22 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Covenant Medical Centergreen2 sentences2021“A defendant who moves for summary judgment may meet its initial burden of production in at least two ways: (1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff's case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) (citation), or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the cause of action (Celotex test). (*** Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 (1986) ***).” Williams v. Covenant Medical Center, 316 Ill. 2011"The trial court's summary judgment may be affirmed on any basis appearing in the record whether or not the court relied on that basis or its reasoning was correct." Ray Dancer, Inc. v. DMC Corp., 230 Ill.App.3d 40, 50 , 171 Ill.Dec. 824 , 594 N.E.2d 1344 (1992). ¶ 6 Where, as in this case, the defendant moves for summary judgment, she may prevail "(1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff's case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) [citation], or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient e | 6 | 8 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen2 sentences2025Here, the trial court found plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the quantum meruit counterclaim to be a Celotex motion (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). 2023However, on a Celotex-type motion, the defendant satisfies its initial burden of production when it “ ‘points out’ the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s position.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 ; see also Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951, ¶ 218 (“[I]n a Celotex motion, the defendant puts forth no affirmative evidence; it merely argues that plaintiff has no evidence to prove its case.”). | 4 | 13 |
Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc.green2 sentences2022“A defendant who moves for summary judgment may meet its initial burden of production in at least two ways: (1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff’s case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) [citation], or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the cause of action (Celotex test) (see Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc., 294 Ill. 2013App. 3d 682, 688 (2000), explained the two differing types of summary judgment motions: “A defendant who moves for summary judgment may meet its initial burden of production in at least two ways: (1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff’s case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) (see Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 , 240-41 *** (1986)), or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the cause of action (Celotex test) (see Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc. | 4 | 6 |
Willett v. Cessna Aircraft Co.green2 sentences2026Id. ¶ 27 The distinction between the two is often relevant because, in cases involving a Celotex- type motion, “strict compliance with Rule 191(b)’s affidavit requirement *** is not automatically necessary.” Jiotis, 2014 IL App (2d) 121293, ¶ 26 . 2023See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326 ; see also Willett v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Ill. | 2 | 5 |
Purtill v. Hessgreen2 sentences2013App. 3d 682, 688 (2000), explained the two differing types of summary judgment motions: “A defendant who moves for summary judgment may meet its initial burden of production in at least two ways: (1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff’s case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) (see Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 , 240-41 *** (1986)), or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the cause of action (Celotex test) (see Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc. 2000A defendant who moves for summary judgment may meet its initial burden of production in at least two ways: (1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff's case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) (see Purtill v. Hess , 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 , 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986)), or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the cause of action ( Celotex test) (see Rice v. AAA Aerostar, Inc. , 294 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Selby v. O'Deagreen2 sentences2025See Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951, ¶ 218 . 2023However, on a Celotex-type motion, the defendant satisfies its initial burden of production when it “ ‘points out’ the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s position.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 ; see also Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951, ¶ 218 (“[I]n a Celotex motion, the defendant puts forth no affirmative evidence; it merely argues that plaintiff has no evidence to prove its case.”). | 2 | 2 |
O'Donnell v. Bailey & Associates Counseling & Psychotherapy LLCgreen2 sentences2026If, on the other hand, the motion seeks to establish that the plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of the case due to a lack of evidence, it is a “Celotex motion.” O’Donnell, 2023 IL App (1st) 221736, ¶ 53 . ¶ 25 In a Celotex motion, the movant must show that the evidence available to the plaintiff, even when viewed in its entirety, is insufficient to prove the critical allegations as a matter of law. 2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Rennickgreen1 sentence2021In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (1998). ¶ 12 RealWheels characterizes Crossan’s motion as a Celotex motion, challenging RealWheels to produce evidence of damages, but Crossan relies on Polka’s deposition as proof that RealWheels suffered no compensable damages. | 1 | 1 |
IGEN, Inc. v. Whitegreen1 sentence2021“Inasmuch as the damages claimed by defendant, as set forth in his examination before trial, are neither actual nor ascertainable and 4 No. 1-18-0812 are speculative in nature, he failed to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice.” Collard & Roe, P.C. v. Vlacancich, 6 Misc. 3d 17 , 18–19, 789 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 600 (2004); see IGEN, Inc. v. White, 250 A.D.2d 463, 464-65 (1998) (“What plaintiff's argument overlooks is that it has sustained no injury unless there has been an infringement against which its patent would have afforded a right of recovery”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreen
green
1 sentence2026Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 110452, ¶ 22 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jiotis v. The Burr Ridge Park District
green
1 sentence2026Id. ¶ 27 The distinction between the two is often relevant because, in cases involving a Celotex- type motion, “strict compliance with Rule 191(b)’s affidavit requirement *** is not automatically necessary.” Jiotis, 2014 IL App (2d) 121293, ¶ 26 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Cohen v. Chicago Park District
green
1 sentence2023Cohen v. Chicago Park District, 2017 IL 121800 , ¶ 17. 2 A “Celotex motion” is a summary judgment motion made by a party who does not have the burden of proof and which asserts that the nonmovant cannot prove an element of its claim. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Berke v. Manilow
green
1 sentence2023As such, it is unclear to this court what evidence Grossinger could obtain to prove Ocampo’s lack of evidence, and we are unaware of any requirement of Grossinger to do so. ¶ 25 Rather, as we have stated, Ocampo is required as the nonmovant to come forward “with some evidence that arguably would entitle recovery at trial.” Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397 , ¶ 3 We note Grossinger’s entreaty to this court to treat his motion for summary judgment like a motion for a directed verdict and cites to Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 2019 IL 123895 , for support. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC
green
1 sentence2023As such, it is unclear to this court what evidence Grossinger could obtain to prove Ocampo’s lack of evidence, and we are unaware of any requirement of Grossinger to do so. ¶ 25 Rather, as we have stated, Ocampo is required as the nonmovant to come forward “with some evidence that arguably would entitle recovery at trial.” Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397 , ¶ 3 We note Grossinger’s entreaty to this court to treat his motion for summary judgment like a motion for a directed verdict and cites to Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 2019 IL 123895 , for support. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Collard & Roe, P.C. v. Vlacancich
neutral
1 sentence2021“Inasmuch as the damages claimed by defendant, as set forth in his examination before trial, are neither actual nor ascertainable and 4 No. 1-18-0812 are speculative in nature, he failed to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice.” Collard & Roe, P.C. v. Vlacancich, 6 Misc. 3d 17 , 18–19, 789 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 600 (2004); see IGEN, Inc. v. White, 250 A.D.2d 463, 464-65 (1998) (“What plaintiff's argument overlooks is that it has sustained no injury unless there has been an infringement against which its patent would have afforded a right of recovery”). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Ray Dancer, Inc. v. D M C Corp.
green
2 sentences2011"The trial court's summary judgment may be affirmed on any basis appearing in the record whether or not the court relied on that basis or its reasoning was correct." Ray Dancer, Inc. v. DMC Corp., 230 Ill.App.3d 40, 50 , 171 Ill.Dec. 824 , 594 N.E.2d 1344 (1992). ¶ 6 Where, as in this case, the defendant moves for summary judgment, she may prevail "(1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff's case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) [citation], or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient e 2011"The trial court's summary judgment may be affirmed on any basis appearing in the record whether or not the court relied on that basis or its reasoning was correct." Ray Dancer, Inc. v. DMC Corp., 230 Ill.App.3d 40, 50 , 171 Ill.Dec. 824 , 594 N.E.2d 1344 (1992). ¶ 6 Where, as in this case, the defendant moves for summary judgment, she may prevail "(1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff's case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law (traditional test) [citation], or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient e | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Washington v. City of Evanston
green
2 sentences2011Gomez met her initial burden here by arguing, based on plaintiff's interrogatory answers ( Washington v. City of Evanston, 336 Ill.App.3d 117, 130-31 , 270 Ill.Dec. 288 , 782 N.E.2d 847 (2002)), that plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prevail because Krivickas is deceased, and plaintiff, the only other known witness to the collision, is barred by the Act from testifying as to certain issues. 2011Gomez met her initial burden here by arguing, based on plaintiff's interrogatory answers ( Washington v. City of Evanston, 336 Ill.App.3d 117, 130-31 , 270 Ill.Dec. 288 , 782 N.E.2d 847 (2002)), that plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prevail because Krivickas is deceased, and plaintiff, the only other known witness to the collision, is barred by the Act from testifying as to certain issues. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.