Vehicle Code violation in Pennsylvania

2025This Court has explained that: if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. -7- J-S02019-25 Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015).5 Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than the probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the informati

2025This Court has explained that: if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. -7- J-S02019-25 Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015).5 Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than the probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the informati

2023See Chase, 960 A.2d at 120 (citing Whren and observing that, “if police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer’s motive for stopping the vehicle is unnecessary” and further explaining that “even stops based on factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the mistake is objectively reasonable”).

2023See Chase, 960 A.2d at 120 (citing Whren and observing that, “if police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer’s motive for stopping the vehicle is unnecessary” and further explaining that “even stops based on factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the mistake is objectively reasonable”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (emphasis added); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (authorizing police - 12 - J-A19044-24 to stop a vehicle when there is reasonable suspicion that a Vehicle Code violation has occurred).

2025See Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (emphasis added); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (authorizing police - 12 - J-A19044-24 to stop a vehicle when there is reasonable suspicion that a Vehicle Code violation has occurred).

2022See id. at 403-04 (stating that “furtive movements, when witnessed within the scope of a lawful traffic stop, [may] provide[] a reasonable basis for a protective frisk”) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (police officer must have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a Vehicle Code violation in order to engage in a traffic stop, with the level of suspicion depending on the nature of the violation).

2022See id. at 403-04 (stating that “furtive movements, when witnessed within the scope of a lawful traffic stop, [may] provide[] a reasonable basis for a protective frisk”) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (police officer must have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a Vehicle Code violation in order to engage in a traffic stop, with the level of suspicion depending on the nature of the violation).

2017In Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419 (Pa. Super. 2012), this Court explained: [Section] 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in support of a stop for the purpose of gathering information necessary to enforce the Vehicle Code violation.

2017In Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419 (Pa. Super. 2012), this Court explained: [Section] 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in support of a stop for the purpose of gathering information necessary to enforce the Vehicle Code violation.

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

2019Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway), Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield to emergency vehicles), and [Commonwealth v.] Feczko, 10 A.3d [1285,] 1291 [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)] (probable cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with Commonwealth v. Holmes, [] 14 A.3d 89 ,

1987See Commonwealth v. Clowser, 212 Pa.Super. 208 , 239 A.2d 870 (1968).

1987See Commonwealth v. Clowser, 212 Pa.Super. 208 , 239 A.2d 870 (1968).

1986Specifically, the trial court held that traffic light violations cannot fulfill the requirement established by earlier decisions of this Court that, to support a conviction under the homicide by vehicle law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant knew or should have known that he was engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation of which death was a “probable consequence.” Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 525 , 417 A.2d 160, 163 (1980).

1986Specifically, the trial court held that traffic light violations cannot fulfill the requirement established by earlier decisions of this Court that, to support a conviction under the homicide by vehicle law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant knew or should have known that he was engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation of which death was a “probable consequence.” Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 525 , 417 A.2d 160, 163 (1980).

2025However, when police initiate a traffic stop, our law requires reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation that requires investigation (or probable cause that the driver committed a non-investigable offense) “at the moment of the stop.” Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. 2009)) (brackets omitted).

2025However, when police initiate a traffic stop, our law requires reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation that requires investigation (or probable cause that the driver committed a non-investigable offense) “at the moment of the stop.” Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. 2009)) (brackets omitted).

2025Where a traffic stop is based upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, it “must serve a stated investigatory purpose.” Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205 A.3d 1264, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2019).

2025Where a traffic stop is based upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, it “must serve a stated investigatory purpose.” Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205 A.3d 1264, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2019).

2023“Thus, [section] 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in support of a stop for the purpose of gathering information necessary to -5- J-A23045-23 enforce the Vehicle Code violation.” Commonwealth v. Venable, 200 A.3d 490, 498 (Pa. Super. 2018). [W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of the violation has to be considered.

2023“Thus, [section] 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in support of a stop for the purpose of gathering information necessary to -5- J-A23045-23 enforce the Vehicle Code violation.” Commonwealth v. Venable, 200 A.3d 490, 498 (Pa. Super. 2018). [W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of the violation has to be considered.

2014“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) quoting Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007) (quoting In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2002)) 12.

2014“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) quoting Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007) (quoting In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2002)) 12.

2014“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) quoting Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007) (quoting In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2002)) 12.

2014“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) quoting Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007) (quoting In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2002)) 12.

2014“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) quoting Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007) (quoting In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2002)) 12.

2014“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) quoting Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2007) (quoting In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2002)) 12.

2016See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) (establishing a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of some other crime); Chase, 960 A.2d at 120 (stating that “[i]f police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer’s motive for stopping the vehicle is unnecessary.”). - 20 - J-A21040-16 bloodshot eyes, smelled the odor of alcohol on his person, and noted that Schwartzer was slurring his speech, which are all signs of intoxicat

2016See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) (establishing a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of some other crime); Chase, 960 A.2d at 120 (stating that “[i]f police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer’s motive for stopping the vehicle is unnecessary.”). - 20 - J-A21040-16 bloodshot eyes, smelled the odor of alcohol on his person, and noted that Schwartzer was slurring his speech, which are all signs of intoxicat

2009See, e.g., Jones, 912 A.2d at 824 (concluding that sentences for burglary and criminal trespass merged because “the very same narrow facts charged proved both crimes”); Comer, 716 A.2d at 599 (holding that sentences for homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter merged because “[ajppellant’s act of recklessly driving his vehicle into the SEPTA bus stand supports both the general element of the ‘commission of a reckless act’ of involuntary manslaughter and the specific requirement of a Vehicle Code violation of homicide by vehicle”); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 588 Pa. 574 , 650 A.2d 20, 24

2009See, e.g., Jones, 912 A.2d at 824 (concluding that sentences for burglary and criminal trespass merged because “the very same narrow facts charged proved both crimes”); Comer, 716 A.2d at 599 (holding that sentences for homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter merged because “[ajppellant’s act of recklessly driving his vehicle into the SEPTA bus stand supports both the general element of the ‘commission of a reckless act’ of involuntary manslaughter and the specific requirement of a Vehicle Code violation of homicide by vehicle”); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 588 Pa. 574 , 650 A.2d 20, 24

2023Clinton, 905 A.2d at 1030 .

2023Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

2009See, e.g., Jones, 912 A.2d at 824 (concluding that sentences for burglary and criminal trespass merged because “the very same narrow facts charged proved both crimes”); Comer, 716 A.2d at 599 (holding that sentences for homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter merged because “[ajppellant’s act of recklessly driving his vehicle into the SEPTA bus stand supports both the general element of the ‘commission of a reckless act’ of involuntary manslaughter and the specific requirement of a Vehicle Code violation of homicide by vehicle”); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 588 Pa. 574 , 650 A.2d 20, 24

2009See, e.g., Jones, 912 A.2d at 824 (concluding that sentences for burglary and criminal trespass merged because “the very same narrow facts charged proved both crimes”); Comer, 716 A.2d at 599 (holding that sentences for homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter merged because “[ajppellant’s act of recklessly driving his vehicle into the SEPTA bus stand supports both the general element of the ‘commission of a reckless act’ of involuntary manslaughter and the specific requirement of a Vehicle Code violation of homicide by vehicle”); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 588 Pa. 574 , 650 A.2d 20, 24

1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d

1987In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015 , 104 S.Ct. 1260 , 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit: By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce d

2024“This is true even if . . . the Vehicle Code violation witnessed by the officer is a minor offense.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

2024“This is true even if . . . the Vehicle Code violation witnessed by the officer is a minor offense.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

2023Id. at 1032-34 .

2021Moreover, “a police officer may stop a motor vehicle if he or she reasonably believes that a provision of the [] Vehicle Code is being or has been violated.” Commonwealth v. Dewitt, 608 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa. 1992). -7- J-S23011-21 Probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, is required to justify a vehicle stop for a suspected Vehicle Code violation when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.