compulsion defense in Kansas

1991In that case, the court concluded that the compulsion defense was applicable to charges of felony murder. 241 Kan. at 642 .

1988However, in State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987), we pointed out that the statutory limitation on the use of the compulsion defense is restricted to crimes of intentional killing.

2011Generally, the compulsion defense is a recognized statutory defense in Kansas under limited circumstances stated in K.S.A. 21-3209: “(1) A person is not guilty of a crime other than murder or voluntary manslaughter by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion or threat of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes that death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or upon his spouse, parent, child, brother or sister if he does not perform such conduct. “(2) The defense provided by this section is not available to one who willfully or

1995This court has held that the compulsion defense is not available in escape cases unless all of the following conditions are met: “ ‘(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; “ ‘(2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which makes any result from such complaints illusory; “ ‘(3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; “ ‘(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other “innocent” persons i

2011App. 2d 114, 115 , 896 P.2d 1101 , rev. denied 258 Kan. 861 (1995), the district court also determined the compulsion defense was not available to an escapee when the imminent threat is not to the escapee but to a third party.

2011On appeal, a panel of this court explicitly determined that “the compulsion defense does not apply where the imminent threat is not to the inmate but to third parties.” 21 Kan.

2003Applying this rule in State v. Davis, 256 Kan. 1 , 883 P. 2d 735 (1994), this court found threats made by a codefendant which were subsequent to the crime were not relevant to the defendant's compulsion defense and were not admissible.

2003Applying this rule in State v. Davis, 256 Kan. 1 , 883 P. 2d 735 (1994), this court found threats made by a codefendant which were subsequent to the crime were not relevant to the defendant's compulsion defense and were not admissible.

2024D.H. does not make a similar argument about the compulsion defense and, as we noted in Trotter, the Kansas Supreme Court "explained that omitting the instruction on the burden of proof for self-defense is not the functional equivalent of omitting an element of the charged offense" and reaffirmed the clear error test as set forth in Crabtree and Cooperwood. 2022 WL 2112212 , at *9 (citing State v. Staten, 304 Kan. 957, 966-67 , 377 P.3d 427 [2016] [Staten II]).

2024D.H. does not make a similar argument about the compulsion defense and, as we noted in Trotter, the Kansas Supreme Court "explained that omitting the instruction on the burden of proof for self-defense is not the functional equivalent of omitting an element of the charged offense" and reaffirmed the clear error test as set forth in Crabtree and Cooperwood. 2022 WL 2112212 , at *9 (citing State v. Staten, 304 Kan. 957, 966-67 , 377 P.3d 427 [2016] [Staten II]).

2024App. 3d 983, 989 , 398 N.E.2d 28 (1979); see also McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333, 361 , 51 A.3d 623 (2012) (noting the defense of "[n]ecessity is similar to duress, except that the compulsion to act comes from 'the physical forces of nature [storms, privations] rather than from human beings'"); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331 , 337 n.3, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975) ("The source of compulsion for duress is the threatened conduct of another human being, while the source of compulsion for necessity is the presence of natural physical forces.") The compulsion defense is available if coercion or dure

2021In pursuing a postsentence motion to withdraw a plea, "[t]he defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have entered the plea and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Bricker, 292 Kan. 239 , Syl. ¶ 5, 252 P.3d 118 (2011).

2021In pursuing a postsentence motion to withdraw a plea, "[t]he defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have entered the plea and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Bricker, 292 Kan. 239 , Syl. ¶ 5, 252 P.3d 118 (2011).

2014In the Notes on Use to PIK Crim. 3d 54.13, it states that the instructional language regarding when the defense of compulsion is unavailable “should be used only when there is some evidence indicating that the defendant willfully or wantonly placed himself or herself in the situation indicated.” In State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992), this court explained the types of situations that would prevent a defendant from raising a compulsion defense.

2014In the Notes on Use to PIK Crim. 3d 54.13, it states that the instructional language regarding when the defense of compulsion is unavailable “should be used only when there is some evidence indicating that the defendant willfully or wantonly placed himself or herself in the situation indicated.” In State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992), this court explained the types of situations that would prevent a defendant from raising a compulsion defense.

2011Generally, the compulsion defense is a recognized statutory defense in Kansas under limited circumstances stated in K.S.A. 21-3209: “(1) A person is not guilty of a crime other than murder or voluntary manslaughter by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion or threat of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes that death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or upon his spouse, parent, child, brother or sister if he does not perform such conduct. “(2) The defense provided by this section is not available to one who willfully or

2011Generally, the compulsion defense is a recognized statutory defense in Kansas under limited circumstances stated in K.S.A. 21-3209: “(1) A person is not guilty of a crime other than murder or voluntary manslaughter by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion or threat of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes that death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or upon his spouse, parent, child, brother or sister if he does not perform such conduct. “(2) The defense provided by this section is not available to one who willfully or

2008In our review, we also agree with the Myers court’s apparent acknowledgment that coercion which is not “present, imminent, . . . impending[, and] continuous” can often overlap with a “reasonable opportunity to escape” or withdraw. 233 Kan. at 616 .

2008Specifically, before our Bell decision in 2003, we often had stated that the evidentiary standard for granting the compulsion instruction request was something greater than “slight and supported only by the defendant’s own testimony.” For example, that same year, in State v. Kessler, 276 Kan. 202, 210 , 73 P.3d 761 (2003), we had recognized some similarities to the Bell standard but also some differences: “A defendant is entitled to instructions on the law applicable to his or her theory of defense [1] if there is evidence to support the theory. [2] Furthermore, there must be evidence which, v

2008Specifically, before our Bell decision in 2003, we often had stated that the evidentiary standard for granting the compulsion instruction request was something greater than “slight and supported only by the defendant’s own testimony.” For example, that same year, in State v. Kessler, 276 Kan. 202, 210 , 73 P.3d 761 (2003), we had recognized some similarities to the Bell standard but also some differences: “A defendant is entitled to instructions on the law applicable to his or her theory of defense [1] if there is evidence to support the theory. [2] Furthermore, there must be evidence which, v

2008State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 806 , 36 P.3d 273 (2001); State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23 , 853 P.2d 644 (1993).” (Emphasis added.) Our decision 30 years before Kessler in State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 197 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), made the same two distinctions, but in a slightly different way: “A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense [1] if it is supported by any evidence whatever. [Citations omitted.] [2] On the other hand, there must be evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would justify a jury finding in accor

2008State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 806 , 36 P.3d 273 (2001); State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23 , 853 P.2d 644 (1993).” (Emphasis added.) Our decision 30 years before Kessler in State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 197 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), made the same two distinctions, but in a slightly different way: “A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense [1] if it is supported by any evidence whatever. [Citations omitted.] [2] On the other hand, there must be evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would justify a jury finding in accor

2008State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 806 , 36 P.3d 273 (2001); State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23 , 853 P.2d 644 (1993).” (Emphasis added.) Our decision 30 years before Kessler in State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 197 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), made the same two distinctions, but in a slightly different way: “A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense [1] if it is supported by any evidence whatever. [Citations omitted.] [2] On the other hand, there must be evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would justify a jury finding in accor

2008State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 806 , 36 P.3d 273 (2001); State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23 , 853 P.2d 644 (1993).” (Emphasis added.) Our decision 30 years before Kessler in State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 197 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), made the same two distinctions, but in a slightly different way: “A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense [1] if it is supported by any evidence whatever. [Citations omitted.] [2] On the other hand, there must be evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would justify a jury finding in accor

2008State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 806 , 36 P.3d 273 (2001); State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23 , 853 P.2d 644 (1993).” (Emphasis added.) Our decision 30 years before Kessler in State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 197 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), made the same two distinctions, but in a slightly different way: “A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense [1] if it is supported by any evidence whatever. [Citations omitted.] [2] On the other hand, there must be evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would justify a jury finding in accor

2008State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 806 , 36 P.3d 273 (2001); State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23 , 853 P.2d 644 (1993).” (Emphasis added.) Our decision 30 years before Kessler in State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 197 , 510 P.2d 115 (1973), made the same two distinctions, but in a slightly different way: “A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense [1] if it is supported by any evidence whatever. [Citations omitted.] [2] On the other hand, there must be evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would justify a jury finding in accor

2005The district court “must instruct the juiy on the law applicable to the defendant’s theories for which there is supporting evidence.” State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 356 , 85 P.3d 697 (2004).

2005The district court “must instruct the juiy on the law applicable to the defendant’s theories for which there is supporting evidence.” State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 356 , 85 P.3d 697 (2004).

1998In State v. Riedl, 15 Kan.

1994Cf. State v. Crawford, 253 Kan. 629, 641 , 861 P.2d 791 (1993).

1994Cf. State v. Crawford, 253 Kan. 629, 641 , 861 P.2d 791 (1993).

1994There was no duty to instruct on the lesser offense of robbery because the evidence clearly shows that a greater offense, aggravated robbery, occurred. [Citation omitted.] The trial court was not required to instruct on the lesser included offense of robbery.” 255 Kan. at 129-30 .

1991Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346 (Alaska App. 1984).

1991Once the coercion justifying the escape disappears, there is no *536 policy reason to justify the convict in remaining at large.” State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d at 635 .