harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in California

2026(See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23 [assuming a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is reviewed under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ]; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 138 [applying the Chapman standard in deciding whether the trial court’s failure to instruct on an affirmative defense was prejudicial]; People v. Mulcrevy (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 127, 131 [same].) That is a demanding standard: Reversal is required unless the failure to instruct on entrapment 7 For example,

2026(See People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23 [assuming a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is reviewed under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18]; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 138 [applying the Chapman standard in deciding whether the trial court’s failure to instruct on an affirmative defense was prejudicial]; People v. Mulcrevy (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 127, 131 [same].) That is a demanding standard: Reversal is required unless the failure to instruct on entrapment 7 For example, i

2025(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) “ ‘Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 .’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 902.) Gonzalez has not made a showing under either standard.

2023A physical restraint has “the potential to impair an accused’s ability to communicate with counsel or participate in the defense,” but the error is harmless where the record “does not reveal any such court improperly orders the use of visible physical restraints, ‘[t]he State must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’”]; accord, People v. Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 774 [shackling error only prejudices defendant’s right to a fair trial where the jury can see the shackles in the courtroom, in which case the ha

2025(People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856 , 901–902.) “ ‘Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 902.) In other words, the error “may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.” (People v. Simms (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 987, 998 ; see also People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661 .) Her

2024(People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 902 .) “Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 .” (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532 .) “Under that standard, the error ‘may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (People v. Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) The burden falls on the People, not the defendant, to demonstrate

2024Accordingly, we cannot conclude that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to presence at the hearing.” (Ibid.) While defendant may have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appear during his discussions with his counsel, the record fails to contain an adequate recitation of it. 8 Error by the trial court in failing to take a proper waiver of the right to be present is subject to harmless error analysis. ( Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533 [constitutional error “pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standa

2024“Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 .” (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532 .) “Under that standard, the error ‘may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (People v. Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) Defendant argues we “cannot know what [he] would have offered in mitigation of his sentence because he was not presen

2026(See, e.g., Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt 4 Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia, who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening. 14 (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) We must reverse

2026(See, e.g., Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt 4 Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia, who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening. 14 (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) We must reverse

2025The People recognize that the Courts of Appeal are not in agreement (Compare People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41, 53 [error on failing to instruct on self-defense subject to People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 harmless error standard] with Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472]) but argue the error is harmless even under Chapman’s more stringent harmless error standard.

2025The Supreme Court has not yet decided which test for prejudice applies to a failure to instruct on an affirmative defense “such as self-defense.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199 [“we have yet to determine whether a trial court’s failure to instruct on a requested affirmative defense instruction supported by substantial evidence is federal constitutional error or state law error”]; compare People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41, 52-53 [failure to instruct on self-defense was reversible error under Watson] with People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 303 [applying Chapm

2026(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) According to Harzan’s Craigslist ad, he was seeking a “young coed friend” to have “good times” with.

2020(See People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132 ; People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 354 .) 16 As the public guardian notes, in Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1094 (Walker), the court stated that the standard of harmless error in conservatorship proceedings was the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman.

2013Bruton error is not reversible per se, but is instead ―scrutinized under the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].‖ (Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) ―In determining whether improperly admitted evidence so prejudiced a defendant that reversal of the judgment of conviction is required, we have observed that ‗if the properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and the incriminating extrajudicial statement is merely cumulative of other direct evidence, the error will be deemed harmless.‘‖ (Ibid.) Apart f

2011(See People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 232 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 , 212 P.3d 639 ] [Bruton/Aranda error is scrutinized under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]; “ ‘if the properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and the incriminating extrajudicial statement is merely cumulative of other direct evidence, the error will be deemed harmless.’ [Citation.]”].) Here, the jury heard properly admitted testimony that Arceo himself told both David and Adan that he shot one of the victims, and that Sergio told

2016(See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ] [“[u]nder the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman”]; accord, People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 62 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ]; People v. El (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1050 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 ].) The statutory error under Penal Code section 977 “is state law error only, and therefore is reversible only if ‘ “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appeal

2016(See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ] [“[u]nder the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman”]; accord, People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 62 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ]; People v. El (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1050 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 ].) The statutory error under Penal Code section 977 “is state law error only, and therefore is reversible only if ‘ “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appeal

2017Omission of an element of an offense is not reversible per se but rather is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 . ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ( Neder ); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 , 826, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 , cert. filed May 22, 2017 ( Merritt ).) In cases of omitted *957 elements, our high court has cautioned the error "will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances , such as where each element was

2017Omission of an element of an offense is not reversible per se but rather is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 . ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ( Neder ); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 , 826, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 , cert. filed May 22, 2017 ( Merritt ).) In cases of omitted *957 elements, our high court has cautioned the error "will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances , such as where each element was

2017Omission of an element of an offense is not reversible per se but rather is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 . ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ( Neder ); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 , 826, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 , cert. filed May 22, 2017 ( Merritt ).) In cases of omitted *957 elements, our high court has cautioned the error "will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances , such as where each element was

2017Omission of an element of an offense is not reversible per se but rather is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 . ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ( Neder ); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 , 826, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 , cert. filed May 22, 2017 ( Merritt ).) In cases of omitted *957 elements, our high court has cautioned the error "will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances , such as where each element was

2015(People v. Watson [(1956)] 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [(Watson)].) Of course, because the Watson standard is less demanding than the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard mandated by the applicable federal constitutional authorities (see [] Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. [at pp.] 306-313; Chapman v. California [(1967)] 386 U.S. 18, 23 [(Chapman)]), whenever a confession admitted in a California trial has been obtained by means that render the confession inadmissible under the federal Constitution, the prejudicial effect of the confession must be determined under the federal standard.” (People v. C

1994(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Of course, because the Watson standard is less demanding than the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard mandated by the applicable federal constitutional authorities (see Arizona *318 v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. 279, 306-312 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329-333 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263-1266 ]; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]), whenever a confession admitted in a California trial has been obtained by means that render the confession inadmissible under the fede

2026(See, e.g., Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt 4 Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia, who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening. 14 (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) We must reverse

2026(See, e.g., Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt 4 Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia, who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening. 14 (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) We must reverse

2025(People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856 , 901–902.) “ ‘Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 902.) In other words, the error “may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.” (People v. Simms (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 987, 998 ; see also People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661 .) Her

2019(People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 902 [“ ‘Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman’ ”]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 [same].) Under that standard, the error “may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.” (Simms, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 998 ; People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661 [federal constitutional error requires reversal of the judgment

2022They appear to also suggest that even if not all aggravating circumstances were provable beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court would nevertheless have imposed the upper term because “the law does not require the trial court to rely on a minimum number of aggravating circumstances” and “as long as a jury could have found a single aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt, any error was harmless.” For the proposition that error was harmless if the jury would have found a single aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt, the People rely on People v. Flores (2022)

2022For the proposition that any error was harmless if at least one but fewer than all aggravating circumstances were proved in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b), the People rely upon People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495 , which applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of harmless error from Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 as adapted to the context of violations of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances by People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 838–839.

2021In People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , the Second Appellate District concluded that the defendant’s federal due process rights were violated and his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of inflammatory gang evidence that was not relevant to the charged offenses and served no legitimate purpose.

2015In People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , a divided panel of another appellate court held the introduction of “a panoply of incriminating gang evidence,” including threats to police, the Mexican Mafia, and several unrelated crimes, where there was nothing inherent in the facts of the charged shooting to suggest any gang motive and the gang evidence was highly prejudicial, violated defendant’s due process right, and led to a fundamentally unfair trial.

2019(See People v. Romero , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 28, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 .) Under that standard, "we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) *39 possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error ... not occurred." ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 , 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 .) This inquiry is " 'the same in substance and effect' " as the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt inquiry triggered by federal constitutional error. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353 , 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408

2019(See People v. Romero , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 28, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 .) Under that standard, "we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) *39 possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error ... not occurred." ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 , 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 .) This inquiry is " 'the same in substance and effect' " as the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt inquiry triggered by federal constitutional error. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353 , 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408

2017(Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 1021 .) In Coy, the Supreme Court explained how the standard 27 applies in the specific context of face-to-face confrontation: “An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness‟ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury‟s assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence.” ( Coy, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 10211022, italics added.) Here, because the evidence of the charged sexual assaul

2017Was Prejudicial The harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 applies to violations of the confrontation right. ( C raig , supra , 497 U.S. at p. 1021 , 110 S.Ct. 3157 .) In Coy , the Supreme Court explained how the standard applies in the specific context of face-to-face confrontation: "An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously inv

2017Omission of an element of an offense is not reversible per se but rather is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 . ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ( Neder ); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 , 826, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 , cert. filed May 22, 2017 ( Merritt ).) In cases of omitted *957 elements, our high court has cautioned the error "will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances , such as where each element was

2017Omission of an element of an offense is not reversible per se but rather is subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 . ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 ( Neder ); People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 , 826, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 , cert. filed May 22, 2017 ( Merritt ).) In cases of omitted *957 elements, our high court has cautioned the error "will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances , such as where each element was

2016"It is established, of course, that Bruton/Aranda error is not prejudicial per se." (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1128 .) Rather, "such error must be scrutinized under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ." ( Anderson, supra, at p. 1128 .) "[I]f the properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and the incriminating extrajudicial statement is merely cumulative of other direct evidence, the error will be deemed harmless." (Id. at p. 1129.) Other evidence was sufficiently strong to render the errors harmless.

2016"It is established, of course, that Bruton/Aranda error is not prejudicial per se." (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1128 .) Rather, "such error must be scrutinized under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ." ( Anderson, supra, at p. 1128 .) "[I]f the properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and the incriminating extrajudicial statement is merely cumulative of other direct evidence, the error will be deemed harmless." (Id. at p. 1129.) Other evidence was sufficiently strong to render the errors harmless.

2013(See Nero, supra, at pp. 513-517 ; Samaniego, supra, at pp. 1163-1164 .) Thus, in the context of homicide, CALCRIM No. 400‟s direction that a defendant is “equally guilty” of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the person who actually committed it, while a generally correct statement of aider and abettor law, has the potential to be misleading, when the aider and abettor‟s intent is at issue. ( Samaniego, supra, at p. 1165 ; see also Nero, supra, at pp. 517-519 [addressing CALJIC No. 3.00].) The record here shows that any error in the inclusion of the “equall

2013(See Nero, supra, at pp. 513-517 ; Samaniego, supra, at pp. 1163-1164 .) Thus, in the context of homicide, CALCRIM No. 400‟s direction that a defendant is “equally guilty” of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the person who actually committed it, while a generally correct statement of aider and abettor law, has the potential to be misleading, when the aider and abettor‟s intent is at issue. ( Samaniego, supra, at p. 1165 ; see also Nero, supra, at pp. 517-519 [addressing CALJIC No. 3.00].) The record here shows that any error in the inclusion of the “equall