newly discovered evidence claim in Iowa

2026To prevail on a newly discovered evidence claim, an applicant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the evidence was discovered after the verdict; (2) that it could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence; (3) that the evidence is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) that the evidence probably would have changed the result of the trial. 4 See Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 151 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

2025New evidence that would merely be impeaching is “not considered material in the context of a newly-discovered-evidence claim.” Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137 , 152–53 (Iowa 2018).

2023See Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143 (“The district court in the instant case reached its holding through a merits analysis of a newly-discovered-evidence claim rather than applying the ground-of-fact standard we clarified in Harrington[ v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003)].

2022See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted) (stating that in order to prevail on a newly- discovered-evidence claim, an applicant must prove those four elements).

2020See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991) (requiring proof of four elements on a newly- discovered-evidence claim, including that “the evidence probably would have changed the result of the trial”).

2018Moon correctly cited to 822.2(1)( d ) in his resistance to the State's motion for summary dismissal. 4 Impeachment evidence may lack the potential to qualify as material evidence if, for example, Moon brought only a newly-discovered-evidence claim because the newly-discovered-evidence test requires "that the evidence is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching." Jones v. State , 479 N.W.2d 265 , 274 (Iowa 1991).

2016To prevail on a newly-discovered-evidence claim, Whiteside must show the proffered evidence (1) was discovered after the verdict, (2) could not have been discovered “earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence,” (3) “is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching,” and (4) “probably would have changed the result of the trial in which [he] was convicted.” State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1996); see also State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Iowa 1996).

2016To prevail on a newly-discovered-evidence claim, Martin must show the proffered evidence (1) was discovered after the verdict, (2) could not have been discovered “earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence,” (3) “is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching,” and (4) “probably would have changed the result of the trial in which [he] was convicted.” State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1996); see also State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Iowa 1996).

2016To prevail on a newly-discovered-evidence claim, Whiteside must show the proffered evidence (1) was discovered after the verdict, (2) could not have been discovered “earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence,” (3) “is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching,” and (4) “probably would have changed the result of the trial in which [he] was convicted.” State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1996); see also State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Iowa 1996).

2016To prevail on a newly-discovered-evidence claim, Martin must show the proffered evidence (1) was discovered after the verdict, (2) could not have been discovered “earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence,” (3) “is material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching,” and (4) “probably would have changed the result of the trial in which [he] was convicted.” State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1996); see also State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Iowa 1996).

2026The second requirement in a newly-discovered-evidence claim is that the evidence “is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching.” D.W., 385 N.W.2d at 583 (citation omitted).

2020See More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016) (citing and separately considering (1) a newly-discovered-evidence claim based on the 4 same flawed evidence that is at issue here and (2) a claim that the flawed evidence deprived the defendant of due process).

2020See More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016) (citing and separately considering (1) a newly-discovered-evidence claim based on the 4 same flawed evidence that is at issue here and (2) a claim that the flawed evidence deprived the defendant of due process).

2018See Cornell , 430 N.W.2d at 386-87 (applying the Brady materiality test requiring a reasonable probability to the probability prong of a newly-discovered-evidence claim); see also Compiano , 261 Iowa at 520 , 154 N.W.2d at 851 (stating the test is whether "there is a reasonable probability of a different result upon another trial" (quoting Westergard , 243 Iowa at 500 , 52 N.W.2d at 43 ) ).

2018See Cornell , 430 N.W.2d at 386-87 (applying the Brady materiality test requiring a reasonable probability to the probability prong of a newly-discovered-evidence claim); see also Compiano , 261 Iowa at 520 , 154 N.W.2d at 851 (stating the test is whether "there is a reasonable probability of a different result upon another trial" (quoting Westergard , 243 Iowa at 500 , 52 N.W.2d at 43 ) ).

2018See Cornell , 430 N.W.2d at 386-87 (applying the Brady materiality test requiring a reasonable probability to the probability prong of a newly-discovered-evidence claim); see also Compiano , 261 Iowa at 520 , 154 N.W.2d at 851 (stating the test is whether "there is a reasonable probability of a different result upon another trial" (quoting Westergard , 243 Iowa at 500 , 52 N.W.2d at 43 ) ).

2018See Cornell , 430 N.W.2d at 386-87 (applying the Brady materiality test requiring a reasonable probability to the probability prong of a newly-discovered-evidence claim); see also Compiano , 261 Iowa at 520 , 154 N.W.2d at 851 (stating the test is whether "there is a reasonable probability of a different result upon another trial" (quoting Westergard , 243 Iowa at 500 , 52 N.W.2d at 43 ) ).

2018See Cornell , 430 N.W.2d at 386-87 (applying the Brady materiality test requiring a reasonable probability to the probability prong of a newly-discovered-evidence claim); see also Compiano , 261 Iowa at 520 , 154 N.W.2d at 851 (stating the test is whether "there is a reasonable probability of a different result upon another trial" (quoting Westergard , 243 Iowa at 500 , 52 N.W.2d at 43 ) ).

2017See State v. Olsen, 794 N.W.2d 285 , 287 n.1 (Iowa 2011). 15 duty to raise an issue that has no merit.

2017See Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994).

2017See Langdeaux v. State, No. 10-1625, 2012 WL 1439077 , at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012) (affirming postconviction court’s denial of motion to amend for untimeliness); see also Bennett v. City of Redfield, 446 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 1989) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to amend because it substantially changed the issues at trial and was untimely).

2003Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (holding section 822.3 requires likelihood that result would be different), with Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 274 *521 (holding section 663A.2(4) (now found at section 822.2(4)) requires probability of different result).

1979On the basis of the evidence presented here, and having in mind that Lawson has the burden of proof, State v. Hicks, 277 N.W.2d 889, 896 (Iowa 1979), we hold that Lawson did not satisfy elements three and four of the newly discovered evidence rule.