compulsion inquiry in Iowa

2021See State v. Walker, 671 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). 16 A defendant asserting a compulsion defense must generate a fact question by proof of four elements: 1. defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; 2. that defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed [the defendant] in a situation in which it was probable that [the defendant] would be forced to commit a criminal act; 3. that the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law; and

2019State v. Walker, 671 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003).

2011In this part of his opinion, Justice Kennedy borrowed from earlier language in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 , 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 430 (1995), which held that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless they impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Yet Justice Kennedy also declined to treat the compulsion inquiry as simply a comparison between the individual’s conditions after he or she invoked Fifth Amendment rights and a preexisting “baseline.” McKune, 536 U.S.

2011In this part of his opinion, Justice Kennedy borrowed from earlier language in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 , 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 430 (1995), which held that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless they impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Yet Justice Kennedy also declined to treat the compulsion inquiry as simply a comparison between the individual’s conditions after he or she invoked Fifth Amendment rights and a preexisting “baseline.” McKune, 536 U.S.

2011Id. at 5.

2011Id. at 5 .

2021See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778 , 793–94 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing freestanding claims of actual innocence).

2017See State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196, 210 (Iowa 2008) (finding erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt).

2015See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994) (“When complaining about the adequacy of an attorney’s representation, it is not enough to simply claim that counsel should have done a better job.

2011In this part of his opinion, Justice Kennedy borrowed from earlier language in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 , 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 430 (1995), which held that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless they impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Yet Justice Kennedy also declined to treat the compulsion inquiry as simply a comparison between the individual’s conditions after he or she invoked Fifth Amendment rights and a preexisting “baseline.” McKune, 536 U.S.

2011In this part of his opinion, Justice Kennedy borrowed from earlier language in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 , 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 430 (1995), which held that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless they impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Yet Justice Kennedy also declined to treat the compulsion inquiry as simply a comparison between the individual’s conditions after he or she invoked Fifth Amendment rights and a preexisting “baseline.” McKune, 536 U.S.

2011See Klingensmith, 256 Iowa at 369-70 , 127 N.W.2d at 657 .

2011See Klingensmith, 256 Iowa at 369-70 , 127 N.W.2d at 657 .

2011See Wilson, 189 N.W.2d at 534 .

1998In Arizona, for example, where the defense is expressly prohibited “for offenses involving homicide or serious physical injury,” see Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 13-412(C), the supreme court ruled the defense unavailable as a matter of law because “[f]irst-degree murder, whether premeditated or felony murder, is a homicide.” State v. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493 , 647 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz.1982).

1998In Arizona, for example, where the defense is expressly prohibited “for offenses involving homicide or serious physical injury,” see Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 13-412(C), the supreme court ruled the defense unavailable as a matter of law because “[f]irst-degree murder, whether premeditated or felony murder, is a homicide.” State v. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493 , 647 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz.1982).

1995The Iowa court adopted the rationale of People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-32 , 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 115 , 69 A.L.R.3d 668, 676 (1974), which held: “A limited defense of necessity is available if the following conditions exist: (1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is not time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There i

1995The Iowa court adopted the rationale of People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-32 , 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 115 , 69 A.L.R.3d 668, 676 (1974), which held: “A limited defense of necessity is available if the following conditions exist: (1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is not time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There i

1995In State v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Iowa 1978), the Iowa court recognized a compulsion defense to an escape from prison and set out the conditions that need to exist for the defense to be available under Iowa Code section 745.1.

1995The Iowa court adopted the rationale of People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-32 , 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 115 , 69 A.L.R.3d 668, 676 (1974), which held: “A limited defense of necessity is available if the following conditions exist: (1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is not time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There i

1994For one thing the compulsion defense seems inappropriate and unavailing under State v. Walton, 311 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Iowa 1981).

1993See State v. LeCompte, 327 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Crim.Jury Instr. 200.35. *814 Finally, Foell contends his trial counsel was ineffective by calling as defense witnesses Oltman and the DCI agent who interrogated Oltman.

1982Iowa Code section 703.1; cf. State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Iowa 1979) (aider and abettor subject to mandatory five-year sentence under section 902.7 for use of firearm despite fact the firearm was used by another participant in crime).