Robert motion in Illinois

2026See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (a case may be taken on appellant’s brief only where the issues are simple and can be decided without additional briefing). ¶ 31 Initially, we note that our review of this appeal is somewhat hindered by deficiencies in the record on appeal.

2013First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). ¶ 16 ANALYSIS ¶ 17 Collett argues that the trial court erred in granting Robert’s motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations period in section 8(a)(1) should have been equitably tolled given her situation.

2015Quoting Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill. 2d 502, 505 (1960), the court stated that section 2-1401 “ ‘does not afford a litigant a remedy whereby he may be relieved of the consequences of his own mistakes or negligence.’ ” Furthermore, the court found that “ ‘to set aside a judgment based on newly discovered evidence, it is quite settled that the evidence must be such as could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of or prior to the entry of the judgment,’ ” quoting In re Marriage of Travlos, 218 Ill.

2015Quoting Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill. 2d 502, 505 (1960), the court stated that section 2-1401 “ ‘does not afford a litigant a remedy whereby he may be relieved of the consequences of his own mistakes or negligence.’ ” Furthermore, the court found that “ ‘to set aside a judgment based on newly discovered evidence, it is quite settled that the evidence must be such as could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of or prior to the entry of the judgment,’ ” quoting In re Marriage of Travlos, 218 Ill.

2015Quoting Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill. 2d 502, 505 (1960), the court stated that section 2-1401 “ ‘does not afford a litigant a remedy whereby he may be relieved of the consequences of his own mistakes or negligence.’ ” Furthermore, the court found that “ ‘to set aside a judgment based on newly discovered evidence, it is quite settled that the evidence must be such as could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of or prior to the entry of the judgment,’ ” quoting In re Marriage of Travlos, 218 Ill.

2015Quoting Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill. 2d 502, 505 (1960), the court stated that section 2-1401 “ ‘does not afford a litigant a remedy whereby he may be relieved of the consequences of his own mistakes or negligence.’ ” Furthermore, the court found that “ ‘to set aside a judgment based on newly discovered evidence, it is quite settled that the evidence must be such as could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of or prior to the entry of the judgment,’ ” quoting In re Marriage of Travlos, 218 Ill.

2015King v. King, 130 Ill.

2015King v. King, 130 Ill.

2003Eads , 204 Ill. 2d at 96 ; Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook , 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000).

2003Eads, 204 Ill. 2d at 96 ; Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000).

2026Robert has forfeited this undeveloped argument. - 11 - No. 1-25-0459 See Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12 (Contentions without reasoned argument do not merit consideration); Ill.

2026See Chernyakova, 2019 IL App (1st) 173066 , ¶ 42. ¶ 39 An attorney presenting a fee petition has the burden of establishing the reasonable value of his services.

2021Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill.2d 33, 53 (1994).

2021Specifically, she contends that Robert’s challenge to the enforceability of the June 21, 2018, order dissolving the parties’ marriage and awarding them property was frivolous. - 16 - Nos. 1-18-1558, 1-19-0847, 1-19-1662 & 1-20-0324 ¶ 44 As stated in our discussion of jurisdiction, the dissolution order expressly left pending Michele’s petition for contribution to her attorney fees. 4 In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119 (recognizing that a petition for dissolution involves a single claim composed of ancillary issues).

2020Sadovsky, 2019 IL App (3d) 180204, ¶ 47 (noting that any refusal to consider evidence regarding the statutory factors “is in direct contravention of the statutory guidelines”). ¶ 78 Moreover, contrary to Robert’s claim, the trial court was not confused as to the relevant time period for assessing a substantial change in circumstances.

2020See id. § 609.2(e). 39 “The standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation is de novo. [Citation.] The primary objective of our analysis is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] ‘It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the words of a statute should be given their plain, ordinary[,] and accepted meaning, unless to do so would defeat the legislative intent.’ Peoria Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Jefferson Trust

2013Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 396 (2009). ¶ 28 In the case before us, dismissal of Robert’s challenge to the sixth amendment to the trust was based solely on the “doctrine of election.” That doctrine, as applied to wills, is not a creature of the common law but was imported into equity from civil law.

2013Carper v. Crowl, 149 Ill. 465, 474-75 (1894).

1997See In re Marriage of Dunseth, 260 Ill.App.3d 816, 833 , 198 Ill.

1997See In re Marriage of Dunseth, 260 Ill.