, under the maxim that equity regards that done which ought to have been done.” The Chancellor sustained the third ground of the motion to dismiss predicated on lack of sufficient ownership by plaintif

1975Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 , 94 S.Ct. 1536 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974).

1975Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 , 94 S.Ct. 1536 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974).

1973The Plaintiffs insist that, since they produced the machine especially for the Defendant, T.C.A. § 47-1204 is not controlling and they rely on the case of Anderson-Gregory Co. v. Lea, 51 Tenn.App. 612 , 370 S.W.2d 934 , in support of their contention, wherein the court said: “We are satisfied from this and other authorities that by the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act it was intended that this provision of our statute should be given the ‘Massachusetts Rule’ construction, and that contracts which require a party to produce goods especially for the buyer which are not suitable for sale to othe

1973The Plaintiffs insist that, since they produced the machine especially for the Defendant, T.C.A. § 47-1204 is not controlling and they rely on the case of Anderson-Gregory Co. v. Lea, 51 Tenn.App. 612 , 370 S.W.2d 934 , in support of their contention, wherein the court said: “We are satisfied from this and other authorities that by the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act it was intended that this provision of our statute should be given the ‘Massachusetts Rule’ construction, and that contracts which require a party to produce goods especially for the buyer which are not suitable for sale to othe

1973In Greene County Tire Co. v. Spurlin, 207 Tenn. 189 , 338 S.W.2d 597 , it was held: “Generally, speaking a covenant which is incidental to the sale and transfer of a trade or business, and which purports to bind the seller not to engage in the same business in competition with a purchaser is lawful and enforceable, provided such covenants are reasonable and go no further than affording a thorough protection to the buyer.” “The question as to reasonableness of the restrains necessary to secure a buyer of a business fair protection in receiving the benefits for which he made the pur chase is to

1973In Greene County Tire Co. v. Spurlin, 207 Tenn. 189 , 338 S.W.2d 597 , it was held: “Generally, speaking a covenant which is incidental to the sale and transfer of a trade or business, and which purports to bind the seller not to engage in the same business in competition with a purchaser is lawful and enforceable, provided such covenants are reasonable and go no further than affording a thorough protection to the buyer.” “The question as to reasonableness of the restrains necessary to secure a buyer of a business fair protection in receiving the benefits for which he made the pur chase is to

1973In Martin v. Wood, 212 Tenn. 389 , 370 S.W.2d 478 , it was held: “Upon being personally served with summons, and properly brought before court, the defendant was given actual notice of the suit and was charged with notice of all subsequent steps to be taken in the case down to and including the final judgment, although he did not in fact appear and had no actual notice of such steps.” We are convinced that the Chancellor was not in error in dismissing the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in this cause, and that the petitioner was not denied due process in the rendering of the judgment in

1973In Martin v. Wood, 212 Tenn. 389 , 370 S.W.2d 478 , it was held: “Upon being personally served with summons, and properly brought before court, the defendant was given actual notice of the suit and was charged with notice of all subsequent steps to be taken in the case down to and including the final judgment, although he did not in fact appear and had no actual notice of such steps.” We are convinced that the Chancellor was not in error in dismissing the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in this cause, and that the petitioner was not denied due process in the rendering of the judgment in

1973Smith v. Norris, 218 Tenn. 329 , 403 S.W.2d 307 (1966).

1973Smith v. Norris, 218 Tenn. 329 , 403 S.W.2d 307 (1966).

1970None of the cited cases involves the interpretation of a will or other written instrument except Fariss v. Bry-Block Co., 208 Tenn. 482 , 346 S.W.2d 705 (1961), in which the only reference to T.C.A. sec. 27-303 is as follows: ‘ ‘ The Court of Appeals was also of opinion that the Chancellor was in error in finding that the will was drafted by a lawyer, because the identity of the draftsman was not shown by the evidence; * * * ” ****** “* * * A casual inspection of this will discloses that it was drawn by a draftsman who was highly skilled in the use of technical legal language and in the meanin

1970None of the cited cases involves the interpretation of a will or other written instrument except Fariss v. Bry-Block Co., 208 Tenn. 482 , 346 S.W.2d 705 (1961), in which the only reference to T.C.A. sec. 27-303 is as follows: ‘ ‘ The Court of Appeals was also of opinion that the Chancellor was in error in finding that the will was drafted by a lawyer, because the identity of the draftsman was not shown by the evidence; * * * ” ****** “* * * A casual inspection of this will discloses that it was drawn by a draftsman who was highly skilled in the use of technical legal language and in the meanin