22 Virginia opinions name it 7 courts 1966–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. Door-Man Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences2004The cases apply three separate tests on the issue of statutory employee: the normal work test, the subcontracted fraction test, and the stranger to the work test Stone v. Door-Man Manufacturing Co., 260 Va. 406, 415 (2000). 2001Next, Pfeifer argues that Krauss was a stranger to Linkhom Bay’s business of building the condominium units since digging ditches outside those units “was not aiding in the construction of those units.” In support of this argument, he notes that we last applied the “stranger to the work test” in Stone v. Door-Man Manufacturing Co., 260 Va. 406, 417-19 , 537 S.E.2d 305, 310-12 (2000). | 3 | 3 |
Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., Inc.green2 sentences2005See Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 170 , 327 S.E.2d 102, 105-06 (1985) (Shell and its progeny consider “whether a subcontractor’s employee, injured by a general contractor’s (or owner’s) negligence on the job, may sue such general contractor or owner at common law or whether such general contractor or owner has become the statutory employer of the plaintiff....”); Ferreira, 60 Va. Cir. at 240 (where injured plaintiff is employee of subcontractor and sues the owner, the normal work test can be applied and the stranger to the work test need not be addressed). 2005See Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 170 , 327 S.E.2d 102, 105-06 (1985) (Shell and its progeny consider “whether a subcontractor’s employee, injured by a general contractor’s (or owner’s) negligence on the job, may sue such general contractor or owner at common law or whether such general contractor or owner has become the statutory employer of the plaintiff....”); Ferreira, 60 Va. Cir. at 240 (where injured plaintiff is employee of subcontractor and sues the owner, the normal work test can be applied and the stranger to the work test need not be addressed). | 2 | 4 |
Cooke v. Skyline Swannanoa, Inc.green2 sentences2020See also Cooke, 226 Va. at 159 (stating that the normal work test “comes into play only where an obvious subcontract is not first found”). 2020See also Cooke, 226 Va. at 159 (stating that the normal work test “comes into play only where an obvious subcontract is not first found”). | 2 | 2 |
Henderson v. Central Tel. Co. of Virginiagreen2 sentences2012As we explained in Henderson v. Central Telephone Co. of Va., 233 Va. 377, 383 , 355 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1987) “[t]he [normal work] test is merely an approach that is useful in determining an entity’s trade, business, or occupation.” It is axiomatic then that the governmental entity test, as a counterpart to the normal work test, is a similarly useful approach for determining a governmental entities’ trade, business, or occupation. 2012As we explained in Henderson v. Central Telephone Co. of Va., 233 Va. 377, 383 , 355 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1987) “[t]he [normal work] test is merely an approach that is useful in determining an entity’s trade, business, or occupation.” It is axiomatic then that the governmental entity test, as a counterpart to the normal work test, is a similarly useful approach for determining a governmental entities’ trade, business, or occupation. | 2 | 2 |
Cinnamon v. International Business MacHines Corp.green2 sentences2012See, e.g., Cinnamon v. IBM Corp., 238 Va. 471, 478 , 384 S.E.2d 618, 621 (1989) (recognizing that the normal work test “is only a corollary guide, sometimes useful but not indispensable, in applying the literal language of the statutes to the facts in a particular case”). 2012See, e.g., Cinnamon v. IBM Corp., 238 Va. 471, 478 , 384 S.E.2d 618, 621 (1989) (recognizing that the normal work test “is only a corollary guide, sometimes useful but not indispensable, in applying the literal language of the statutes to the facts in a particular case”). | 2 | 2 |
Peanut City Iron & Metal Co. v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2013In this context, “strict enforcement” does not necessarily mean “harsh enforcement.” Indeed, in Jenkins , the Supreme Court held that the commission erred as a matter of law when it found that “the work rule was not strictly enforced because no punishment or penalty was assessed against claimant for his known violations of it.” Jenkins, 207 Va. at 403 , 150 S.E.2d at 123 (emphasis added). 2013In this context, “strict enforcement” does not necessarily mean “harsh enforcement.” Indeed, in Jenkins , the Supreme Court held that the commission erred as a matter of law when it found that “the work rule was not strictly enforced because no punishment or penalty was assessed against claimant for his known violations of it.” Jenkins, 207 Va. at 403 , 150 S.E.2d at 123 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Whetzel v. McKeegreen1 sentence2006Whetzel v. McKee, 44 Va. Cir. 315, 317 (Rockingham County 1998) (holding that the work on the claim had not become “trial preparation” because the matter had not reached the point that the insurance carrier in considering litigation had hired or consulted an attorney). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2005The Court holds that claim (I)(A) satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Ferreira v. Boeing Service Co.green1 sentence2005See Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 170 , 327 S.E.2d 102, 105-06 (1985) (Shell and its progeny consider “whether a subcontractor’s employee, injured by a general contractor’s (or owner’s) negligence on the job, may sue such general contractor or owner at common law or whether such general contractor or owner has become the statutory employer of the plaintiff....”); Ferreira, 60 Va. Cir. at 240 (where injured plaintiff is employee of subcontractor and sues the owner, the normal work test can be applied and the stranger to the work test need not be addressed). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005Therefore, “any activity which the owner is authorized or required to do by law or otherwise, is considered the trade, business, or occupation of the owner.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 218, 223-24 , 591 S.E.2d 72, 75-76 (2004). 2005Therefore, “any activity which the owner is authorized or required to do by law or otherwise, is considered the trade, business, or occupation of the owner.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 218, 223-24 , 591 S.E.2d 72, 75-76 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Gulf Refining Co. v. Browngreen1 sentence2001“It is only by consideration of all the facts pertaining to the relationship in any case, including the provisions of the contract, the actual conduct of the parties, and the conditions of the business in which they are engaged, that it can be determined whether the [individual] is endowed with that control over his own methods and means of doing the work which is the test of an independent contractor.” The Texas Co., 177 Va. at 568 , 14 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1938)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich
green
2 sentences2012The normal work test was recognized by the Court in Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715 , 187 S.E.2d 162 (1972).”[The] test is not one of whether the subcontractor’s activity is useful, necessary, or even absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer’s business, since, after all, this could be said of practically any repair, construction, or transportation service. 2012The normal work test was recognized by the Court in Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715 , 187 S.E.2d 162 (1972).”[The] test is not one of whether the subcontractor’s activity is useful, necessary, or even absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer’s business, since, after all, this could be said of practically any repair, construction, or transportation service. | 6 | 1997–2012 |
Smith v. Virginia Employment Commission
green
1 sentence2022“In all ‘judicial proceedings’ involving VEC appeals, ‘the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law.” Smith, 59 Va. App. at 520 (quoting Code § 60.2-625(A)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Dorothy M. Farish, Guardian for Shirley F. Farish v. Courion Industries, Inc. And Otis Elevator Company
green
2 sentences2005The Farish court then concluded that the normal work test did not bring Otis under the University’s workers’ compensation coverage and immunize it from suit, noting that while “University employees effect minor elevator repairs in most of the buildings, the responsibility for all major repairs at the time of the accident belonged to Otis or other elevator companies” and it was “especially significant that surveys, tests, and inspections were conducted exclusively by Otis employees because such service required particular skills and expertise.” Id. 2005While analyzing this issue, the Farish court noted that the general rule is that “major repairs, or specialized repairs of the sort which the employer is not equipped to handle with his own force, are held to be outside his regular business ...” and therefore, “in those cases, the owner is not the ‘statutory employer’ of the contractor’s employees and an action may be maintained against it as an ‘other party’.” Id. (citing Bassett, 216 Va. at 902 , 224 S.E.2d at 326 as quoting this principle). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. v. McReynolds
green
2 sentences2005The court then quoted Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715 , 187 S.E.2d 162 (1972), and Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897 , 224 S.E.2d 323 (1976), for the explanation of the normal work test: The test is not one of whether the subcontractor’s activity is useful, necessary, or even absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer’s business, since, after all, this could be said of practically any repair, construction, or transportation service. 2005The court then quoted Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715 , 187 S.E.2d 162 (1972), and Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897 , 224 S.E.2d 323 (1976), for the explanation of the normal work test: The test is not one of whether the subcontractor’s activity is useful, necessary, or even absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer’s business, since, after all, this could be said of practically any repair, construction, or transportation service. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Nichols v. VVKR, INC.
green
2 sentences2004In Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516 , 403 S.E.2d 698 (1991), we held: A governmental entity or a public utility does not share the ability to choose its activities. 2004In Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516 , 403 S.E.2d 698 (1991), we held: A governmental entity or a public utility does not share the ability to choose its activities. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Texas Co. v. Zeigler
green
2 sentences2001“It is only by consideration of all the facts pertaining to the relationship in any case, including the provisions of the contract, the actual conduct of the parties, and the conditions of the business in which they are engaged, that it can be determined whether the [individual] is endowed with that control over his own methods and means of doing the work which is the test of an independent contractor.” The Texas Co., 177 Va. at 568 , 14 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1938)). 2001“It is only by consideration of all the facts pertaining to the relationship in any case, including the provisions of the contract, the actual conduct of the parties, and the conditions of the business in which they are engaged, that it can be determined whether the [individual] is endowed with that control over his own methods and means of doing the work which is the test of an independent contractor.” The Texas Co., 177 Va. at 568 , 14 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1938)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Johnson v. Jefferson National Bank
green
1 sentence1996Johnson v. Jefferson National Bank, 244 Va. 482 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles
green
2 sentences1989In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work to be done is reached." 209 Va. at 565 , 165 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 , 48 S.Ct. 221, 222 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928)). *303 Colonial Williamsburg does not argue that Jones was at a place where employees were not allowed to be or that she violated a work rule. 1989In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work to be done is reached." 209 Va. at 565 , 165 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 , 48 S.Ct. 221, 222 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928)). *303 Colonial Williamsburg does not argue that Jones was at a place where employees were not allowed to be or that she violated a work rule. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Brown v. Reed
green
2 sentences1989In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work to be done is reached." 209 Va. at 565 , 165 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 , 48 S.Ct. 221, 222 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928)). *303 Colonial Williamsburg does not argue that Jones was at a place where employees were not allowed to be or that she violated a work rule. 1989In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work to be done is reached." 209 Va. at 565 , 165 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 , 48 S.Ct. 221, 222 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928)). *303 Colonial Williamsburg does not argue that Jones was at a place where employees were not allowed to be or that she violated a work rule. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Vaz's Case
green
2 sentences1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. 1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Claim of Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co.
neutral
2 sentences1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. 1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Claim of Mason v. Lit Realty Co.
neutral
1 sentence1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations
green
2 sentences1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. 1966Cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571 , 183 So. 871 , 119 A.L.R. 1403 ; Mason v. hit Realty Company, 16 App. Div. 2d 715, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 895 ; In re Vaz’s Case, 342 Mass. 495 , 174 N.E. 2d 360 ; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills Co., 184 App. Div. 820 , 172 N.Y.S. 724 ; Beck v. C. & J. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.