actual-innocence claim in Illinois

2020See Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 , (describing ‘conclusive character’ requirement as the ‘most important[ ]’ element of an actual-innocence claim).” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 39-40.

2020This court reiterated in Edwards that the “ ‘conclusive character’ requirement is the ‘most important[ ]’ element of an actual-innocence claim” (Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 ) and that the “ ‘no reasonable juror’ standard ‘requires a stronger showing than that required to establish Strickland prejudice’ ” (id. (quoting Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir. 2011))).

2017On an actual-innocence claim, “leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’ ” Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 , 969 N.E.2d 829 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

2017On an actual-innocence claim, “leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’ ” Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 , 969 N.E.2d 829 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

2023For a claim asserting actual innocence, the defendant must make a substantial showing that the evidence supporting his claim is “newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 46 (citing People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009)). ¶ 34 The State in this case argues that the defendant’s petition fails to satisfy the materiality and conclusive-character elements of the actual-innocence standard.

2020Cf. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 26-27 (finding that the trial court implicitly granted leave by ruling that the defendant’s successive petition presented the gist of an actual- innocence claim).

2012Evidence is also not newly discovered when the evidence "presents facts already known to a defendant at or prior to trial, though the source of these facts may have been unknown, unavailable or uncooperative." People v. Collier, 387 Ill.App.3d 630, 637 , 326 Ill.Dec. 760 , 900 N.E.2d 396, 403 (2008). ¶ 22 Despite the requirement a defendant must show due diligence in the discovery of the supporting evidence, defendant's amended postconviction petition does not assert any due diligence in discovering the evidence supporting defendant's actual-innocence claim.

2012Evidence is also not newly discovered when the evidence "presents facts already known to a defendant at or prior to trial, though the source of these facts may have been unknown, unavailable or uncooperative." People v. Collier, 387 Ill.App.3d 630, 637 , 326 Ill.Dec. 760 , 900 N.E.2d 396, 403 (2008). ¶ 22 Despite the requirement a defendant must show due diligence in the discovery of the supporting evidence, defendant's amended postconviction petition does not assert any due diligence in discovering the evidence supporting defendant's actual-innocence claim.

2017On an actual-innocence claim, “leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’ ” Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 , 969 N.E.2d 829 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

2017On an actual-innocence claim, “leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’ ” Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 , 969 N.E.2d 829 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

2026See People v. Holman, 2012 IL App (5th) 100587-U . ¶9 The defendant appealed this court’s decision, and on January 28, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court directed this court to reconsider the judgment in light of People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 .

2022See Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 56 (affirming the denial of leave to file the defendant’s fifth postconviction petition based on the defendant’s failure to establish “cause” where the - 13 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210473-U defendant failed to “raise this or a similar claim in any of his earlier postconviction proceedings” (emphasis added)). ¶ 34 Counsel also suggests that it would be frivolous to argue that defendant’s fourth successive postconviction petition made an actual-innocence claim such that defendant was not required to establish cause and prejudice.

2020This court reiterated in Edwards that the “ ‘conclusive character’ requirement is the ‘most important[ ]’ element of an actual-innocence claim” (Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 ) and that the “ ‘no reasonable juror’ standard ‘requires a stronger showing than that required to establish Strickland prejudice’ ” (id. (quoting Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir. 2011))).

2012See also Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir.2010) ( habeas petitioner asserting innocence as gateway to defaulted claim must show that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir.2011) (noting that this "no reasonable juror" standard "requires a stronger showing than that required to establish Strickland prejudice"). ¶ 41 The appellate court below held that further postconviction proceedings were unnecessary because petitioner failed to assert a colorabl

2024We will find manifest error “when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 . ¶ 72 While an actual-innocence claim may be pursued under the Act, the standard to obtain relief for such a claim “is extraordinarily difficult to meet.” Id. ¶ 94.

2024Our supreme court elaborated on the elements of an actual-innocence claim in People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , ¶ 96: “New means the evidence was discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. [Citation.] -5- Material means the evidence is relevant and probative of petitioner’s innocence. [Citation.] Noncumulative means the evidence adds to what the jury heard. [Citation.] And conclusive means the evidence, when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead to a different result.” ¶ 15 Here, defendant attached Officer N

2014The circuit court thus properly denied defendant’s motion for the additional reason that defendant failed to establish subsection (c)(1). ¶ 33 In People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203, 213 (2001), this court held that evidence which is “materially relevant” to a defendant’s actual-innocence claim need not, standing alone, exonerate the defendant; rather, it must tend to “significantly advance” his claim of actual innocence.

2014The circuit court thus properly denied defendant’s motion for the additional reason that defendant failed to establish subsection (c)(1). ¶ 33 In People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203, 213 (2001), this court held that evidence which is “materially relevant” to a defendant’s actual-innocence claim need not, standing alone, exonerate the defendant; rather, it must tend to “significantly advance” his claim of actual innocence.

2020See People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (2002) (describing the three requirements for evidence offered in support of an actual-innocence claim).

2012Moreover, an actual-innocence claim only entitles a defendant to relief when "the evidence is of such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of retrial." Harris, 206 Ill.2d at 301 , 276 Ill.Dec. 286 , 794 N.E.2d at 188 . ¶ 21 Since the trial court found almost all of defendant's evidence supporting an actual-innocence claim was not newly discovered evidence, we begin our analysis there.

2024People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 330 (2009). ¶ 13 In his petition, defendant claimed that the DVD was material evidence that supported an actual-innocence claim.

2023For a claim asserting actual innocence, the defendant must make a substantial showing that the evidence supporting his claim is “newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 46 (citing People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009)). ¶ 34 The State in this case argues that the defendant’s petition fails to satisfy the materiality and conclusive-character elements of the actual-innocence standard.

2021See People v. Shaw, 2019 IL App (1st) 152994, ¶¶ 45, 54 (a guilty-plea defendant may bring an actual-innocence claim without challenging the validity of the plea, for no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of his liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence). ¶ 28 In support of his actual-innocence claim, the defendant submitted documentation in the form of two newspaper articles purportedly published in February 2017.

2021See People v. Shaw, 2019 IL App (1st) 152994, ¶¶ 45, 54 (a guilty-plea defendant may bring an actual-innocence claim without challenging the validity of the plea, for no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of his liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence). ¶ 28 In support of his actual-innocence claim, the defendant submitted documentation in the form of two newspaper articles purportedly published in February 2017.

2020Id. at 330-31 ; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

2020Id. at 330-31 ; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

2016See - 45 - No. 1-09-0884 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) ("[A] claim of 'actual innocence' is *** a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."). ¶ 135 Federal courts have grappled with the dilemma posed when the actual-innocence test is used as a gateway to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim premised on counsel's failure to present certain evidence at trial.

2016See - 45 - No. 1-09-0884 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) ("[A] claim of 'actual innocence' is *** a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."). ¶ 135 Federal courts have grappled with the dilemma posed when the actual-innocence test is used as a gateway to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim premised on counsel's failure to present certain evidence at trial.

2013An actual-innocence claim should be treated procedurally like any other postconviction claim (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 ), and “[i]n a post-conviction hearing the burden of proof is upon the petitioner to show a denial of [a] constitutional right by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v. Stovall, 47 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1970). ¶ 93 The State’s argument essentially repackages an argument made by then-Chief Justice Bilandic in his dissent upon denial of rehearing in Washington.

2013An actual-innocence claim should be treated procedurally like any other postconviction claim (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 ), and “[i]n a post-conviction hearing the burden of proof is upon the petitioner to show a denial of [a] constitutional right by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v. Stovall, 47 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1970). ¶ 93 The State’s argument essentially repackages an argument made by then-Chief Justice -18- Bilandic in his dissent upon denial of rehearing in Washington.

2012See also Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir.2010) ( habeas petitioner asserting innocence as gateway to defaulted claim must show that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir.2011) (noting that this "no reasonable juror" standard "requires a stronger showing than that required to establish Strickland prejudice"). ¶ 41 The appellate court below held that further postconviction proceedings were unnecessary because petitioner failed to assert a colorabl

2012See also Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2010) (habeas petitioner asserting innocence as gateway to defaulted claim must show that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that this “no reasonable juror” standard “requires a stronger showing than that required to establish Strickland prejudice”). ¶ 41 The appellate court below held that further postconviction proceedings were unnecessary because petitioner failed to assert a colorab

2023In terms of substance, the evidence in support of that claim must be (1) newly discovered, (2) material, (3) not merely cumulative, and (4) “of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004). ¶ 39 At the evidentiary hearing in this case, the defendant’s actual-innocence claim depended entirely on the testimony of Dwight Hayes, a DOC inmate who, over the years, had been convicted of multiple felonies.

2023Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d at 153 .

2026See People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 278 (2006) (recognizing, for the first time, that an involuntary intoxication defense may be based on an unexpected and unwarned side effect of prescribed medication).

2026He argues instead that the second petition must be treated as an initial petition because, in the proceedings on the first petition, the trial court’s failure -5- to comply with either section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act or Rule 651(b) denied him “ ‘one complete opportunity to show a substantial denial of his constitutional rights’ ” (People v. Lieberman, 186 Ill.

2025The determination of whether forensic evidence significantly advances the defendant’s actual innocence claim requires an evaluation of the evidence introduced at trial, as well as the evidence the defendant seeks to test.” People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 33 (quoting Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 213 ). ¶ 43 Section 116-3 also requires a defendant to “present a prima facie case” tending to show “identity was the issue in the trial *** which resulted in his or her conviction” and “the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substit

2024He raised an actual-innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence, as well as a Brady (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)) violation for the State’s failure to disclose surveillance video from the crime scene.

2024The Act gives a defendant a statutory right to counsel, and the defendant is entitled to a reasonable level of assistance from counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2020); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1999).