22 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People Ex Rel. Daley v. Joycegreen2 sentences2021Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22 (1988). “[W]aivers [of constitutional rights] must not only be voluntary, but must be ‘ ”knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 21 The waiver of a bench trial rarely comes up in case law, likely because “a jury trial is the norm for a felony case and a bench trial is the exception.” People v. Powell, 281 Ill. 1996See People ex rel[.] Daley v[.] Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209 , 533 N.E.2d [873] (1988).” Defendant also argues that "[d]efense counsel made clear that he had a personal preference for a jury trial and he decided to go forward with the jury trial regardless of the defendant’s wishes.” •1 Although we think defendant’s argument mischaracterizes the record regarding Clifton’s discussion with defendant on the desirability of a jury trial, we choose to address it as if — as defendant claims on appeal — defendant wanted a bench trial all along and Clifton never so informed the court. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Powellgreen2 sentences2025Taking defendant’s allegation as true and liberally construing it in his favor, as we must at this stage, defendant’s allegation sufficiently demonstrates defendant informed defense counsel he wanted a bench trial and defense counsel usurped defendant’s right to waive a jury trial by failing to honor defendant’s wishes. -8- ¶ 27 The State relies on People v. Powell, 281 Ill. 2021Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22 (1988). “[W]aivers [of constitutional rights] must not only be voluntary, but must be ‘ ”knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 21 The waiver of a bench trial rarely comes up in case law, likely because “a jury trial is the norm for a felony case and a bench trial is the exception.” People v. Powell, 281 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Talmage v. Union Central Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2009Talmage v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 315 Ill.App. 623, 642 , 43 N.E.2d 575 (1942). 2009Talmage v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 315 Ill.App. 623, 642 , 43 N.E.2d 575 (1942). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Matchengreen1 sentence2024In re Marriage of Matchen, 372 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2021Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22 (1988). “[W]aivers [of constitutional rights] must not only be voluntary, but must be ‘ ”knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 21 The waiver of a bench trial rarely comes up in case law, likely because “a jury trial is the norm for a felony case and a bench trial is the exception.” People v. Powell, 281 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McClanahangreen1 sentence2021Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22 (1988). “[W]aivers [of constitutional rights] must not only be voluntary, but must be ‘ ”knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 21 The waiver of a bench trial rarely comes up in case law, likely because “a jury trial is the norm for a felony case and a bench trial is the exception.” People v. Powell, 281 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22 (1988). “[W]aivers [of constitutional rights] must not only be voluntary, but must be ‘ ”knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ” People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). ¶ 21 The waiver of a bench trial rarely comes up in case law, likely because “a jury trial is the norm for a felony case and a bench trial is the exception.” People v. Powell, 281 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Zemblidge
green
2 sentences2017Downs III resolved the issue arising from the reasonable-doubt question, and we note these circumstances for completeness. -5- 2017 IL App (2d) 121156-C respect to the bench-trial claim: “Counsel adopts in part and amends Defendant’s #11, to wit: ‘On first and second day of trial defendant asked (trial) counsel to dismiss the Jury and instead continue with a Bench Trial, but counsel ignored defendant.’ Defendant acknowledges that once the trial had begun the decision to waive defendant’s jury right reverts to the discretion of the court (People v. Zemblidge, 104 Ill. 2017In submitting defendant’s second amended motion alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Krankel counsel stated with respect to the bench-trial claim: “Counsel adopts in part and amends Defendant’s #11, to wit: ‘On first and second day of trial defendant asked (trial) counsel to dismiss the Jury and instead continue with a Bench Trial, but counsel ignored defendant.’ Defendant acknowledges that once the trial had begun the decision to waive defendant’s jury right reverts to the discretion of the court (People v. Zemblidge, 104 Ill. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo
green
2 sentences2011A divided panel of the appellate court upheld the circuit court's order. 405 Ill. 2011A divided panel of the appellate court upheld the circuit court’s order. 405 Ill. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
In re Marriage of Bernay
green
1 sentence2024In re Marriage of Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 14 . ¶ 21 In a bench trial or a hearing such as the lengthy multi-day proceedings on Scott’s motion, the trial court sits as the trier of fact, hearing the witnesses and reviewing the direct presentation of the evidence, and it is in the best position to make credibility determinations and factual findings. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Kallal
green
1 sentence2019As a result, we find no need to expand the supreme court’s bench trial requirement to a jury trial on a defendant’s recovery petition if the jury has been properly instructed on this point of law.” People v. Kallal, 2019 IL App (4th) 180099, ¶ 50 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Schmitt
green
2 sentences2018People v. Schmitt , 131 Ill. 2d 128 , 138, 137 Ill.Dec. 12 , 545 N.E.2d 665 (1989). 2018People v. Schmitt , 131 Ill. 2d 128 , 138, 137 Ill.Dec. 12 , 545 N.E.2d 665 (1989). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2016Id. ¶ 34 In his initial appointment, Krankel counsel adopted five of defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective assistance, including the general claim, the bench-trial claim, and the alibi claim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Colgan v. Rae-Ann Electric Co.
green
1 sentence1994App. 3d 386, 392 , 414 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 .) Defendant does not argue that the dual trial was error, but only that the award of damages in the bench trial was error. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Shegog
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 615 , 346 N.E.2d 208 , the appellate court found that the trial court improperly admitted an undisclosed statement into evidence in a bench trial in violation of Rule 412 and section 114 — 10. 1992(Shegog, 37 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Enoch
green
1 sentence1992Our supreme court, in People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176 , clarified the necessity of raising alleged errors in a written, post-trial motion. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Pagan
green
2 sentences1983(People v. Pagan (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 525 , 288 N.E.2d 102 .) Nothing in the record persuades us that the trial court was influenced by the witness’ race in considering his testimony. 1983(People v. Pagan (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 525 , 288 N.E.2d 102 .) Nothing in the record persuades us that the trial court was influenced by the witness’ race in considering his testimony. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Terranova
neutral
1 sentence1979App. 3d 1023, 1027 , 379 N.E.2d 1303 ; People v. Terranova (1977), 49 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Jenkins
neutral
2 sentences1979Although defendant did not raise the issue in her post-trial motion, it has been held that a post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve error in a bench trial when the error has been brought to the attention of the trial court by motion or timely objection, thus" giving the trial court the opportunity to correct the error (People v. Jenkins (1978), 62 Ill. 1979App. 3d 1023, 1027 , 379 N.E.2d 1303 ; People v. Terranova (1977), 49 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
The People v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences1977(People v. Hoffman (1942), 381 Ill. 460 , 45 N.E.2d 874 .) This court’s Third District has held that a post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve error in a bench trial when the error has been brought to the attention of the trial court by motion or by timely objection, thus, giving the trial court the opportunity to correct the error involved. 1977(People v. Hoffman (1942), 381 Ill. 460 , 45 N.E.2d 874 .) This court’s Third District has held that a post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve error in a bench trial when the error has been brought to the attention of the trial court by motion or by timely objection, thus, giving the trial court the opportunity to correct the error involved. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Guynn
green
1 sentence1977People v. Guynn (1975), 33 Ill. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
The People v. Gooden
green
2 sentences1971The cases cited by defendants, People v. Gooden (1949), 403 Ill. 455 , 86 N.E.2d 198 and People v. Botulinski (1943), 383 Ill. 608 , 50 N.E.2d 716 , bear no similarity to the contention urged by defendants. 1971The cases cited by defendants, People v. Gooden (1949), 403 Ill. 455 , 86 N.E.2d 198 and People v. Botulinski (1943), 383 Ill. 608 , 50 N.E.2d 716 , bear no similarity to the contention urged by defendants. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
The People v. Botulinski
green
2 sentences1971The cases cited by defendants, People v. Gooden (1949), 403 Ill. 455 , 86 N.E.2d 198 and People v. Botulinski (1943), 383 Ill. 608 , 50 N.E.2d 716 , bear no similarity to the contention urged by defendants. 1971The cases cited by defendants, People v. Gooden (1949), 403 Ill. 455 , 86 N.E.2d 198 and People v. Botulinski (1943), 383 Ill. 608 , 50 N.E.2d 716 , bear no similarity to the contention urged by defendants. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
The People v. Robinson
green
1 sentence1969People v. Robinson, 30 Ill2d 437, 197 NE2d 45 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.