issue preclusion doctrine (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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issue preclusion doctrine in Tennessee

22 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
Beaty v. McGrawgreen
tennctapp · 1998 · cited in 7 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2013
2 sentences

2013A. Collateral Estoppel “‘Collateral estoppel is an issue preclusion doctrine devised by the courts.’” Trinity Inds., Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., Inc., 147 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Beaty v. McGraw, 15 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).

2012As this Court has stated before: Collateral estoppel, an issue preclusion doctrine, was devised by the courts to “conserve judicial resources, to relieve litigants from the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, and to encourage reliance on judicial decisions by preventing inconsistent decisions.” Beaty v. McGraw, 15 S.W.3d 819 at 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

67
Goeke v. Woodsgreen
tenn · 1989 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2008
2 sentences

2008See Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn. 1989); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

2003See Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn.1989); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991).

55
Dickerson v. Godfreygreen
tenn · 1992 · cited in 5 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2008
2 sentences

2008See Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn. 1989); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

2003See Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn.1989); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991).

55
State Ex Rel. Cihlar v. Crawfordgreen
tennctapp · 2000 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2009–2016
2 sentences

2016Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (“Collateral estoppel is an issue preclusion doctrine.”).

2015Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (“Collateral estop-pel is an issue preclusion doctrine.”).

44
Mullins v. Stategreen
tenn · 2009 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026See Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 534 (citations omitted); State v. Thompson, 285 -6- S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Cromwell v. Sac.

2016The doctrine of collateral estoppel renders the determination of a particular issue of law or fact conclusive on the parties and their privies where it has previously been “actually or necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Cihlar, 39 S.W.3d at 178-79 ; see also Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 535 (“[W]hen an issue has been actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the parties, that determination is conclusive against the parties in subsequent proceedings”).

33
Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc.green
tennctapp · 1991 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1998–2008
2 sentences

2008See Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn. 1989); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

2003See Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn.1989); Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991).

33
Ashe v. Swensongreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Although couched in terms of “previous determination,” the concept at issue is actually that of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel.1 “In criminal prosecutions, as in civil litigation, the issue-preclusion principle means that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’” Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352 , 356 (2016) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)); see also Massengill v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tenn. 1987) (“Collateral est

11
Massengill v. Scottgreen
tenn · 1987 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Although couched in terms of “previous determination,” the concept at issue is actually that of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel.1 “In criminal prosecutions, as in civil litigation, the issue-preclusion principle means that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’” Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352 , 356 (2016) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)); see also Massengill v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tenn. 1987) (“Collateral est

11
Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnoldgreen
· 2016 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Doe v. Arnold, 502 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tenn. 2016) (citations omitted).

11
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. v. Marsh USA, Inc.green
tennctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 382, 393 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2009). 6 .

11
Trinity Industries, Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co.green
tennctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013A. Collateral Estoppel “‘Collateral estoppel is an issue preclusion doctrine devised by the courts.’” Trinity Inds., Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., Inc., 147 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Beaty v. McGraw, 15 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).

11
Atchley v. Atchleygreen
tennctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007This court has frequently stated that “the full faith and credit clause requires that the common law doctrine of res judicata be applied in one state to a judgment rendered in another state to the same extent that it applied in the state of its rendition.” First State Bank of Holly Springs, Mississippi v. Wyssbrod, 124 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003); Longphre v. Longphre, No. E2006-00323-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1214965 , at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App.E.S., Apr. 25, 2007); Atchley v. Atchley, 585 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978).

11
Trinity Industries, Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co.green
tennctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Collateral estoppel is an issue preclusion doctrine that was devised by the courts to “conserve judicial resources, to relieve litigants from the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, and to encourage reliance on judicial decisions by preventing inconsistent decisions.” Trinity Indus., Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 159, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Beaty v. McGraw, 15 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).

11
First State Bank of Holly Springs v. Wyssbrodgreen
tennctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007This court has frequently stated that “the full faith and credit clause requires that the common law doctrine of res judicata be applied in one state to a judgment rendered in another state to the same extent that it applied in the state of its rendition.” First State Bank of Holly Springs, Mississippi v. Wyssbrod, 124 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003); Longphre v. Longphre, No. E2006-00323-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1214965 , at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App.E.S., Apr. 25, 2007); Atchley v. Atchley, 585 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978).

11
Allied Sound, Inc. v. Neelygreen
tennctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
1 sentence

1996Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1992); Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn. 1989); Allied Sound, Inc. v. Neely, 909 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Hampton v. Tennessee Truck Sales, Inc. green
tennctapp · 1999
2 sentences

2005Hampton v. Tennessee Truck Sales, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 643, 645 .

2004Hampton v. Tennessee Truck Sales, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

22004–2005
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States green
scotus · 2016
1 sentence

2019Although couched in terms of “previous determination,” the concept at issue is actually that of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel.1 “In criminal prosecutions, as in civil litigation, the issue-preclusion principle means that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’” Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352 , 356 (2016) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)); see also Massengill v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tenn. 1987) (“Collateral est

12019–2019
In Re bridgestone/firestone green
tennctapp · 2008
2 sentences

2016We explained that under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “[wjhen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment ... the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Firestone II, 286 S.W.3d at 904 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)).

2016In Firestone II, we considered the preclusive effect of the forum non conveniens dismissal in Firestone I. 3 Relevant to this appeal, we explained that under the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, “[wjhen'an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by. a valid and final judgment ... the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Firestone II, 286 S.W.3d at 904 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)).

12016–2016

Where else courts name it

CA 97 (1991–2026) MA 53 (1983–2025) OH 46 (1996–2025) OR 45 (1990–2025) IA 42 (1977–2026) WI 40 (1990–2026) CO 24 (1993–2026) OK 23 (1985–2018) TN 22 (1996–2026) CT 20 (1985–2025) TX 19 (1990–2021) AZ 12 (1995–2024) NY 12 (1981–2004) VT 9 (1995–2026) NV 9 (2000–2018) MO 8 (1983–2021) UT 8 (1998–2026) IL 8 (1992–2026) NM 7 (1994–2015) NJ 7 (1990–2021) KY 6 (1997–2024) HI 6 (1986–2024) DC 6 (1986–2010) AR 6 (2002–2025) PA 6 (1983–2005) DE 5 (2000–2019) IN 4 (1988–2020) WA 4 (1985–2011) AK 4 (1991–2025) SC 4 (2012–2023) WV 4 (1995–2022) ID 3 (1990–2023) MD 3 (2000–2020) AL 3 (1983–1998) FL 3 (2006–2011) MI 3 (2014–2025) VA 2 (2002–2010) RI 2 (2000–2023) NH 2 (2001–2014) MT 2 (2016–2023) KS 2 (2007–2010) ND 2 (2022–2022) MN 2 (2015–2026) LA 2 (2023–2023) GA 2 (2012–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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