Vehicle Code violation in California

2014(Cf. Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 [“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”].) Thus, it is not an “unwarranted extension” of McKay to apply that case to a situation such as 7 existed in Gomez and in the instant case, where even though the reason for prolonging the detention had nothing to do with the Vehicle Code violation that provided the initial justification for the traffic stop, the traffic stop was supported by probable cause.

2014(Cf. Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 [“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”].) Thus, it is not an “unwarranted extension” of McKay to apply that case to a situation such as 7 existed in Gomez and in the instant case, where even though the reason for prolonging the detention had nothing to do with the Vehicle Code violation that provided the initial justification for the traffic stop, the traffic stop was supported by probable cause.

1993Chapter 2 provides the procedures to be followed by peace officers making arrests for Vehicle Code violations committed in their presence. (§ 40300; see, e.g., People v. Wohlleben, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at p. 463 [procedure for warrantless misdemeanor arrest for Vehicle Code violation is provided in Vehicle Code, not Penal Code].) Section 40302 is one of several sections of chapter 2 which specify the various circumstances under which an officer either has the option to take a citee before a magistrate, or is required to do so.

1993Chapter 2 provides the procedures to be followed by peace officers making arrests for Vehicle Code violations committed in their presence. (§ 40300; see, e.g., People v. Wohlleben, supra, 261 Cal. App.2d at p. 463 [procedure for warrantless misdemeanor arrest for Vehicle Code violation is provided in Vehicle Code, not Penal Code].) Section 40302 is one of several sections of chapter 2 which specify the various circumstances under which an officer either has the option to take a citee before a magistrate, or is required to do so.

2014(People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1229 .) For purposes of evaluating the legality of a traffic stop, we look at whether there were facts to support an objective manifestation of the potential for a Vehicle Code violation, not whether after the fact there was actually a violation.

2014(People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1229 .) For purposes of evaluating the legality of a traffic stop, we look at whether there were facts to support an objective manifestation of the potential for a Vehicle Code violation, not whether after the fact there was actually a violation.

2024(People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148 .) “Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold” requiring only “ ‘ “some minimal level of objective justification.” ’ ” (U.S. v. Castillo, supra, 804 F.3d at p. 367 .) Circumstances can give rise to reasonable suspicion even if they do not “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277 .) As a result, “a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer making the stop reasonably suspects the violation of a traffic law even if later investigation dispels that suspicion.” (Peop

2024(People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148 .) “Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold” requiring only “ ‘ “some minimal level of objective justification.” ’ ” (U.S. v. Castillo, supra, 804 F.3d at p. 367 .) Circumstances can give rise to reasonable suspicion even if they do not “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277 .) As a result, “a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer making the stop reasonably suspects the violation of a traffic law even if later investigation dispels that suspicion.” (Peop

2014(See People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 605 (McKay).) Second, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 (Atwater) that an officer may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest a person who the officer has probable cause to believe has committed “even a very minor criminal offense,” such as a Vehicle Code violation.

2014(See People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 605 (McKay).) Second, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 (Atwater) that an officer may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest a person who the officer has probable cause to believe has committed “even a very minor criminal offense,” such as a Vehicle Code violation.

2014(See People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 605 (McKay).) Second, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 (Atwater) that an officer may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest a person who the officer has probable cause to believe has committed “even a very minor criminal offense,” such as a Vehicle Code violation.

2014(See People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 605 (McKay).) Second, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 (Atwater) that an officer may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest a person who the officer has probable cause to believe has committed “even a very minor criminal offense,” such as a Vehicle Code violation.

2016Appellant cites People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577 (McGaughran) and Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349 (Williams), for the proposition his detention was unlawfully prolonged where “Hanou, after obtaining all the information he needed in order to decide that appellant’s license tags were in good standing, and a citation was therefore unnecessary, chose to ask a series of investigative questions which were unrelated to the suspected Vehicle Code violation.” (AOB/15) (Italics added.) Concerning prolonged detentions following traffic stops, People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App

2009First, the McGaughran court clarified it was not addressing those traffic offenses "for which the officer is either required or authorized to take the defendant into custody and transport him . . . for the filing of a complaint." ( People v. McGaughran, supra , 25 Cal.3d at p. 583 .) Further, in framing the issue, the court relied on the fact that the defendant could not be arrested for that particular Vehicle Code violation, stating "the issue is whether a police officer who (1) has stopped a motorist for a traffic violation for which the latter cannot be taken into custody and (2) has alread

1993(People v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 837 , 496 P.2d 1205 ]; People v. Griffith (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 948, 950-951 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 367 ]; see Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 902-905 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; People v. Franklin (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 627, 633 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 529 ]; see also People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 582 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 ]; United States v. Fouche (9th Cir. 1985) 776 F.2d 1398, 1403 [80 A.L.R.Fed. 605] [traffic infraction always a basis for a stop].) In People v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 186, o

1993(People v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 837 , 496 P.2d 1205 ]; People v. Griffith (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 948, 950-951 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 367 ]; see Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 902-905 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; People v. Franklin (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 627, 633 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 529 ]; see also People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 582 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 ]; United States v. Fouche (9th Cir. 1985) 776 F.2d 1398, 1403 [80 A.L.R.Fed. 605] [traffic infraction always a basis for a stop].) In People v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 186, o

2024(People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148 .) “Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold” requiring only “ ‘ “some minimal level of objective justification.” ’ ” (U.S. v. Castillo, supra, 804 F.3d at p. 367 .) Circumstances can give rise to reasonable suspicion even if they do not “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277 .) As a result, “a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer making the stop reasonably suspects the violation of a traffic law even if later investigation dispels that suspicion.” (Peop

2024(People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148 .) “Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold” requiring only “ ‘ “some minimal level of objective justification.” ’ ” (U.S. v. Castillo, supra, 804 F.3d at p. 367 .) Circumstances can give rise to reasonable suspicion even if they do not “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277 .) As a result, “a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer making the stop reasonably suspects the violation of a traffic law even if later investigation dispels that suspicion.” (Peop

2016And once Fletcher stopped the car, he made no attempt to investigate the alleged possible Vehicle Code violation. “[A] traffic stop . . . may not be used solely for the purpose of discovering evidence of another charge (i.e., to effect a so-called pretext search).” (People v. Franklin (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 627, 633 .) At the same time, a traffic “stop is [not] rendered illegal, as a ‘pretextual’ stop,” by an officer’s “subjective desire to search for narcotics” as long as the stop is determined to be “objectively reasonable” (People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 ), i.e., one “which

1993(People v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 837 , 496 P.2d 1205 ]; People v. Griffith (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 948, 950-951 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 367 ]; see Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 902-905 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ]; People v. Franklin (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 627, 633 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 529 ]; see also People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 582 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 ]; United States v. Fouche (9th Cir. 1985) 776 F.2d 1398, 1403 [80 A.L.R.Fed. 605] [traffic infraction always a basis for a stop].) In People v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 186, o

2016And once Fletcher stopped the car, he made no attempt to investigate the alleged possible Vehicle Code violation. “[A] traffic stop . . . may not be used solely for the purpose of discovering evidence of another charge (i.e., to effect a so-called pretext search).” (People v. Franklin (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 627, 633 .) At the same time, a traffic “stop is [not] rendered illegal, as a ‘pretextual’ stop,” by an officer’s “subjective desire to search for narcotics” as long as the stop is determined to be “objectively reasonable” (People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 ), i.e., one “which

2015“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.” (Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 812 ; see People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438 .) Even without regard to the Vehicle Code section 5201 stop, there was probable cause to arrest defendant based on the information gathered during the task force investigation.

2016(People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468 ; People v. Binkerd (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149 ["where one victim dies from an alcohol-related accident due to a violation of Vehicle Code [section 23153], the Vehicle Code violation would always be a lesser included offense" of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated].) Such cases are inapposite when the charges involve separate victims.

2016(People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468 ; People v. Binkerd (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149 ["where one victim dies from an alcohol-related accident due to a violation of Vehicle Code [section 23153], the Vehicle Code violation would always be a lesser included offense" of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated].) Such cases are inapposite when the charges involve separate victims.

2015(See Gomez, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 .) Assuming the traffic stop could only be justified by the Vehicle Code violation, we alternatively hold that the trial court correctly determined that the detention was not unduly prolonged under the circumstances as they developed.

2015(See Gomez, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 .) Assuming the traffic stop could only be justified by the Vehicle Code violation, we alternatively hold that the trial court correctly determined that the detention was not unduly prolonged under the circumstances as they developed.

2012(Id. at p. 644; accord, People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 863 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ].) Conversely, “ ‘an officer’s mistaken factual belief, held reasonably and in good faith, can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.’ ” (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 644 , citing U.S. v. Twilley (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 1092, 1096, fn. 1 .) Ultimately, we need not determine whether Officer Taylor made a mistake of fact or law, or whether the facts known to him gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that appellant committed a Vehicle Code violation by failing to signal.

2012(Id. at p. 644; accord, People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 863 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ].) Conversely, “ ‘an officer’s mistaken factual belief, held reasonably and in good faith, can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.’ ” (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 644 , citing U.S. v. Twilley (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 1092, 1096, fn. 1 .) Ultimately, we need not determine whether Officer Taylor made a mistake of fact or law, or whether the facts known to him gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that appellant committed a Vehicle Code violation by failing to signal.

2006As the Supreme Court recently observed in a similar setting, "The question for us, though, is not whether [the] vehicle was in fact in full compliance with the law at the time of the stop, but whether [the officer] had `"articulable suspicion"' it was not." ( People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1136 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 , 136 P.3d 859 ( Saunders ); citing Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 184 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 , 111 L.Ed.2d 148 ["`reasonableness,' with respect to this necessary element, does not demand that the government be factually correct in its assessment"].) The possibility

2006As the Supreme Court recently observed in a similar setting, "The question for us, though, is not whether [the] vehicle was in fact in full compliance with the law at the time of the stop, but whether [the officer] had `"articulable suspicion"' it was not." ( People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1136 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 , 136 P.3d 859 ( Saunders ); citing Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 184 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 , 111 L.Ed.2d 148 ["`reasonableness,' with respect to this necessary element, does not demand that the government be factually correct in its assessment"].) The possibility

2012A. Legality of Traffic Stop “ ‘A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ ” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 196 P.3d 806 ].) Traffic stops are investigatory detentions that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation or other criminal activity; the probable cause necessary for an arrest is

2012A. Legality of Traffic Stop “ ‘A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ ” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 196 P.3d 806 ].) Traffic stops are investigatory detentions that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation or other criminal activity; the probable cause necessary for an arrest is