retaliatory eviction defense in California

2025“The retaliatory eviction doctrine is founded on the premise that ‘[a] landlord may normally evict a tenant for any reason or for no reason at all, but he may not evict for an improper reason.’ ” (Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 249 .) Retaliatory eviction may be asserted as a cause of action as well as a defense in an unlawful detainer action.

2024“In interpreting section 1942.5, the court was expansive, emphasizing the ‘important public policy’ the remedies authorized by that statute serve. ( Barela, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 253, 254.) Section 1942.5, the court said, ‘is a 11 remedial statute aimed at protecting tenants from certain types of abuses’ (Barela, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 251 ), and ‘[i]mplicit in the passage of any remedial legislation is a general intent to protect from intimidation those who report violations of the law.’ (Id. at p. 252.) Thus, section 1942.5 is to be ‘ “liberally construed to effect its objectives and to su

2018In a discussion dealing with a rent ordinance claim ( Wallace, supra , at pp. 1212-1213, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ), it string cites Action Apartment , Feldman , and Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1534 , 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 492 -a case that does not involve the issue of statutory conflict or section 1942.5-and then later, in a brief section dealing separately with the retaliatory eviction claim ( Wallace, at pp. 1214-1215, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ), refers back to its prior rent ordinance discussion, finally concluding with the categorical announcement that bringing an evict

2018In a discussion dealing with a rent ordinance claim ( Wallace, supra , at pp. 1212-1213, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ), it string cites Action Apartment , Feldman , and Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1534 , 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 492 -a case that does not involve the issue of statutory conflict or section 1942.5-and then later, in a brief section dealing separately with the retaliatory eviction claim ( Wallace, at pp. 1214-1215, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ), refers back to its prior rent ordinance discussion, finally concluding with the categorical announcement that bringing an evict

2018There, a tenant who paid $75 per month in rent complained to his landlord about dilapidated conditions, and in response, the landlord increased his rent to $125 per month and then evicted him. ( Id. at p. 510, 90 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 476 P.2d 97 .) Our Supreme Court held that a retaliatory eviction defense was available in the eviction proceedings, independent of section 1942.5.

2018There, a tenant who paid $75 per month in rent complained to his landlord about dilapidated conditions, and in response, the landlord increased his rent to $125 per month and then evicted him. ( Id. at p. 510, 90 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 476 P.2d 97 .) Our Supreme Court held that a retaliatory eviction defense was available in the eviction proceedings, independent of section 1942.5.

2018Several months after the tenants requested various repairs, the landlord served notice he was withdrawing his property from the rental market pursuant to the Ellis Act. ( Drouet, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 588 , 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 73 P.3d 1185 .) When the tenants failed to vacate, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer action, to which the tenants raised a retaliatory eviction defense. ( Id. at pp. 588-589, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 73 P.3d 1185 .) The landlord unsuccessfully moved for summary adjudication of that defense. ( Id . at p. 589, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 73 P.3d 1185 .) On writ review, Division

2018Several months after the tenants requested various repairs, the landlord served notice he was withdrawing his property from the rental market pursuant to the Ellis Act. ( Drouet, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 588 , 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 73 P.3d 1185 .) When the tenants failed to vacate, the landlord filed an unlawful detainer action, to which the tenants raised a retaliatory eviction defense. ( Id. at pp. 588-589, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 73 P.3d 1185 .) The landlord unsuccessfully moved for summary adjudication of that defense. ( Id . at p. 589, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 73 P.3d 1185 .) On writ review, Division

2025(Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 .) Ashford alleges that Midpeninsula evicted her in retaliation for complaining in August and September 2022 that Midpeninsula had committed “improprieties” in the selection process for the award of the contract for the Bear Creek Stables, sending an October 2022 letter complaining of Midpeninsula’s Brown Act violations, and filing the November 2022 original complaint in this matter.

2003(E.g., Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 ; Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 737 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 784 ; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 775 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 242 ; Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) We may therefore infer that the Legislature relied on contemporaneous judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding to preserve only procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) [1] Th

2024(Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 583 [California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) action].) As our Supreme Court has explained: “the aim of fee-shifting statutes is ‘to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific . . . laws.’ ” (Ibid.) The court in Aweeka, in first recognizing a retaliatory eviction cause of action, noted that consequential damages might be “nominal.” (Aweeka, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 281 .) Punitive damages can help make such a cause of action more viable in some

2003(E.g., Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 ; Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 737 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 784 ; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 775 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 242 ; Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) We may therefore infer that the Legislature relied on contemporaneous judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding to preserve only procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) [1] Th

2018Growers ... wherein this court stressed the importance of preventing retaliatory evictions ... [through] a remedial scheme [that] depends upon private initiative for enforcement. ... [¶] The strong public policy interests in preserving the summary nature of the unlawful detainer proceeding will not be significantly impaired if the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction is allowed here." ( Barela , supra , 30 Cal.3d at p. 244 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 636 P.2d 582 .) Barela also put to rest any remaining "notion that the common law retaliatory eviction defense was preempted by statute," thereb

2018Growers ... wherein this court stressed the importance of preventing retaliatory evictions ... [through] a remedial scheme [that] depends upon private initiative for enforcement. ... [¶] The strong public policy interests in preserving the summary nature of the unlawful detainer proceeding will not be significantly impaired if the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction is allowed here." ( Barela , supra , 30 Cal.3d at p. 244 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 636 P.2d 582 .) Barela also put to rest any remaining "notion that the common law retaliatory eviction defense was preempted by statute," thereb

2018(Id. at p. 1475.) The appeal in Feldman involved the Feldmans’ cross-complaint for damages in the unlawful detainer action, by which they asserted seven claims, including a retaliatory eviction claim under section 1942.5, former subdivision (c). ( Feldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1475-1476, 1492-1494.) On the landlord’s anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court struck this claim, and on appeal, our Division Two colleagues affirmed.

2017Relying on Action Apartment , the appellate court concluded the retaliatory eviction claim was barred by the litigation privilege. ( Feldman , at p. 1486, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) As Banuelos noted, "the [ Feldman ] court did not discuss the distinction between a tenant suing under a city ordinance, as in Action Apartment , and a tenant suing under the authority of coequal state statute, nor did it analyze section 1942.5 to determine whether it 'makes clear' that it is not barred by the litigation privilege." ( Banuelos , at p. 333, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 , citing Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th

2025(American Continental Inc. Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281 ; see also County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444 [“ ‘the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney’ ”].) In any case, sections 1717 and 1942.5 are alternative bases for an award of attorney’s fee following litigation of a retaliatory eviction claim where the parties had signed a lease, meaning tenants could proceed under either statute.

2024(Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 583 [California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) action].) As our Supreme Court has explained: “the aim of fee-shifting statutes is ‘to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific . . . laws.’ ” (Ibid.) The court in Aweeka, in first recognizing a retaliatory eviction cause of action, noted that consequential damages might be “nominal.” (Aweeka, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 281 .) Punitive damages can help make such a cause of action more viable in some

2024However, in Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 90 (Custom Parking), the court held that the defense of retaliatory eviction could be raised in an unlawful detainer action brought against a commercial tenant, where the lessor terminated the tenancy “because [the tenant’s] officers and employees refused to perjure themselves in an action involving [the lessor] and other tenants of [the lessor].” (Id. at pp. 91-92; see id. at p. 101.) Custom Parking explains the history of the retaliatory eviction defense and the development of the principle that a landlord “ ‘ “may be p

2024(Custom Parking, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 94 ; see id. at pp. 93-95.) The court also 4 recognized the issue was complicated “by case law which recognizes and/or applies a distinction between commercial and residential unlawful detainer actions.” (Id. at p. 96; see id. at pp. 96-101.) Custom Parking allowed the retaliatory eviction defense in that case because it involved a “strong public policy against intimidating witnesses in a lawsuit from testifying honestly,” a context where “the distinction between a commercial and a residential tenancy pales into insignificance.” (Custom Parking, sup

2024“Section 1942.5 was [first] enacted into law as part of comprehensive landlord-tenant reform legislation.” (Kriz v. Taylor (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 302, 310 (Kriz).)4 “[T]he obvious intent of this statutory scheme [is] to encourage private initiative to enforce tenantability standards.” (Kriz, at p. 311.) More specifically, after section 1942.5 was enacted in 1970, but before it became effective, the California Supreme Court recognized the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction as a defense in unlawful detainer proceedings.

2023The Second District in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Handley (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 956 , disagreed with on other grounds by Esbensen v. Userware International, Inc. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 631, 638, fn.4 , stated in dicta that the opinion of S.P.

2017Relying on Action Apartment , the appellate court concluded the retaliatory eviction claim was barred by the litigation privilege. ( Feldman , at p. 1486, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) As Banuelos noted, "the [ Feldman ] court did not discuss the distinction between a tenant suing under a city ordinance, as in Action Apartment , and a tenant suing under the authority of coequal state statute, nor did it analyze section 1942.5 to determine whether it 'makes clear' that it is not barred by the litigation privilege." ( Banuelos , at p. 333, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 , citing Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th

2017Relying on Action Apartment , the appellate court concluded the retaliatory eviction claim was barred by the litigation privilege. ( Feldman , at p. 1486, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) As Banuelos noted, "the [ Feldman ] court did not discuss the distinction between a tenant suing under a city ordinance, as in Action Apartment , and a tenant suing under the authority of coequal state statute, nor did it analyze section 1942.5 to determine whether it 'makes clear' that it is not barred by the litigation privilege." ( Banuelos , at p. 333, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 , citing Action Apartment , supra , 41 Cal.4th

2003(E.g., Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 ; Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 737 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 784 ; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 775 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 242 ; Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) We may therefore infer that the Legislature relied on contemporaneous judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding to preserve only procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) [1] Th

2003(E.g., Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 ; Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 737 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 784 ; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 775 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 242 ; Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 650 .) We may therefore infer that the Legislature relied on contemporaneous judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding to preserve only procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c). ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 568 P.2d 394 .) [1] Th

2003(Cf. California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 143 , 211 Cal.Rptr. 152 [claim of retaliation is not a defense in unlawful detainer action based on foreclosure of property]; Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law (App.2002) 132 N.M. 687 , 54 P.3d 91, 97-98 [claim of retaliation is not a defense in unlawful detainer action based on landlord's decision not to remain in the federal government's former Section 8 housing program]; see generally Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation (D.C.Cir.1972) 463 F.2d 853, 867 .) Although we have at times analogized a tenant'

2003(Cf. California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 143 , 211 Cal.Rptr. 152 [claim of retaliation is not a defense in unlawful detainer action based on foreclosure of property]; Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law (App.2002) 132 N.M. 687 , 54 P.3d 91, 97-98 [claim of retaliation is not a defense in unlawful detainer action based on landlord's decision not to remain in the federal government's former Section 8 housing program]; see generally Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation (D.C.Cir.1972) 463 F.2d 853, 867 .) Although we have at times analogized a tenant'