Committee bar in Connecticut

2010In O’Brien’s Petition, supra, 55, our Supreme Court “held that the [Superior Court] had ‘rightly declined to hear evidence as to questions the decision of which was entrusted to the State bar examining committee’ and that it was ‘proper for [the court] to inquire whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair investigation of the facts.’ We have since adhered to that rule generally, stating that the issue before the court is whether the committee or the bar . . . acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts.” (Emphasis

2010In O’Brien’s Petition, supra, 55, our Supreme Court “held that the [Superior Court] had ‘rightly declined to hear evidence as to questions the decision of which was entrusted to the State bar examining committee’ and that it was ‘proper for [the court] to inquire whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair investigation of the facts.’ We have since adhered to that rule generally, stating that the issue before the court is whether the committee or the bar . . . acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts.” (Emphasis

2003Id. “ [T]he issue before the court is whether the committee or the bar, in withholding its approval for admission, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts.” In re Application of Warren, 149 Conn. 266, 273 , 178 A.2d 528 (1962).

2001The standard of review for this panel "in cases involving admission or readmission to the bar has been clear since it was announced by this court in 1906 in O'Brien's Petition, [ 79 Conn. 46 , 55-56 , 63 A. 777 (1906)] (court merely inquires whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair investigation of the facts)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812 , 823 , 601 A.2d 1021 (1992). "[T]he issue before [this panel] is whether the committee or the bar, in withholding its approval for admission, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or

2001The standard of review for this panel "in cases involving admission or readmission to the bar has been clear since it was announced by this court in 1906 in O'Brien's Petition, [ 79 Conn. 46 , 55-56 , 63 A. 777 (1906)] (court merely inquires whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair investigation of the facts)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812 , 823 , 601 A.2d 1021 (1992). "[T]he issue before [this panel] is whether the committee or the bar, in withholding its approval for admission, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or

2001The standard of review for this panel "in cases involving admission or readmission to the bar has been clear since it was announced by this court in 1906 in O'Brien's Petition, [ 79 Conn. 46 , 55-56 , 63 A. 777 (1906)] (court merely inquires whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair investigation of the facts)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812 , 823 , 601 A.2d 1021 (1992). "[T]he issue before [this panel] is whether the committee or the bar, in withholding its approval for admission, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or

1975The hearing is not one de novo.” (Italics supplied.) Our Connecticut practice over many years has vested in the bar and its committees “a wide discretion over such qualifications as character and professional competence.” In re Application of Dodd, 132 Conn. 237, 244 .

1960In re Application of Dodd, supra. It may well be that our Supreme Court may, in the future, adopt the liberal interpretation sought by the applicant.

1975Although “[w]e have uniformly held that occurrences at such hearings are not admissible as-a means of interpreting a legislative act, any more than are the private reasons of individual members for supporting it; Litchfield v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 573 , 131 A. 560 ; Peck v. Fanion, 124 Conn. 549, 553 , 1 A.2d 143 . . . ; [wjhere however, a report of a special commission or committee to the governor or General Assembly is presented to it, we consider it upon the assumption that its contents are generally known to the members of that body, at least in determining the general intent of the

1975Although “[w]e have uniformly held that occurrences at such hearings are not admissible as-a means of interpreting a legislative act, any more than are the private reasons of individual members for supporting it; Litchfield v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 573 , 131 A. 560 ; Peck v. Fanion, 124 Conn. 549, 553 , 1 A.2d 143 . . . ; [wjhere however, a report of a special commission or committee to the governor or General Assembly is presented to it, we consider it upon the assumption that its contents are generally known to the members of that body, at least in determining the general intent of the

1922In Fox v. South Norwalk, 85 Conn. 237, 240 , 82 Atl. 642 , we state the practice where a demurrer to the remon *664 strance is interposed for error apparent upon the face of the record: “Where the committee reports only the ultimate fact found, the party claiming to be aggrieved by any ruling or conduct of the committee on the hearing, and seeking relief therefrom, must, unless the court, on motion, recommits the report, file a remonstrance against the acceptance of it, and therein state specifically the rulings complained of, with such facts as it is claimed show their materiality to the issu

1922In Fox v. South Norwalk, 85 Conn. 237, 240 , 82 Atl. 642 , we state the practice where a demurrer to the remon *664 strance is interposed for error apparent upon the face of the record: “Where the committee reports only the ultimate fact found, the party claiming to be aggrieved by any ruling or conduct of the committee on the hearing, and seeking relief therefrom, must, unless the court, on motion, recommits the report, file a remonstrance against the acceptance of it, and therein state specifically the rulings complained of, with such facts as it is claimed show their materiality to the issu

1922Geary v. New Haven, 76 Conn. 84, 91 , 55 Atl. 584 .

1922Geary v. New Haven, 76 Conn. 84, 91 , 55 Atl. 584 .

2003Because the trial court exercises no discretion, but rather is confined to a review of the record before the [respondent], we are not limited to the deferential standard of manifest abuse or injustice when reviewing its legal conclusions about the adequacy of the evidence before the [respondent].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 50 , 818 A.2d 14 (2003); Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812, 823 , 601 A.2d 1021 (1992).

2003Because the trial court exercises no discretion, but rather is confined to a review of the record before the [respondent], we are not limited to the deferential standard of manifest abuse or injustice when reviewing its legal conclusions about the adequacy of the evidence before the [respondent].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 50 , 818 A.2d 14 (2003); Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812, 823 , 601 A.2d 1021 (1992).

1999This is because legislation is a purposive act . . . and, therefore, identifying the particular problem that the legislature sought to resolve helps to identify the purpose or purposes for which the legislature used the language in question.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 197 , 708 A.2d 1371 (1998); United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 450 , 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

1999This is because legislation is a purposive act . . . and, therefore, identifying the particular problem that the legislature sought to resolve helps to identify the purpose or purposes for which the legislature used the language in question.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 197 , 708 A.2d 1371 (1998); United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 450 , 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

1999“The committee claim[ed] on appeal [to the Appellate Court] that the trial court abused its discretion when it (1) suspended the defendant from the practice of law for only six months, and (2) did not discipline the defendant further because of his admission at the presentment hearing that he had made certain misrepresentations in federal court.” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Spirer, 46 Conn. App. 450, 451-54 , 699 A.2d 1047 (1997).

1999“The committee claim[ed] on appeal [to the Appellate Court] that the trial court abused its discretion when it (1) suspended the defendant from the practice of law for only six months, and (2) did not discipline the defendant further because of his admission at the presentment hearing that he had made certain misrepresentations in federal court.” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Spirer, 46 Conn. App. 450, 451-54 , 699 A.2d 1047 (1997).

1998Rapport’s testimony also supports the conclusion that the statutory exception for bona fide mortgages applies to the mortgage loan, not just to a mortgage conveyance that secures the loan. “ ‘To determine legislative intent, it is often useful to examine the title of a proposed bill ....’” State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 239 Conn. 638, 649 , 687 A.2d 134 (1997); State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 25 , 670 A.2d 851 (1996).

1998Rapport’s testimony also supports the conclusion that the statutory exception for bona fide mortgages applies to the mortgage loan, not just to a mortgage conveyance that secures the loan. “ ‘To determine legislative intent, it is often useful to examine the title of a proposed bill ....’” State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 239 Conn. 638, 649 , 687 A.2d 134 (1997); State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 25 , 670 A.2d 851 (1996).

1998Rapport’s testimony also supports the conclusion that the statutory exception for bona fide mortgages applies to the mortgage loan, not just to a mortgage conveyance that secures the loan. “ ‘To determine legislative intent, it is often useful to examine the title of a proposed bill ....’” State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 239 Conn. 638, 649 , 687 A.2d 134 (1997); State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 25 , 670 A.2d 851 (1996).

1998Rapport’s testimony also supports the conclusion that the statutory exception for bona fide mortgages applies to the mortgage loan, not just to a mortgage conveyance that secures the loan. “ ‘To determine legislative intent, it is often useful to examine the title of a proposed bill ....’” State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 239 Conn. 638, 649 , 687 A.2d 134 (1997); State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 25 , 670 A.2d 851 (1996).

1998The same is true for lines . . . 117 through 136.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 1, 1989 Sess., p. 255. “ ‘[I]t is now well settled that testimony before legislative committees may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought to address by the legislation.’ ” Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, supra, 244 Conn. 197 ; see United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 450 , 692 A.2d 742 (1997); State v. Ledbetter, 240 Conn. 317, 337 , 692 A.2d 713 (1997).

1998The same is true for lines . . . 117 through 136.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 1, 1989 Sess., p. 255. “ ‘[I]t is now well settled that testimony before legislative committees may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought to address by the legislation.’ ” Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, supra, 244 Conn. 197 ; see United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 450 , 692 A.2d 742 (1997); State v. Ledbetter, 240 Conn. 317, 337 , 692 A.2d 713 (1997).

1991"Generally, the automatic stay does not apply to proceedings against non-debtors." In re The Metal Center, 31 B.R. 458 , 462 (Bkrtcy, D.

1991"Generally, the automatic stay does not apply to proceedings against non-debtors." In re The Metal Center, 31 B.R. 458 , 462 (Bkrtcy, D.

1981Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313 , 325n, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 286 , 435 A.2d 333 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 406 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977).

1981Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313 , 325n, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 286 , 435 A.2d 333 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 406 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977).

1981Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313 , 325n, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 286 , 435 A.2d 333 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 406 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977).

1981Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313 , 325n, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 286 , 435 A.2d 333 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 406 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977).

1981Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313 , 325n, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 286 , 435 A.2d 333 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 406 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977).

1981Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313 , 325n, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 286 , 435 A.2d 333 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 406 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977).

1975Although “[w]e have uniformly held that occurrences at such hearings are not admissible as-a means of interpreting a legislative act, any more than are the private reasons of individual members for supporting it; Litchfield v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 573 , 131 A. 560 ; Peck v. Fanion, 124 Conn. 549, 553 , 1 A.2d 143 . . . ; [wjhere however, a report of a special commission or committee to the governor or General Assembly is presented to it, we consider it upon the assumption that its contents are generally known to the members of that body, at least in determining the general intent of the

1975Although “[w]e have uniformly held that occurrences at such hearings are not admissible as-a means of interpreting a legislative act, any more than are the private reasons of individual members for supporting it; Litchfield v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 573 , 131 A. 560 ; Peck v. Fanion, 124 Conn. 549, 553 , 1 A.2d 143 . . . ; [wjhere however, a report of a special commission or committee to the governor or General Assembly is presented to it, we consider it upon the assumption that its contents are generally known to the members of that body, at least in determining the general intent of the

1962Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Assn., 111 Conn. 47, 51 , 149 A. 415 ; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 417; Blaney v. Standing Committee, 129 Conn. 51, 56 , 26 A.2d 354 .

1962Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Assn., 111 Conn. 47, 51 , 149 A. 415 ; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 417; Blaney v. Standing Committee, 129 Conn. 51, 56 , 26 A.2d 354 .

1962Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Assn., 111 Conn. 47, 51 , 149 A. 415 ; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 417; Blaney v. Standing Committee, 129 Conn. 51, 56 , 26 A.2d 354 .

1962Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Assn., 111 Conn. 47, 51 , 149 A. 415 ; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 417; Blaney v. Standing Committee, 129 Conn. 51, 56 , 26 A.2d 354 .

1938Litchfield v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 573 , 131 Atl. 560 ; State v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 75 , 36 Atl. 1019 .

1938Litchfield v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 573 , 131 Atl. 560 ; State v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 75 , 36 Atl. 1019 .

1930Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11 , 22 Atl. 441 .

1930Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11 , 22 Atl. 441 .