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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Currier v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2026While the statute does provide exceptions to the broad issue preclusion doctrine (see id. § 3-4(d)), there is no exception based on a defendant’s request to sever counts. 2026The Currier majority’s holding contravened the general principle that the “Court indulge[s] every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 521 . ¶ 53 The State has not shown that Collins (1) was aware that moving to sever would result in the loss of his right to invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion or (2) abandoned his right to invoke issue preclusion when he moved for severance. | 3 | 4 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences2026Under the issue preclusion doctrine, “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 . 2026See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 . | 2 | 4 |
People v. Tennergreen2 sentences2024Ashe v. Swenson, 397 -8- 2024 IL App (2d) 240005 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); see also People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002) (noting that issue preclusion bars the litigation of an issue that was decided in a prior case). 2024Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); see also People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002) (noting that issue preclusion bars the litigation of an issue that was decided in a prior case). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2026See People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 50 (a defendant’s waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent); People v. Lego, 168 Ill. 2d 561, 564 (1995) (requirement of a knowing and intelligent choice calls for a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it); Wallace, 602 A.2d at 349-50 (defendant’s motion for severance did not waive argument for issue preclusion). | 1 | 1 |
The PEOPLE v. Harangreen1 sentence2026See Haran, 27 Ill. 2d at 231 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Butlergreen1 sentence2026See State v. Butler, 505 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Iowa 1993) (finding that defendant’s motion to sever did not constitute waiver of his right to assert the collateral estoppel defense). ¶ 51 H. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Legogreen1 sentence2026See People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 50 (a defendant’s waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent); People v. Lego, 168 Ill. 2d 561, 564 (1995) (requirement of a knowing and intelligent choice calls for a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it); Wallace, 602 A.2d at 349-50 (defendant’s motion for severance did not waive argument for issue preclusion). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lesleygreen1 sentence2026See People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 50 (a defendant’s waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent); People v. Lego, 168 Ill. 2d 561, 564 (1995) (requirement of a knowing and intelligent choice calls for a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it); Wallace, 602 A.2d at 349-50 (defendant’s motion for severance did not waive argument for issue preclusion). | 1 | 1 |
Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp.green1 sentence2024See People v. Jefferson, 2024 IL 128676, ¶ 37 (observing that, in Currier, “eight of the justices addressed the scope of the issue preclusion doctrine and the Court’s holding in Ashe, and on this question, they were evenly divided”); cf. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that plurality opinions are not binding precedent); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128 , 1139 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (plurality opinions are not binding and are merely persuasive); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that, in fragmented decisions wi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Luis Gonzalez-Lauzan, Jr.green1 sentence2024See People v. Jefferson, 2024 IL 128676, ¶ 37 (observing that, in Currier, “eight of the justices addressed the scope of the issue preclusion doctrine and the Court’s holding in Ashe, and on this question, they were evenly divided”); cf. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that plurality opinions are not binding precedent); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128 , 1139 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (plurality opinions are not binding and are merely persuasive); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that, in fragmented decisions wi | 1 | 1 |
Marks v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024See People v. Jefferson, 2024 IL 128676, ¶ 37 (observing that, in Currier, “eight of the justices addressed the scope of the issue preclusion doctrine and the Court’s holding in Ashe, and on this question, they were evenly divided”); cf. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that plurality opinions are not binding precedent); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128 , 1139 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (plurality opinions are not binding and are merely persuasive); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that, in fragmented decisions wi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jeffersongreen1 sentence2024See People v. Jefferson, 2024 IL 128676, ¶ 37 (observing that, in Currier, “eight of the justices addressed the scope of the issue preclusion doctrine and the Court’s holding in Ashe, and on this question, they were evenly divided”); cf. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that plurality opinions are not binding precedent); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128 , 1139 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (plurality opinions are not binding and are merely persuasive); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that, in fragmented decisions wi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Santamaria
green
2 sentences2024Id. 2024Id. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Osborne v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2002DECISION While Oak Park’s brief offers little in the way of authority or legal reasoning, it does cite one important case — Osborne v. Kelly, 207 Ill. 2002DECISION While Oak Park's brief offers little in the way of authority or legal reasoning, it does cite one important case –- Osborne v. Kelly , 207 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Hoffman v. Hoffman
green
1 sentence2026Indeed, the major premise from Ashe is that the defendant is entitled to the favorable jury finding, having run the gauntlet in the previous trial and having faced the possibility of criminal punishment. ¶ 33 Illinois courts have referred to this doctrine as “estoppel by verdict” (Hoffman, 330 Ill. at 417 ), “collateral estoppel” (Nowak v. St. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Gregg v. Georgia
green
1 sentence2024See People v. Jefferson, 2024 IL 128676, ¶ 37 (observing that, in Currier, “eight of the justices addressed the scope of the issue preclusion doctrine and the Court’s holding in Ashe, and on this question, they were evenly divided”); cf. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that plurality opinions are not binding precedent); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128 , 1139 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (plurality opinions are not binding and are merely persuasive); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that, in fragmented decisions wi | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Collins
neutral
1 sentence2024Ashe v. Swenson, 397 -8- 2024 IL App (2d) 240005 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); see also People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002) (noting that issue preclusion bars the litigation of an issue that was decided in a prior case). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Moore
green
2 sentences1992We adopt these factors with some modification, namely: (1) The parties or their privies must have been involved in both cases; (2) Some controlling fact or material question must be identical in both cases; (3) The party sought to be precluded must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first cause; (4) The controlling issue or material fact must have been actually litigated or decided in the prior action (we use the words “or decided” guardedly to cover some situations where a party is held to have waived his right to litigate by his default and a judgment is entere 1992We adopt these factors with some modification, namely: (1) The parties or their privies must have been involved in both cases; (2) Some controlling fact or material question must be identical in both cases; (3) The party sought to be precluded must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first cause; (4) The controlling issue or material fact must have been actually litigated or decided in the prior action (we use the words “or decided” guardedly to cover some situations where a party is held to have waived his right to litigate by his default and a judgment is entere | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Housing Authority for La Salle County v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n
green
2 sentences1992We adopt these factors with some modification, namely: (1) The parties or their privies must have been involved in both cases; (2) Some controlling fact or material question must be identical in both cases; (3) The party sought to be precluded must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first cause; (4) The controlling issue or material fact must have been actually litigated or decided in the prior action (we use the words “or decided” guardedly to cover some situations where a party is held to have waived his right to litigate by his default and a judgment is entere 1992We adopt these factors with some modification, namely: (1) The parties or their privies must have been involved in both cases; (2) Some controlling fact or material question must be identical in both cases; (3) The party sought to be precluded must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first cause; (4) The controlling issue or material fact must have been actually litigated or decided in the prior action (we use the words “or decided” guardedly to cover some situations where a party is held to have waived his right to litigate by his default and a judgment is entere | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.