21 California opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Standishgreen2 sentences2021(People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 870 .) To effectuate the right to a speedy preliminary hearing, section 859b contains two deadlines. 2021The statute “‘reflects a clear legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to a preliminary hearing.’” (People v. Standish, supra, at p. 870 .) “To effectuate the right to a speedy preliminary hearing, section 859b contains two deadlines. [¶] First, the preliminary hearing ‘shall be held within 10 court days’ of the 7 In People v. Love, the court stated that “the Legislature [has not] created a provision [in section 859b] for the withdrawal of properly entered waivers.” (People v. Love (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 276, 285 .) We do not reach the issue of whether defendant’s revoca | 2 | 4 |
Ng v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026Relevant here, the statute requires the trial court to hold the preliminary hearing within 10 court days of the date the defendant is arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs later. (§ 859b.) It also, in pertinent part, requires the trial court to release the defendant on their own recognizance if “the defendant has remained in custody for 10 or more court days solely on that complaint,” unless one of six enumerated exceptions applies (none of which are at issue here). (§ 859b.) It is well established that the release provision operates only when “the defendant is in custody for 1 Undesignated se 2026Relevant here, the statute requires the trial court to hold the preliminary hearing within 10 court days of the date the defendant is arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs later. (§ 859b.) It also, in pertinent part, requires the trial court to release the defendant on their own recognizance if “the defendant has remained in custody for 10 or more court days solely on that complaint,” unless one of six enumerated exceptions applies (none of which are at issue here). (§ 859b.) It is well established that the release provision operates only when “the defendant is in custody for 1 Undesignated se | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lovegreen2 sentences2025(Love, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 285 .) “We must interpret a statute in context, examining other legislation on the same or similar subjects to ascertain the Legislature’s probable intent.” (Estate of Burden (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1028 .) As Love observed, the Legislature included a waiver withdrawal provision in the statute governing the right to a speedy trial (§ 1382), but did not include such a provision in the statute governing the right to a speedy preliminary hearing (§ 859b). 2021The statute “‘reflects a clear legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to a preliminary hearing.’” (People v. Standish, supra, at p. 870 .) “To effectuate the right to a speedy preliminary hearing, section 859b contains two deadlines. [¶] First, the preliminary hearing ‘shall be held within 10 court days’ of the 7 In People v. Love, the court stated that “the Legislature [has not] created a provision [in section 859b] for the withdrawal of properly entered waivers.” (People v. Love (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 276, 285 .) We do not reach the issue of whether defendant’s revoca | 1 | 4 |
Ramos v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 731 .) “The 60-day limit protects the right to a speedy preliminary hearing by ensuring that, even with good cause, the hearing may not be continued indefinitely. [Citation.] It also ensures that criminal cases are moved expeditiously through the courts.” (Favor, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, citing People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 675 .) After briefing in this appeal was complete, our division decided Favor, in which we agreed with Garcia that a defendant may enter a limited waiver of the 60-day deadline in section 859b. 2021(Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 731 .) “The 60-day limit protects the right to a speedy preliminary hearing by ensuring that, even with good cause, the hearing may not be continued indefinitely. [Citation.] It also ensures that criminal cases are moved expeditiously through the courts.” (Favor, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, citing People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 675 .) In Favor, we concluded a defendant may waive the 60-day deadline in two ways. | 1 | 4 |
Curry v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 179 ; accord, Curry, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 [“[S]ection 859b must … be subordinated to the constitutional right of self-representation.”]; see Lind, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 [“A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy preliminary hearing is not infringed by the suspension of the 60-day rule for the time it takes to resolve that defendant’s challenge to the impartiality of the judge assigned to his or her case.”].) We observe that Kowalski confronted the failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days while we confront the 60-day 2021(Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 179 ; accord, Curry, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 [“[S]ection 859b must … be subordinated to the constitutional right of self-representation.”]; see Lind, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 [“A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy preliminary hearing is not infringed by the suspension of the 60-day rule for the time it takes to resolve that defendant’s challenge to the impartiality of the judge assigned to his or her case.”].) We observe that Kowalski confronted the failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days while we confront the 60-day | 1 | 1 |
Jacob B. v. County of Shastagreen1 sentence2021Thus, “‘[the] trial court was confronted with the difficult problem of procedurally navigating this case to avoid the Scylla of delay and the Charybdis of ineffective and inadequate representation.’” ( Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 178–179, quoting People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 148 .) As explained in Kowalski, “[d]efendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel at his preliminary hearing, this being a ‘critical stage’ of the proceedings. [Citation.] And counsel must actually be prepared and effective. [Citation.] Defendant also has a right to a speedy trial and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lindgreen2 sentences2021(Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 179 ; accord, Curry, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 [“[S]ection 859b must … be subordinated to the constitutional right of self-representation.”]; see Lind, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 [“A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy preliminary hearing is not infringed by the suspension of the 60-day rule for the time it takes to resolve that defendant’s challenge to the impartiality of the judge assigned to his or her case.”].) We observe that Kowalski confronted the failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days while we confront the 60-day 2021(Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 179 ; accord, Curry, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 [“[S]ection 859b must … be subordinated to the constitutional right of self-representation.”]; see Lind, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 [“A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy preliminary hearing is not infringed by the suspension of the 60-day rule for the time it takes to resolve that defendant’s challenge to the impartiality of the judge assigned to his or her case.”].) We observe that Kowalski confronted the failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days while we confront the 60-day | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)green2 sentences2016We recognize that a defendant has a right to a speedy preliminary hearing, but the prosecutor too has a strong interest at stake — •“ ‘ “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ])—and thus, as the Henderson court explained, a “ ‘ ‘ “dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.” ’ ” ’ ” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 938 , italics omitted.) 3 We “recognize that our decision restricts the options avail 2016We recognize that a defendant has a right to a speedy preliminary hearing, but the prosecutor too has a strong interest at stake — •“ ‘ “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ])—and thus, as the Henderson court explained, a “ ‘ ‘ “dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.” ’ ” ’ ” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 938 , italics omitted.) 3 We “recognize that our decision restricts the options avail | 1 | 1 |
People v. Noriegagreen2 sentences1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abdel-Malakgreen2 sentences1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Branchgreen2 sentences1970(In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 210 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 238 , 449 P.2d 174 ].) (2) that defendant was denied a speedy preliminary hearing — delayed for a week because of théí illness of the magistrate; (3) that a witness, admonished not to discuss her testimony at the first part of the preliminary hearing, did so. 1970(In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 210 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 238 , 449 P.2d 174 ].) (2) that defendant was denied a speedy preliminary hearing — delayed for a week because of théí illness of the magistrate; (3) that a witness, admonished not to discuss her testimony at the first part of the preliminary hearing, did so. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Figueroa
green
2 sentences2021(Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 731 .) “The 60-day limit protects the right to a speedy preliminary hearing by ensuring that, even with good cause, the hearing may not be continued indefinitely. [Citation.] It also ensures that criminal cases are moved expeditiously through the courts.” (Favor, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, citing People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 675 .) After briefing in this appeal was complete, our division decided Favor, in which we agreed with Garcia that a defendant may enter a limited waiver of the 60-day deadline in section 859b. 2021The 60-day limit protects the right to a speedy preliminary hearing by ensuring that, even with good cause, the hearing may not be continued indefinitely. [Citation.] It also ensures that criminal cases are moved expeditiously through the courts.” (Favor, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 989–990, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Superior Court (Arnold) (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 923 , 932 (Arnold); People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665 , 673–675 (Figueroa).) b. | 5 | 2017–2021 |
People v. Kowalski
green
2 sentences2021(Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 179 ; accord, Curry, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 [“[S]ection 859b must … be subordinated to the constitutional right of self-representation.”]; see Lind, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 [“A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy preliminary hearing is not infringed by the suspension of the 60-day rule for the time it takes to resolve that defendant’s challenge to the impartiality of the judge assigned to his or her case.”].) We observe that Kowalski confronted the failure to hold a preliminary hearing within 10 days while we confront the 60-day 2013(People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174, 176-177 .) But, as noted by respondent, Penal Code section 859b, subdivision (a) requires that a defendant “personally” waive the right to a speedy preliminary hearing, or the “right to preliminary examination within the 10 court days,” not the right to a preliminary hearing itself. | 2 | 2013–2021 |
People v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2016We recognize that a defendant has a right to a speedy preliminary hearing, but the prosecutor too has a strong interest at stake — •“ ‘ “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ])—and thus, as the Henderson court explained, a “ ‘ ‘ “dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.” ’ ” ’ ” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 938 , italics omitted.) 3 We “recognize that our decision restricts the options avail 2016We recognize that a defendant has a right to a speedy preliminary hearing, but the prosecutor too has a strong interest at stake — •“ ‘ “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ])—and thus, as the Henderson court explained, a “ ‘ ‘ “dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.” ’ ” ’ ” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 938 , italics omitted.) 3 We “recognize that our decision restricts the options avail | 2 | 2010–2016 |
In Re Samano
green
2 sentences2010Section 1050.1 is the equivalent of `good cause.'" ( 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 989 .) We cannot reasonably construe "the defendant" in section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B), to mean "the defendant, or any jointly charged defendant." In Samano , "there [was] no question that the goals of a speedy preliminary hearing, on the one hand, and the joinder and bail provisions, on the other hand, [were] in conflict." ( Samano, supra , 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 .) Here, however, sections 1050.1 and 1382 are not necessarily in conflict. 2010Section 1050.1 is the equivalent of `good cause.'" ( 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 989 .) We cannot reasonably construe "the defendant" in section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B), to mean "the defendant, or any jointly charged defendant." In Samano , "there [was] no question that the goals of a speedy preliminary hearing, on the one hand, and the joinder and bail provisions, on the other hand, [were] in conflict." ( Samano, supra , 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 .) Here, however, sections 1050.1 and 1382 are not necessarily in conflict. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2025Taylor also filed motions to dismiss for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 and vindictive prosecution, to change venue, and multiple motions to dismiss his appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 4 Trial was originally set in July 2023. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Marsden
green
1 sentence2025Taylor also filed motions to dismiss for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 and vindictive prosecution, to change venue, and multiple motions to dismiss his appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 4 Trial was originally set in July 2023. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Pitchess v. Superior Court
red
1 sentence2025Neither Taylor nor his appointed counsel filed a written motion for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. 4 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 5 Taylor filed two nonstatutory motions to dismiss, three motions to set aside the information or indictment (§ 995) multiple discovery motions under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 for law enforcement personnel files, and motions to dismiss for violation of the rights to a speedy preliminary hearing, to a speedy filing of the accusatory information, and to a continuous preliminary hearing (§§ 859b, 739, 861). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Burden v. Agnew
green
1 sentence2025(Love, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 285 .) “We must interpret a statute in context, examining other legislation on the same or similar subjects to ascertain the Legislature’s probable intent.” (Estate of Burden (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1028 .) As Love observed, the Legislature included a waiver withdrawal provision in the statute governing the right to a speedy trial (§ 1382), but did not include such a provision in the statute governing the right to a speedy preliminary hearing (§ 859b). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2025Neither Taylor nor his appointed counsel filed a written motion for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. 4 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 5 Taylor filed two nonstatutory motions to dismiss, three motions to set aside the information or indictment (§ 995) multiple discovery motions under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 for law enforcement personnel files, and motions to dismiss for violation of the rights to a speedy preliminary hearing, to a speedy filing of the accusatory information, and to a continuous preliminary hearing (§§ 859b, 739, 861). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. MacKey
green
1 sentence2024We address that argument in part D, infra. 5 arraignment is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 729 .) Thus, “excepting only his own waiver, a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 consecutive calendar days from entry of plea or arraignment, whichever is later.” (People v. Mackey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 177, 183 .) B. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Victor J. Orena and Pasquale Amato
green
1 sentence2024(Orena, supra, 986 F.2d at p. 630 .) On this score, the People maintain that petitioner’s dilemma was “largely wrought by his own hands” because he elected to waive his right to a speedy preliminary hearing and trial at the outset of the case and moved or stipulated to several trial continuances. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Johnny W. v. Superior Court of San Francisco City & County
neutral
1 sentence2024As noted, they do not dispute petitioner’s argument that he was 4 entitled to enter a limited time waiver, which effectively concedes that petitioner is entitled to relief from the challenged ruling.2 “ ‘Having complied with the procedural prerequisites, we are authorized to issue a peremptory writ in the first instance.’ ” (Johnny W. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 559, 568 .) A. The Language of Section 859b “Both the defendant and the people have the right to a preliminary examination at the earliest possible time.” (§ 859b, 2d para.) “To effectuate the right to a speedy preliminary h | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Powell
green
1 sentence2021Thus, “‘[the] trial court was confronted with the difficult problem of procedurally navigating this case to avoid the Scylla of delay and the Charybdis of ineffective and inadequate representation.’” ( Kowalski, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 178–179, quoting People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 148 .) As explained in Kowalski, “[d]efendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel at his preliminary hearing, this being a ‘critical stage’ of the proceedings. [Citation.] And counsel must actually be prepared and effective. [Citation.] Defendant also has a right to a speedy trial and | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Ferrer
green
1 sentence2016We recognize that a defendant has a right to a speedy preliminary hearing, but the prosecutor too has a strong interest at stake — •“ ‘ “the fair prosecution of crimes properly alleged” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ])—and thus, as the Henderson court explained, a “ ‘ ‘ “dismissal which arbitrarily cuts those rights without a showing of detriment to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.” ’ ” ’ ” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 938 , italics omitted.) 3 We “recognize that our decision restricts the options avail | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Landrum v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2005Nevertheless, defendant argues that denying her a speedy preliminary hearing within 10 court days “is squarely at odds with Section 859b’s purpose to ensure defendants do not languish in custody while awaiting a preliminary hearing.” Defendant relies on Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 634 P.2d 352 ] (Landrum) in which the Supreme Court, considering an earlier version of the statute, stated, “Section 859b reflects a clear legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to a preliminary hearing.” (Id. at p. 12.) The preceding paragraph of Landrum 2005Nevertheless, defendant argues that denying her a speedy preliminary hearing within 10 court days “is squarely at odds with Section 859b’s purpose to ensure defendants do not languish in custody while awaiting a preliminary hearing.” Defendant relies on Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 634 P.2d 352 ] (Landrum) in which the Supreme Court, considering an earlier version of the statute, stated, “Section 859b reflects a clear legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to a preliminary hearing.” (Id. at p. 12.) The preceding paragraph of Landrum | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Townsend v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 1998Decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal have expressly recognized the tension between two rights guaranteed to every criminal defendant, the right to a speedy trial conferred by both the federal and state Constitutions and implemented through the time requirements in statutory provisions such as sections 686, 1381, and 1382, on the one hand, and the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, on the other hand. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 566-569 , 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ( Johnson ); Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3 | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.