actual-innocence claim in Iowa

2026To succeed on an actual-innocence claim in the context of a dispositive summary judgment ruling, Keyes must show that there exists no issue of material fact that “no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which . . . the applicant [was found] guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 797 .

2026See State v. Roland, No. 19-1434, 2020 WL 4497135 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020). 4 application in May 2023, adding an actual-innocence claim as recognized by our supreme court in Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795-98 (Iowa 2018).

2026See Lindaman v. State, No. 22-1032, 2023 WL 2908647 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023) (“Schmidt does not apply to overcome the statute of limitations where the evidence put forward to support a claim of actual innocence was available to the applicant or could have been discovered with due diligence within the limitations period” (emphasis added) (citation omitted))). 7 For evidence introduced in a criminal case to qualify as violative of an applicant’s due process rights, “the evidence must have been so inherently unreliable that even allowing the jury to consider the evidence rendered the

2026See id.; cf. More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016) (discussing the requirement for newly discovered evidence under section 822.2(1)(d)).

2018In Schlup v. Delo , in considering a petitioner's actual-innocence claim accompanied by an assertion of constitutional violations at trial, the Supreme Court explained what constitutes a gateway claim and articulated the gateway standard. 513 U.S. 298 , 315-17, 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851 , 861-62, 867, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).

2018In Schlup v. Delo , in considering a petitioner's actual-innocence claim accompanied by an assertion of constitutional violations at trial, the Supreme Court explained what constitutes a gateway claim and articulated the gateway standard. 513 U.S. 298 , 315-17, 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851 , 861-62, 867, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).

2026We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Roland’s ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim, reverse its dismissal of his actual-innocence claim, and remand for further proceedings on the actual-innocence claim. 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 I.

2025See Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 6, 9 (noting that Schmidt involved a “potentially viable claim of actual innocence” because the applicant “wholly denied the offense occurred”); see also Beavers v. Saffle, 216 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that intoxication and self-defense arguments “go to legal innocence, as opposed to factual innocence”); Penticoff v. State, No. 23-0650, 2024 WL 2043142 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024) (questioning whether applicant “properly asserted a claim of actual innocence” where he raised intoxication and self-defense arguments in a postconviction-relief chal

2021Up until the supreme court’s decision in Schmidt, the rule was that “criminal defendant waives all defenses and objections to the criminal proceedings by pleading guilty, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” except for “irregularities intrinsic to the plea—irregularities that bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea.” State v. Brown, 911 N.W.2d 180, 187 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018); accord Schmidt, 908 N.W.2d at 803 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Until today, it had been well settled that a plea of guilty waives all defenses or objections which are not intrinsic to the ple

2020See Williams, 2010 WL 446532, at *5 (“It is clear Williams at least had joint constructive possession of the gun—by its proximity in the vehicle Williams was operating and due to his suspicious activity of hiding in a closet in a stranger’s home after the crash” and noting “the gun was consistent with the gun used in the robberies as depicted by the surveillance videos, and also matched the description given by [a] witness.”).3 2 The district court rejected the actual-innocence claim on the merits and also concluded counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to raise opinions filed in

2018These circumstances distinguish this case from State v. Bendickson, No. 18-0229, also decided today. 4 See id. at 781 (“An applicant filed a postconviction-relief action claiming he was actually innocent although he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to the charged crimes.”). 5 any challenge to his plea on appeal); see also State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980) (“Where the trial court informs the defendant of this procedural requirement, we will not hesitate to preclude challenges to plea proceedings on appeal.”).

2018The court must therefore assess the merits of the claim, considering " 'all the evidence,' old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under 'rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.' " House v. Bell , 547 U.S. 518 , 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (quoting *815 Schlup , 513 U.S. at 327 -28 , 115 S.Ct. at 867 ).

2018The court must therefore assess the merits of the claim, considering " 'all the evidence,' old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under 'rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.' " House v. Bell , 547 U.S. 518 , 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (quoting *815 Schlup , 513 U.S. at 327 -28 , 115 S.Ct. at 867 ).

2018The majority also discusses Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Tex. Crim.

2018P. 2.8(2)(d), 2.24(3)(a) (barring appellate challenges to guilty pleas when defendant fails to file a proper motion in arrest of judgment); see State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 2002) (holding defendant failed to preserve error by not moving in arrest of judgment when informed failure to do so would bar 3 Shultsev did not timely raise an actual-innocence claim in the district court and does not ask on appeal for a remand to present evidence supporting such a claim.

2018We think it is nevertheless informative in constructing a standard for freestanding actual-innocence claims in Iowa. 31 prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.” In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993); accord In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 (Cal. 2007).

2018See, e.g. , Krahn v. Kinney , 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 , 1061 (1989) (collecting cases and holding that the elements of proof for legal malpractice are the same regardless of whether the action arises from civil or criminal representation). 5 In rejecting the actual-innocence requirement in that circumstance, the Jones court described a hypothetical situation that mirrors Kraklio's situation: [I]t is appropriate to examine the consequences of a contrary holding in a situation not presented here, namely where an attorney's negligence resulted in a legally impermissible sentence that

2018See, e.g. , Krahn v. Kinney , 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 , 1061 (1989) (collecting cases and holding that the elements of proof for legal malpractice are the same regardless of whether the action arises from civil or criminal representation). 5 In rejecting the actual-innocence requirement in that circumstance, the Jones court described a hypothetical situation that mirrors Kraklio's situation: [I]t is appropriate to examine the consequences of a contrary holding in a situation not presented here, namely where an attorney's negligence resulted in a legally impermissible sentence that

2018Moreover, to succeed on an actual-innocence claim, the applicant also must show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478 , 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).

2018Moreover, to succeed on an actual-innocence claim, the applicant also must show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478 , 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).

2018This is a far cry from allowing a nonrecanting recantation to disturb a guilty plea. 79 Jamison v. State, 765 S.E.2d 123, 130 (S.C. 2014), the Supreme Court of South Carolina did open the door to actual-innocence claims by persons who had pled guilty but it established a very high burden for them—one the majority characterizes as “too stringent.” Also, in People v. Tiger, 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700–01 (App. Div. 2017), the court recognized an actual- innocence claim by a defendant who had pled guilty, although New York’s highest court has clearly not gone that far, see People v. Plunkett, 971 N.E.2

2018This is a far cry from allowing a nonrecanting recantation to disturb a guilty plea. 79 Jamison v. State, 765 S.E.2d 123, 130 (S.C. 2014), the Supreme Court of South Carolina did open the door to actual-innocence claims by persons who had pled guilty but it established a very high burden for them—one the majority characterizes as “too stringent.” Also, in People v. Tiger, 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700–01 (App. Div. 2017), the court recognized an actual- innocence claim by a defendant who had pled guilty, although New York’s highest court has clearly not gone that far, see People v. Plunkett, 971 N.E.2

2018"Underlying the ... requirement ... that [a] plaintiff must have obtained postconviction relief ... is the principle that absent relief from a conviction or sentence, the criminal plaintiff's own actions are presumably the proximate cause of his injury." Jones v. Link , 493 F.Supp.2d 765 , 769 (E.D.

2018In such a case, any available appellate, post-conviction, or habeas corpus remedies would not sufficiently redress plaintiff's injury, that is his unlawfully prolonged incarceration, and in these circumstances, plaintiff's "case [would be] more akin to that of an innocent person wrongfully convicted than of a guilty person attempting to take advantage of his own wrongdoing." It follows then that like the "innocent person wrongfully convicted due to inadequate representation [he] has suffered a compensable injury [and] the nexus between the malpractice and palpable harm is sufficient to warrant

2018We think it is nevertheless informative in constructing a standard for freestanding actual-innocence claims in Iowa. 31 prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.” In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993); accord In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 (Cal. 2007).

2018This is a far cry from allowing a nonrecanting recantation to disturb a guilty plea. 79 Jamison v. State, 765 S.E.2d 123, 130 (S.C. 2014), the Supreme Court of South Carolina did open the door to actual-innocence claims by persons who had pled guilty but it established a very high burden for them—one the majority characterizes as “too stringent.” Also, in People v. Tiger, 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700–01 (App. Div. 2017), the court recognized an actual- innocence claim by a defendant who had pled guilty, although New York’s highest court has clearly not gone that far, see People v. Plunkett, 971 N.E.2

2016See State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009) (“We have repeatedly held we will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). 2 The State contends Grayson failed to preserve error on his argument of the actual- innocence exception.