fitness hearing in California

2020(People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716-717 [the sole question at a fitness hearing is whether the minor would be amenable to treatment if adjudged a ward of the court]; People v. Superior Court (Zaharias M.) (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 302, 307 [same].) Disposition The order denying the section 1170.95 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to issue an OSC and proceed to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3).

2020Code, § 707) to find that appellant was ineligible for resentencing. 3Our Supreme Court granted review in People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 on the issue of whether superior courts may consider the record of conviction in determining the stage one issue of whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95. 3 (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716-717 [the sole question at a fitness hearing is whether the minor would be amenable to treatment if adjudged a ward of the court]; People v. Superi

2022(Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808, 810 (Ramona R.); People v. Weaver (1985) 39 Cal.3d 654 , 659–660 [addressing Coleman’s use immunity].) In Ramona R., the first of the two decisions, the issue our Supreme Court addressed was whether use immunity for testimony that a minor gave at a fitness hearing or statements she made to her probation officer remained viable given the passage of Proposition 8, which added section 28, subdivision (d), to article I to the California Constitution.9 In 9Proposition 8 enacted what has been deemed the “Right- to-Truth-in-Evidence” provision i

2021(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641 , 691–694 [privileged disclosures in habeas corpus proceeding based on ineffective assistance of counsel did not waive attorney-client privilege for purpose of retrial]; People v. Knight (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1 , 5–8 [statements made in support of motion to substitute appointed counsel are subject to use immunity]; Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478 , 498–503 [statements made during a court-compelled mental examination cannot be used in a subsequent trial]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 , 806–811 [statemen

2022(See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 , 586–589 [statements made by a minor to probation officer and to court in a fitness hearing could not be introduced as substantive evidence against minor in criminal trial]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602 [minor’s statements to probation officer inadmissible for any purpose to prove criminal guilt in juvenile or adult proceeding]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521 [statements made by parent in therapy ordered by dependency court inadmissible in parent’s criminal trial]; Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.A

2007In Ramona R., a minor argued that the juvenile court presiding over a fitness hearing "erred in refusing to grant her immunity from use at trial of any statements she made in the fitness hearing or to her probation officer." ( Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 804 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 .) The court discussed earlier decisions in which it had adopted exclusionary rules, which it pervasively labeled "immunities," to shield statements by minors in juvenile court proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 806, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 et seq., citing Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575

2020(People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716-717 [the sole question at a fitness hearing is whether the minor would be amenable to treatment if adjudged a ward of the court]; People v. Superior Court (Zaharias M.) (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 302, 307 [same].) Disposition The order denying the section 1170.95 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to issue an OSC and proceed to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3).

2020Code, § 707) to find that appellant was ineligible for resentencing. 3Our Supreme Court granted review in People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 on the issue of whether superior courts may consider the record of conviction in determining the stage one issue of whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95. 3 (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716-717 [the sole question at a fitness hearing is whether the minor would be amenable to treatment if adjudged a ward of the court]; People v. Superi

2017Assuming it is a foregone conclusion that the prosecution would file a motion for a fitness hearing on remand, "[r]eversal of the judgment effectively operates to vitiate the prior attachment of jeopardy." ( Pineda , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, fn. 10 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 ; see Juan G . v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1480 , 1494, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 816 ["voters are presumed to have been aware of existing law at the time an initiative was enacted"].) Accordingly, I see no impediment to applying Proposition 57 retroactively to this case.

2017Assuming it is a foregone conclusion that the prosecution would file a motion for a fitness hearing on remand, "[r]eversal of the judgment effectively operates to vitiate the prior attachment of jeopardy." ( Pineda , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, fn. 10 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 ; see Juan G . v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1480 , 1494, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 816 ["voters are presumed to have been aware of existing law at the time an initiative was enacted"].) Accordingly, I see no impediment to applying Proposition 57 retroactively to this case.

2017Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2); see Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335, 340-341 [ 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 371 P.3d 223 ] [describing history and general provisions of the initiative measure].) Thus, Proposition 57 effectively guarantees a juvenile accused felon a right to a fitness hearing before he or she may be sent to the criminal division for prosecution as an adult. 3.

2017Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2); see Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335, 340-341 [ 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 371 P.3d 223 ] [describing history and general provisions of the initiative measure].) Thus, Proposition 57 effectively guarantees a juvenile accused felon a right to a fitness hearing before he or she may be sent to the criminal division for prosecution as an adult. 3.

2017Assuming it is a foregone conclusion that the prosecution would file a motion for a fitness hearing on remand, "[r]eversal of the judgment effectively operates to vitiate the prior attachment of jeopardy." ( Pineda , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, fn. 10 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 ; see Juan G . v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1480 , 1494, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 816 ["voters are presumed to have been aware of existing law at the time an initiative was enacted"].) Accordingly, I see no impediment to applying Proposition 57 retroactively to this case.

2017Assuming it is a foregone conclusion that the prosecution would file a motion for a fitness hearing on remand, "[r]eversal of the judgment effectively operates to vitiate the prior attachment of jeopardy." ( Pineda , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, fn. 10 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 ; see Juan G . v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1480 , 1494, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 816 ["voters are presumed to have been aware of existing law at the time an initiative was enacted"].) Accordingly, I see no impediment to applying Proposition 57 retroactively to this case.

2025Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)’” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 , 305–306.) It was the prosecution’s burden at the fitness hearing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the minor should be transferred back to criminal court.

2025Bill 3 The Supreme Court granted review in In re J.M., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 745 , deferring further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Lopez 6 2361 retroactively]; In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152 , 169–170 (Miguel R.), citing People v. Superior Court (Lara), supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 304 .) Defendant contends he must be given a new fitness hearing to allow the juvenile court to consider the now required relevant factors under Senate Bill 545 and to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2021(Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 .) In resolving the matter, the court “order[ed] the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.” (Ibid.) In Cervantes, the court held that the defendant could “avail himself of a fitness hearing, and if he does so, the matter shall be transferred to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.” (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 .) 19 evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Pen.

2021(Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 .) In resolving the matter, the court “order[ed] the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.” (Ibid.) In Cervantes, the court held that the defendant could “avail himself of a fitness hearing, and if he does so, the matter shall be transferred to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.” (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 .) 19 evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Pen.

2022Under the proposition, minors may be tried and sentenced in criminal courts “ ‘only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated.’ ” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 305 , quoting People v. Vela (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 68, 72 .) As discussed below, this transfer hearing differs in significant ways from the fitness hearing Padilla received.

2021However, before resentencing can take place, we direct a limited remand to the juvenile court to conduct a fitness hearing, as described in People v. Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at page 82 .

2022(See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 , 586–589 [statements made by a minor to probation officer and to court in a fitness hearing could not be introduced as substantive evidence against minor in criminal trial]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602 [minor’s statements to probation officer inadmissible for any purpose to prove criminal guilt in juvenile or adult proceeding]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521 [statements made by parent in therapy ordered by dependency court inadmissible in parent’s criminal trial]; Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.A

2007In Ramona R., a minor argued that the juvenile court presiding over a fitness hearing "erred in refusing to grant her immunity from use at trial of any statements she made in the fitness hearing or to her probation officer." ( Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 804 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 .) The court discussed earlier decisions in which it had adopted exclusionary rules, which it pervasively labeled "immunities," to shield statements by minors in juvenile court proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 806, 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 et seq., citing Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575

2013VI, § 13.) A “ „miscarriage of justice‟ should be declared only when the court . . . is of the „opinion‟ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Failure to hold a fitness hearing does not result in the superior court‟s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but instead results in an excess of jurisdiction.

2013(People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [failure to allow public preliminary hearing was not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, and was reviewed under appropriate standard of prejudicial error]; In re Wright (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 663, 673 .) This court has applied a Watson11 harmless error analysis in similar circumstances, holding that “ „a “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court . . . is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.‟ [Citation.]”

2024(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 694 [privileged disclosures in habeas corpus proceeding based on ineffective assistance of counsel did not waive attorney- client privilege for purpose of retrial]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 810-811 [statements made by a minor to a probation officer and during a fitness hearing are inadmissible as substantive evidence against minor at subsequent trial]; Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 502-503 [statements made during a court-compelled mental examination cannot be used in a subsequent trial].) Th

2024(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 694 [privileged disclosures in habeas corpus proceeding based on ineffective assistance of counsel did not waive attorney- client privilege for purpose of retrial]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 810-811 [statements made by a minor to a probation officer and during a fitness hearing are inadmissible as substantive evidence against minor at subsequent trial]; Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 502-503 [statements made during a court-compelled mental examination cannot be used in a subsequent trial].) Th

2013(People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [failure to allow public preliminary hearing was not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, and was reviewed under appropriate standard of prejudicial error]; In re Wright (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 663, 673 .) This court has applied a Watson11 harmless error analysis in similar circumstances, holding that “ „a “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court . . . is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.‟ [Citation.]”

2013(People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [failure to allow public preliminary hearing was not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, and was reviewed under appropriate standard of prejudicial error]; In re Wright (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 663, 673 .) This court has applied a Watson11 harmless error analysis in similar circumstances, holding that “ „a “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court . . . is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.‟ [Citation.]”

2009“The sole purpose of the fitness hearing is to determine whether the best interest of the minor and of society will be served by retention in the juvenile court or whether the minor should be tried as an adult. [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Ronald H.) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1475, 1479 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 4 ].) A transfer hearing “does not directly result in an adjudication of guilt or delinquency” (People v. Superior Court (Steven S.) (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 162, 173 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 788 ]), and the question of a minor’s amenability to treatment within the juvenile court system is concerned

1985As pointed out in People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra, a fitness hearing does not involve an adjudication of guilt and does not directly result in confinement or other punishment; its sole purpose “is to determine ‘whether [the] best interest of the child and of society would be served by the retention of the juvenile court authority over him or whether the juvenile, under all the circumstances, should be transferred to be tried as an adult.’” (Id., at p. 718, quoting State v. Piche (1968) 74 Wn.2d 9, 14 [ 442 P.2d 632 ].) This purpose, the court declared, “may best be effectuated by the sound exerci

2002(Edsel P. v. Superior Court, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 763, 786-787 .) “ ‘[T]he prima facie case’ amounts to ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of Penal Code sections 871 and 872. ‘That phrase is generally equivalent to “reasonable and probable cause” which has been defined as such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 780, fn. 10, citations omitted.) The prima facie hearing may be consolidated with the fitness hearing itself.

1993A fitness hearing does not involve an adjudication of guilt but instead a determination of whether the best interests of the minor and society would be served by retention of juvenile court authority (Edsel P. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 763, 776 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 869 ], quoting People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 718-719 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 392 , 557 P.2d 976 ].) In fact, when a minor would be presumed to be unfit because he committed one of the offenses set forth in section 707, subdivision (b), the minor can first require the People to prove that his acts constitute the offens

1981Rule 1348(j) has since provided: " Unless the minor objects, a judge or referee who has conducted a fitness hearing may participate in any subsequent contested jurisdiction hearing relating to the same offense." (Italics added.) *818 Rule 1348(j) was adopted by the Judicial Council for the express purpose of bringing California's juvenile court procedure into conformity with the above discussed high authority of Breed v. Jones, supra, 421 U.S. 519 , Donald L. v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 592 , and In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855 .

1981Rule 1348(j) has since provided: “Unless the minor objects, a judge or referee who has conducted a fitness hearing may participate in any subsequent contested jurisdiction hearing relating to the same offense.” (Italics added.) Rule 1348(j) was adopted by the Judicial Council for the express purpose of bringing California’s juvenile court procedure into conformity with the above discussed high authority of Breed v. Jones, supra, 421 U.S. 519 , Donald L. v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 592 , and In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855 .

1989(People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ].) Similarly, “testimony a minor gives at a fitness hearing or statements he makes to his probation officer may not be used against him at a subsequent trial of the offense.” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 810 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) The case before us, however, presents no conflict between self-incrimination and candor requiring extension of this judicially created use immunity.

1989(People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ].) Similarly, “testimony a minor gives at a fitness hearing or statements he makes to his probation officer may not be used against him at a subsequent trial of the offense.” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 810 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) The case before us, however, presents no conflict between self-incrimination and candor requiring extension of this judicially created use immunity.

2022We agree with the People that the requirement of a fitness hearing is a state procedural rule and the failure to hold a fitness hearing does not violate a juvenile’s fundamental constitutional rights (see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 38 546–547); trying a juvenile in adult court without a fitness hearing is an act in excess of the court’s jurisdiction but the lack of a hearing does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 838–840, overruled on another ground by Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 843 ); and a defen

2021We agree with the People that the requirement of a fitness hearing is a state procedural rule and the failure to hold a fitness hearing does not violate a juvenile’s fundamental constitutional rights (see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 546–547); trying a juvenile in adult court without a fitness hearing is an act in excess of the court’s jurisdiction but the lack of a hearing does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 838–840); and a defendant may not complain on appeal about a state procedural defect which he invited or t

2022(See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 , 586–589 [statements made by a minor to probation officer and to court in a fitness hearing could not be introduced as substantive evidence against minor in criminal trial]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602 [minor’s statements to probation officer inadmissible for any purpose to prove criminal guilt in juvenile or adult proceeding]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521 [statements made by parent in therapy ordered by dependency court inadmissible in parent’s criminal trial]; Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.A

1992The court specifically held that “section 355.1 protects] a parent’s privilege against self-incrimination since a parent’s testimony in a dependency proceeding may not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” (200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1296.) In turn, based on analogy to Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ], in which the court determined that statements to a probation officer and to a court in a fitness hearing by a minor charged with murder could not be used as substantive evidence against the minor at trial, the court in In re Jessica B. (198

2024(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 691-694 [privileged disclosures in habeas corpus proceeding based on ineffective assistance of counsel did not waive attorney-client privilege for purpose of retrial]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 806-811 [statements made by a minor to a probation officer and during a fitness hearing are inadmissible as substantive evidence against minor at subsequent trial]; People v. Knight (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-8 [statements made in support of motion to substitute appointed counsel are subject to use immunity in subsequent pr

2022(See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 , 586–589 [statements made by a minor to probation officer and to court in a fitness hearing could not be introduced as substantive evidence against minor in criminal trial]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602 [minor’s statements to probation officer inadmissible for any purpose to prove criminal guilt in juvenile or adult proceeding]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521 [statements made by parent in therapy ordered by dependency court inadmissible in parent’s criminal trial]; Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.A

2022(See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 , 586–589 [statements made by a minor to probation officer and to court in a fitness hearing could not be introduced as substantive evidence against minor in criminal trial]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602 [minor’s statements to probation officer inadmissible for any purpose to prove criminal guilt in juvenile or adult proceeding]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521 [statements made by parent in therapy ordered by dependency court inadmissible in parent’s criminal trial]; Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.A

1993Code, § 628) are inadmissible as substantive evidence or for impeachment in any subsequent proceeding to determine criminal guilt, although they may be used at hearings on the issues of detention and fitness for juvenile treatment. 12 In Sheila O. v. Superior Court, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at page 814 , the minor refused to testify at a fitness hearing (Welf. & Inst.

2019Bill No. 1391 “effectively prohibits judges from determining whether certain juveniles should be transferred to criminal court.”].) The courts have long held that, regardless of who may or may not request a fitness hearing under section 707, “the court, on its own motion, [may] order a hearing to determine a person’s fitness.” (Green v. Municipal Court (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 794, 803 ; accord, In re Richard C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 966, 971, fn. 8 [“the court may entertain such a petition [for a fitness hearing] on its own motion.”]; In re 5 The majority is correct that nothing in Prop. 57 was m

1997It cannot be deemed "redundant." [1] Unless otherwise stated, further statutory references are to the Penal Code. [2] Although decisional law has held that in rare instances a fitness hearing may be proposed by the court ( Green v. Municipal Court (1976) 67 Cal. App.3d 794, 798-804 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 710 ]) or requested by the minor ( Joey W. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal. App.4th 1167, 1174 [ 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 486 ]), Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 authorizes only the "petitioner" to do so.

2017(See, e.g., Mendoza , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 348 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 , rev. gr.; Cervantes , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 600, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 , rev. gr. ["[L]ater Supreme Court cases have limited Estrada 's retroactivity exception to statutory changes that mitigate the penalty for a particular crime ..."].) They then reason Section 4 does not reduce the penalty for a particular crime, even though juvenile courts cannot order offenders to be held in custody as long as courts of criminal jurisdiction can, because Section 4's amendments provide only an uncertain benefit, namely, a fit

2017(See, e.g., Mendoza , supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 348 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 , rev. gr.; Cervantes , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 600, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 , rev. gr. ["[L]ater Supreme Court cases have limited Estrada 's retroactivity exception to statutory changes that mitigate the penalty for a particular crime ..."].) They then reason Section 4 does not reduce the penalty for a particular crime, even though juvenile courts cannot order offenders to be held in custody as long as courts of criminal jurisdiction can, because Section 4's amendments provide only an uncertain benefit, namely, a fit