cognate rule in California

2023We have said that “ ‘where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and that the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.’ ” (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53 , 58–59 (Palermo); see generally Jam v. International Finance Corp. (2019) 586 U.S. __ , __ [ 139 S.Ct. 759, 769 ] [referring to this princ

2022(See In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 [“Several modern decisions have applied the Palermo rule, but none have done so without regard to other indicia of legislative intent.”]; Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [Palermo rule is not mechanically applied]; People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505 [“the Palermo rule is not to be applied in a vacuum”]; see also People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [“ ‘ “[A] rule of construction . . . is not a straitjacket.” ’ ”]; Woodbury v. Brown- Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 432 [“Rules of statutory construction are not

2022(See In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 [“Several modern decisions have applied the Palermo rule, but none have done so without regard to other indicia of legislative intent.”]; Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [Palermo rule is not mechanically applied]; People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505 [“the Palermo rule is not to be applied in a vacuum”]; see also People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [“ ‘ “[A] rule of construction . . . is not a straitjacket.” ’ ”]; Woodbury v. Brown- Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 432 [“Rules of statutory construction are not

2013Defendant relies on Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53 [ 195 P.2d 1 ] (Palermo). “ ‘It is a well established principle of statutory law that, where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and that the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.’ ” (Palermo, at pp. 58-59.) “ ‘It also . . . [must]

1994(Cf. Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) Although the particulars may vary, a cognate principle governs in the case of an indemnity action following settlement: "The indemnitee's unilateral acts, albeit reasonable and undertaken in good faith, cannot bind the indemnitor; notice and an opportunity to defend are the indispensable due process satisfying elements." [15] ( Jennings v. United States (4th Cir.1967) 374 F.2d 983, 986 ; cf. Breese v. Price, supra, 29 Cal.3d 923, 929 .) Any other rule "would allow [the indemnitee] to spend [the indemnitor's] money wi

1994(Cf. Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) Although the particulars may vary, a cognate principle governs in the case of an indemnity action following settlement: "The indemnitee's unilateral acts, albeit reasonable and undertaken in good faith, cannot bind the indemnitor; notice and an opportunity to defend are the indispensable due process satisfying elements." [15] ( Jennings v. United States (4th Cir.1967) 374 F.2d 983, 986 ; cf. Breese v. Price, supra, 29 Cal.3d 923, 929 .) Any other rule "would allow [the indemnitee] to spend [the indemnitor's] money wi

1994(Cf. Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) Although the particulars may vary, a cognate principle governs in the case of an indemnity action following settlement: "The indemnitee's unilateral acts, albeit reasonable and undertaken in good faith, cannot bind the indemnitor; notice and an opportunity to defend are the indispensable due process satisfying elements." [15] ( Jennings v. United States (4th Cir.1967) 374 F.2d 983, 986 ; cf. Breese v. Price, supra, 29 Cal.3d 923, 929 .) Any other rule "would allow [the indemnitee] to spend [the indemnitor's] money wi

1994(Cf. Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ].) Although the particulars may vary, a cognate principle governs in the case of an indemnity action following settlement: "The indemnitee's unilateral acts, albeit reasonable and undertaken in good faith, cannot bind the indemnitor; notice and an opportunity to defend are the indispensable due process satisfying elements." [15] ( Jennings v. United States (4th Cir.1967) 374 F.2d 983, 986 ; cf. Breese v. Price, supra, 29 Cal.3d 923, 929 .) Any other rule "would allow [the indemnitee] to spend [the indemnitor's] money wi

2001The court concluded he was not, relying upon the principle of statutory construction that when a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, such provisions are incorporated in the form they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified. ( In re Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 442-43, 445, 255 Cal.Rptr. 35 .) The Oluwa court recognized the cognate rule that when the reference is general rather than specific, such as a reference to a body of laws, then the referring statute takes the laws referred to not only in their contemporary form but a

1992Section 3508 was amended in 1971 to refer to “full-time ‘peace officers’ as that term is defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code.” (Italics added.) “ ‘ “[I]t is a well established principle of statutory law that, where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, . . . [Citations.] [[[]. . . [T]here is a cognate rule, ... to the effect that where the reference is

2025Today’s opinion does not reach several issues that are integral to the instant matter and have arisen in hundreds of cases since we granted review: (1) the constitutionality of Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (c), which prohibits consideration of a criminal defendant’s inability to pay in imposing the minimum $300 restitution fine (all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code); (2) whether the imposition of fines and fees may violate due process or equal protection principles, particularly where the monetary order creates “cascading consequences” that trap a defendant in

2023We have said that “ ‘where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and that the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.’ ” (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53 , 58–59 (Palermo); see generally Jam v. International Finance Corp. (2019) 586 U.S. __ , __ [ 139 S.Ct. 759, 769 ] [referring to this princ

2022(See In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 [“Several modern decisions have applied the Palermo rule, but none have done so without regard to other indicia of legislative intent.”]; Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [Palermo rule is not mechanically applied]; People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505 [“the Palermo rule is not to be applied in a vacuum”]; see also People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [“ ‘ “[A] rule of construction . . . is not a straitjacket.” ’ ”]; Woodbury v. Brown- Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 432 [“Rules of statutory construction are not

2022(See In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 [“Several modern decisions have applied the Palermo rule, but none have done so without regard to other indicia of legislative intent.”]; Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [Palermo rule is not mechanically applied]; People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505 [“the Palermo rule is not to be applied in a vacuum”]; see also People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [“ ‘ “[A] rule of construction . . . is not a straitjacket.” ’ ”]; Woodbury v. Brown- Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 432 [“Rules of statutory construction are not

2022(See In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 [“Several modern decisions have applied the Palermo rule, but none have done so without regard to other indicia of legislative intent.”]; Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [Palermo rule is not mechanically applied]; People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505 [“the Palermo rule is not to be applied in a vacuum”]; see also People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [“ ‘ “[A] rule of construction . . . is not a straitjacket.” ’ ”]; Woodbury v. Brown- Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 432 [“Rules of statutory construction are not

2020(People v. Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 44 [“‘“[T]here is a cognate rule, recognized as applicable to many cases, to the effect that where the reference is general instead of specific, such as a reference to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or laws referred to not only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be changed from time to time, and . . . as they may be subjected to elimination altogether by repeal.”’”].) Second, as addressed fully ante, the definition of a crime and the punishment for a cri

2011(Id. at pp. 60-63; see, e.g., People v. Domagalski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1380, 1385 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 249 ] [when the canon of specific reference applies, the effect is “ ‘the same as if the adopted statute had been set out verbatim in the adopting statute,’ ” so that repeal or modification of the referenced statute does not affect the incorporating statute].) The court also recognized “ ‘a cognate rule.’ ” (Palermo, at p. 59.) “ ‘[W]here the reference is general instead of specific, such as ... to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring stat

2011(Id. at pp. 60-63; see, e.g., People v. Domagalski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1380, 1385 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 249 ] [when the canon of specific reference applies, the effect is “ ‘the same as if the adopted statute had been set out verbatim in the adopting statute,’ ” so that repeal or modification of the referenced statute does not affect the incorporating statute].) The court also recognized “ ‘a cognate rule.’ ” (Palermo, at p. 59.) “ ‘[W]here the reference is general instead of specific, such as ... to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring stat

2002(Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1485 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ]; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 819 ].) *45 In Oluwa , the issue was whether the defendant, who was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder, was entitled to a more favorable credit calculation for postsentence worktime credits under section 2933.

2002(Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1485 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ]; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 819 ].) *45 In Oluwa , the issue was whether the defendant, who was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder, was entitled to a more favorable credit calculation for postsentence worktime credits under section 2933.

2002(Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1485 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ]; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 819 ].) *45 In Oluwa , the issue was whether the defendant, who was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder, was entitled to a more favorable credit calculation for postsentence worktime credits under section 2933.

2002(Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1485 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ]; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 819 ].) *45 In Oluwa , the issue was whether the defendant, who was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder, was entitled to a more favorable credit calculation for postsentence worktime credits under section 2933.

1989The rationale set forth in Rancho Santa Anita v. City of Arcadia (1942) 20 Cal.2d 319, 322 [ 125 P.2d 475 ], provides an apposite analogy.

1989The rationale set forth in Rancho Santa Anita v. City of Arcadia (1942) 20 Cal.2d 319, 322 [ 125 P.2d 475 ], provides an apposite analogy.

1969(Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430 [ 181 P. 645 ]; Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal.2d 819, 824 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 362 P.2d 43 ]; Estate of Thompson, 18 Cal.App.2d 680, 683 [ 64 P.2d 984 ]; Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 213 ]; Prob.

1969(Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430 [ 181 P. 645 ]; Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal.2d 819, 824 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 362 P.2d 43 ]; Estate of Thompson, 18 Cal.App.2d 680, 683 [ 64 P.2d 984 ]; Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 213 ]; Prob.

1969(Estate of McKenzie, 246 Cal.App.2d 740, 746 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 888 ]; Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal.2d 613, 617 [ 328 P.2d 1 ].) A cognate principle is that the language used must be liberally construed with a view to carrying into effect what the will as a whole shows was the real intent of the testator.

1969(Estate of McKenzie, 246 Cal.App.2d 740, 746 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 888 ]; Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal.2d 613, 617 [ 328 P.2d 1 ].) A cognate principle is that the language used must be liberally construed with a view to carrying into effect what the will as a whole shows was the real intent of the testator.

1969(Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430 [ 181 P. 645 ]; Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal.2d 819, 824 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 362 P.2d 43 ]; Estate of Thompson, 18 Cal.App.2d 680, 683 [ 64 P.2d 984 ]; Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 213 ]; Prob.

1969(Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430 [ 181 P. 645 ]; Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal.2d 819, 824 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 362 P.2d 43 ]; Estate of Thompson, 18 Cal.App.2d 680, 683 [ 64 P.2d 984 ]; Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 213 ]; Prob.

1969(Estate of McKenzie, 246 Cal.App.2d 740, 746 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 888 ]; Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal.2d 613, 617 [ 328 P.2d 1 ].) A cognate principle is that the language used must be liberally construed with a view to carrying into effect what the will as a whole shows was the real intent of the testator.

1969(Estate of McKenzie, 246 Cal.App.2d 740, 746 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 888 ]; Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal.2d 613, 617 [ 328 P.2d 1 ].) A cognate principle is that the language used must be liberally construed with a view to carrying into effect what the will as a whole shows was the real intent of the testator.

1969(Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430 [ 181 P. 645 ]; Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal.2d 819, 824 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 362 P.2d 43 ]; Estate of Thompson, 18 Cal.App.2d 680, 683 [ 64 P.2d 984 ]; Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 213 ]; Prob.

1969(Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430 [ 181 P. 645 ]; Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal.2d 819, 824 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 362 P.2d 43 ]; Estate of Thompson, 18 Cal.App.2d 680, 683 [ 64 P.2d 984 ]; Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 213 ]; Prob.