Ortiz rule in California

2015However, as in Ortiz, “[w]e next inquire whether the error in denying defendant’s motion for severance was prejudicial so as to require reversal of the conviction.” (Ortiz, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 45 .) Before we proceed to that analysis, we pause to reject respondent’s apparent contention that this case falls within an exception to the Ortiz requirement, as found in People v. Hernandez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 936 and People v. Wickliffe (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 37 .

2013We therefore conclude that the Ortiz holding does not extend to defendants charged with a crime or series of crimes committed as part of a single transaction.” ( Hernandez, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at pp. 940-941, fn. omitted.) The “single transaction” exception to the Ortiz rule was also applied in People v. Wickliffe (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 37, 40-41 (Wickliffe), in which the court approved the joint trial of a defendant charged with driving under the influence and a codefendant charged with battery and assault where all of the crimes occurred during a joint operation of repossessing a vehicle.

2015However, as in Ortiz, “[w]e next inquire whether the error in denying defendant’s motion for severance was prejudicial so as to require reversal of the conviction.” (Ortiz, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 45 .) Before we proceed to that analysis, we pause to reject respondent’s apparent contention that this case falls within an exception to the Ortiz requirement, as found in People v. Hernandez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 936 and People v. Wickliffe (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 37 .

2013Essien cannot claim any violation of Ortiz, because he was “included in at least one count of the accusatory pleading with all other defendants with whom he [was] tried.” (Ortiz, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 43 .) As to Mullan and Calvo, they were not jointly charged with any offense, but their joint trial was appropriate because their crimes were part of a single course of violent conduct against the same victim and amounted to a “single transaction.” Defendants argue the published cases recognizing the “single transaction” exception to the Ortiz rule (Hernandez and Wickliffe) are distinguishable b

2013We conclude the trial court reasonably denied defendant’s motion because relieving counsel under these circumstances would have resulted in the “ ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983 .) Defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly applied the standard in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 465 P.2d 44 ] for substituting one appointed counsel for another rather than the Ortiz standard for discharging retained counsel and appointing new counsel.

2013We conclude the trial court reasonably denied defendant’s motion because relieving counsel under these circumstances would have resulted in the “ ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983 .) Defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly applied the standard in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 465 P.2d 44 ] for substituting one appointed counsel for another rather than the Ortiz standard for discharging retained counsel and appointing new counsel.

2025The “ ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a [defendant’s] constitutional rights.’ ” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 26 .) “ ‘The admission of relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 949 .) In this case, the trial court reasonably determined that the proffered opinion testimony was relevant to the charged crime and was not unduly prejudicial.

2025The “ ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a [defendant’s] constitutional rights.’ ” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 26 .) “ ‘The admission of relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 949 .) In this case, the trial court reasonably determined that the proffered opinion testimony was relevant to the charged crime and was not unduly prejudicial.

2025(People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 399 .) We likewise reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of the officers’ identification testimony violated his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.

2023(People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134 , 1157– 1158.) As discussed ante (see pt.

2023(See First Student, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 1030, 1031.) In 2015, a division of the Second District Court of Appeal issued a published opinion in Connor v. First Student, Inc. (Connor),4 4 After the California Supreme Court granted review of Connor, the name of the case was changed to First Student Cases. 6 concluding that, “although ICRAA and CCRAA might overlap to some degree, there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ between them that would render ICRAA unconstitutional.” (First Student, at p. 1032, quoting the Court of Appeal’s Connor opinion.) Thus, the appellate court held, agencies that provide

2023Further, we are not persuaded by Ortiz’s suggestion that the prosecutor’s reason is dubious because, after the prosecutor struck S.H., “another prospective juror noted the difficulty of being comfortable resolving conflicts due to ‘the gravity’ of the situation” but “was accepted as an alternate.” Even assuming arguendo that we can consider the voir dire of another prospective juror that occurred after the trial court had ruled on Ortiz’s objection (see Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 624 ), the alternate juror’s answers are not comparable to S.H.’s answers. 17 Given that the prosecutor’s two b

2023Further, we are not persuaded by Ortiz’s suggestion that the prosecutor’s reason is dubious because, after the prosecutor struck S.H., “another prospective juror noted the difficulty of being comfortable resolving conflicts due to ‘the gravity’ of the situation” but “was accepted as an alternate.” Even assuming arguendo that we can consider the voir dire of another prospective juror that occurred after the trial court had ruled on Ortiz’s objection (see Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 624 ), the alternate juror’s answers are not comparable to S.H.’s answers. 17 Given that the prosecutor’s two b

2022(See Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 70 ; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 ; cf. People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 230–232.) Accordingly, we reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of Lam’s statement as a dying declaration was error and requires reversal of his murder conviction.

2022(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) 24 C.

2022(See Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 70 ; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 ; cf. People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 230–232.) Accordingly, we reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of Lam’s statement as a dying declaration was error and requires reversal of his murder conviction.

2021(Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 319 ; Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) The People presented Deputy Fernandez’s testimony, photographs of the recovered gun, magazine, and ammunition (except for the ammunition recovered from Ortiz’s pocket), and the Miranda waiver form on which Ortiz wrote, “The gun is mine.” Ortiz’s defense was based entirely on his testimony, which contradicted that of Deputy Fernandez in every pertinent respect.7 Ortiz was unable to offer any explanation for why Deputy Fernandez had a motive to point a gun at Ortiz, plant evidence in his car, or forg

2021(Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 319 ; Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) The People presented Deputy Fernandez’s testimony, photographs of the recovered gun, magazine, and ammunition (except for the ammunition recovered from Ortiz’s pocket), and the Miranda waiver form on which Ortiz wrote, “The gun is mine.” Ortiz’s defense was based entirely on his testimony, which contradicted that of Deputy Fernandez in every pertinent respect.7 Ortiz was unable to offer any explanation for why Deputy Fernandez had a motive to point a gun at Ortiz, plant evidence in his car, or forg

2021(Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 319 ; Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 .) The People presented Deputy Fernandez’s testimony, photographs of the recovered gun, magazine, and ammunition (except for the ammunition recovered from Ortiz’s pocket), and the Miranda waiver form on which Ortiz wrote, “The gun is mine.” Ortiz’s defense was based entirely on his testimony, which contradicted that of Deputy Fernandez in every pertinent respect.7 Ortiz was unable to offer any explanation for why Deputy Fernandez had a motive to point a gun at Ortiz, plant evidence in his car, or forg

2021(Flores, at p. 405; People v. Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1037 .) And Ortiz’s admission on cross-examination that attempted carjacking is a strike is only minimally more prejudicial than his testimony that he was convicted of attempted carjacking. 10 The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Ortiz’s motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct.

2019On appeal, Ortiz contends that “[s]ince the underlying causes of action should have survived, so must the claim for injunctive relief.” We agree. 17 Defendants contend that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Ortiz’s claim for injunctive relief because the “FEHA provides adequate legal remedies.” Defendants fail to cite any authority in support of their assertion, and to the extent defendants assert that injunctive relief is not available in actions brought under the FEHA, our Supreme Court has concluded otherwise. “ ‘[U]pon a finding of unlawful discrimination, a court may gr

2019On appeal, Ortiz contends that “[s]ince the underlying causes of action should have survived, so must the claim for injunctive relief.” We agree. 17 Defendants contend that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Ortiz’s claim for injunctive relief because the “FEHA provides adequate legal remedies.” Defendants fail to cite any authority in support of their assertion, and to the extent defendants assert that injunctive relief is not available in actions brought under the FEHA, our Supreme Court has concluded otherwise. “ ‘[U]pon a finding of unlawful discrimination, a court may gr

2016As stated in the controlling case of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 23: ‘there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error ....’ The right here is such a right.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 988 .) At the trial readiness hearing, the court was obligated to address Zapien’s motion to discharge his retained attorney, including the Ortiz factors, in assessing whether Zapien’s request to discharge his retained attorney would cause him prejudice or was untimely.

2016As stated in the controlling case of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 23: ‘there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error ....’ The right here is such a right.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 988 .) At the trial readiness hearing, the court was obligated to address Zapien’s motion to discharge his retained attorney, including the Ortiz factors, in assessing whether Zapien’s request to discharge his retained attorney would cause him prejudice or was untimely.

2014(People v. Munoz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 860, 863 .) b.

2014(People v. Munoz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 860, 863 .) b.