act done violation in Texas

1933Co., 89 Tex. 583 , 36 S. W. 63 , 65: “Negligence, whether of the plaintiff or defendant, is generally a question of fact and becomes a question of law, to be decided by the court, only when the act done is in violation of some law, or when the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference regarding the care of the party in doing the act in question.

1933Co., 89 Tex. 583 , 36 S. W. 63 , 65: “Negligence, whether of the plaintiff or defendant, is generally a question of fact and becomes a question of law, to be decided by the court, only when the act done is in violation of some law, or when the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference regarding the care of the party in doing the act in question.

1939Co., 90 Tex. 82 , 36 S.W. 247 , 37 S.W. 319 , this was said: "`Negligence, whether by the plaintiff or defendant, is generally a question of fact, and becomes a question of law to be decided by the court only when the act done is in violation of some law, or when the facts are undisputed, and admit of but one inference regarding the care of the party in doing the act in question.

1939Co., 90 Tex. 82 , 36 S.W. 247 , 37 S.W. 319 , this was said: "`Negligence, whether by the plaintiff or defendant, is generally a question of fact, and becomes a question of law to be decided by the court only when the act done is in violation of some law, or when the facts are undisputed, and admit of but one inference regarding the care of the party in doing the act in question.

1921Lee v. Railway Co., 89 Tex. 588 , 36 S. W. 63 ; Adams v. Railway; 164 S. W. 853 ; Wininger v. Railway, 105 Tex. 61 , 143 S. W. 1150 .

1915Adams v. Railway Co., 164 S. W. 853 . [6] There are a number of assignments alleging error in the failure of the trial court to submit certain issues tendered by the defendant.

1912Railway v. Kane, 69 Md. 11 , 13 Atl. 387 , 9 Am.

1912Railway v. Kane, 69 Md. 11 , 13 Atl. 387 , 9 Am.

1973See Smalley v. Paine, 102 Tex. 304 , 116 S.W. 38 ; Smissen v. State, 71 Tex. 222 , 9 S.W. 112 ; Rains v. Herring, 68 Tex. 468 , 5 S.W. 369 .

1973See Smalley v. Paine, 102 Tex. 304 , 116 S.W. 38 ; Smissen v. State, 71 Tex. 222 , 9 S.W. 112 ; Rains v. Herring, 68 Tex. 468 , 5 S.W. 369 .

1973See Smalley v. Paine, 102 Tex. 304 , 116 S.W. 38 ; Smissen v. State, 71 Tex. 222 , 9 S.W. 112 ; Rains v. Herring, 68 Tex. 468 , 5 S.W. 369 .

1973See Smalley v. Paine, 102 Tex. 304 , 116 S.W. 38 ; Smissen v. State, 71 Tex. 222 , 9 S.W. 112 ; Rains v. Herring, 68 Tex. 468 , 5 S.W. 369 .

1933In other words, to authorize the court to take the question from the jury, the evidence must be of such character that there is no room for ordinary minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from it.” The following statement is taken from the case of Stooksbury v. Swan, 85 Tex. 563 , 22 S. W. 963 , 966, opinion by Judge Stayton: “The inference of one fact from the existence of others is for the jury, and not for the court, in all cases in which the fact to be inferred or presumed is to be believed or rejected as the application of reason and common experience to the facts proved may jus

1921Lee v. Railway Co., 89 Tex. 588 , 36 S. W. 63 ; Adams v. Railway; 164 S. W. 853 ; Wininger v. Railway, 105 Tex. 61 , 143 S. W. 1150 .

1919In other words, the facts of the case do not “fill the requirements of the law in order to constitute negligence as matter of law.” In Romine v. Railway Co., 24 Ind. App. 230 , 56 N. E. 245 , it appeared that a passenger while looking through an outside door of the car was resting his hand on a closet door at his side.

1919In other words, the facts of the case do not “fill the requirements of the law in order to constitute negligence as matter of law.” In Romine v. Railway Co., 24 Ind. App. 230 , 56 N. E. 245 , it appeared that a passenger while looking through an outside door of the car was resting his hand on a closet door at his side.

1916In other words, to authorize the court to take the question from the jury the evidence must be of such character that there is no room for ordinary minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from it” — citing the case of Railway Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 417 , 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L.

1916It follows that the numerous authorities cited by appellant condemning the inquiry into the motives of a Legislature in the exercise of a valid power have no pertinency or applicability to an act done in violation of the Constitution. [9] While not commending the expenditure by.the Pennsylvania Legislature, as shown in Russ v. Commonwealth, 210 Pa. 644 , 60 Atl. 169 , 1 L.

1916Now, "while the naked fact that an accident has happened may be no evidence of negligence, yet the character of the accident and the circumstances in proof attending it may be such as to lead reasonably to the belief that without negligence it would not have occurred"; and "where the particular thing causing the injury has been shown to be under the management of the defendant, or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the ac

1916Now, "while the naked fact that an accident has happened may be no evidence of negligence, yet the character of the accident and the circumstances in proof attending it may be such as to lead reasonably to the belief that without negligence it would not have occurred"; and "where the particular thing causing the injury has been shown to be under the management of the defendant, or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the ac

1915In other words, to authorize the court to take the question from the jury, the evidence must be of such a character that there is no room for ordinary minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from it.” [3] It is well settled that a railroad com-comis guilty of actionable negligence in fail-failto exercise ordinary care to discover and avoid injuring persons upon the track at such places and upon such occasions as one of ordinary prudence would expect to find them; and whether such persons are tres-tresor rightfully upon the track makes no difference in the determination of the issue of

1913The jury have solved it against the appellant; and according to the rule advanced in the leading case of Lee v. Railway Company, 89 Tex. 583 , 36 S.W. 63 , we are unable to say that they did it on insufficient testimony: "Negligence, whether of the plaintiff or defendant, is generally a question of fact, and becomes a question of law to be decided by the court only when the act done is in violation of some law, or when the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference regarding the care of the party in doing the act in question; in other words, to authorize the court to take the question

1913The jury have solved it against the appellant; and according to the rule advanced in the leading case of Lee v. Railway Company, 89 Tex. 583 , 36 S.W. 63 , we are unable to say that they did it on insufficient testimony: "Negligence, whether of the plaintiff or defendant, is generally a question of fact, and becomes a question of law to be decided by the court only when the act done is in violation of some law, or when the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference regarding the care of the party in doing the act in question; in other words, to authorize the court to take the question

1900Railway v. Lee, 89 Texas, 588 ; Haass v. Railway, 57 S. W.