bench trial rule in Texas

2003See IKB Indus., Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp. , 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997) (appeal from dismissal as a sanction); Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon , 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1992) (mandamus review of dismissal as a sanction).

2003See IKB Indus., Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex.1997) (appeal from dismissal as a sanction); Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex.1992) (mandamus review of dismissal as a sanction).

2003See IKB Indus., Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp. , 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997) (appeal from dismissal as a sanction); Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon , 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1992) (mandamus review of dismissal as a sanction).

2003See IKB Indus., Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex.1997) (appeal from dismissal as a sanction); Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex.1992) (mandamus review of dismissal as a sanction).

2019See King’s River Trail Ass’n, 447 S.W.3d at 451 ; see also Renaud, 2017 WL 6045566 , at *3.

2015Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g en banc) (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)).12 To analyze the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not.

2015Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g en banc) (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)).12 To analyze the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not.

2015Compare Magana v. Citibank, N.A., 454 S.W.3d 667 , 681 n.11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (examining the appellants’ prayer for relief and concluding that they challenged the factual sufficiency of the evidence because they sought remand, which is the appropriate remedy when the evidence is factually insufficient) with Whitmire v. Greenridge Place Apartments, No. 01-06-00963-CV, 2007 WL 2894167 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2007, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (construing a challenge to the denial of a “motion for directed verdict” in a bench trial as a challenge

2014Nor do the parties address the applicability to a bench trial of the principle that a trial court has no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on self-defense, even if it is raised by the evidence. 9 See Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2014Nor do the parties address the applicability to a bench trial of the principle that a trial court has no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on self-defense, even if it is raised by the evidence. 9 See Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2011City of Roanoke v. Town of Westlake , 111 S.W.3d 617, 626 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). [5] The trial court limited the bench trial to this claim p ursuant to a motion to bifurcate filed by the Kettricks, and it stated that it would conduct a trial on the partition matter, if necessary. [6] In its findings and conclusions, the trial court generally referred to the “Defendants,” but it identified the Kettricks, the Cupits, and Tate all as defendants at various points.

2002In our original opinion, we only addressed the issue regarding the absence of the written jury waiver, and we held that “the failure to procure a written waiver or a statement in open court by the defendant waiving his right of trial by jury prior to proceeding to a bench trial was error.” Garza v. State, 61 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001), vacated, 77 S.W.3d 292 (Tex.Crim.