vested rights doctrine in Pennsylvania

1989In Myers v. State College Zoning Hearing Board, 108 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 624 , 530 A.2d 526 (1987), this Court held that a party appealing the decision of a zoning hearing board to the common pleas court could not raise in that appeal any issue which had not been raised before the zoning hearing board unless the court allowed it upon due cause shown. 3 In reviewing the record, we find no application or motion by the tenant to have the common pleas court consider the issue of whether it had acquired a vested right to the building perriiit and certificate of occupancy. 4 The tenant, in an attemp

1989In Myers v. State College Zoning Hearing Board, 108 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 624 , 530 A.2d 526 (1987), this Court held that a party appealing the decision of a zoning hearing board to the common pleas court could not raise in that appeal any issue which had not been raised before the zoning hearing board unless the court allowed it upon due cause shown. 3 In reviewing the record, we find no application or motion by the tenant to have the common pleas court consider the issue of whether it had acquired a vested right to the building perriiit and certificate of occupancy. 4 The tenant, in an attemp

2016PJD asserts that, like the landowner who is allowed to use his or her property when in good faith he or she relied on a permit issued in error and incurred significant non-recoverable *1045 costs, the vested rights doctrine should similarly allow it to rely on the CIAA Exception Permit until its natural expiration on February 28, 2015. 5 PJD argues that in Turner v. Martz, 42 Pa.Cmwlth. 328 , 401 A.2d 585 (1979), this Court held that a landowner could not have his sewer permit revoked even though improperly issued because he had relied on the permit in good faith and had expended monies based

2016PJD asserts that, like the landowner who is allowed to use his or her property when in good faith he or she relied on a permit issued in error and incurred significant non-recoverable *1045 costs, the vested rights doctrine should similarly allow it to rely on the CIAA Exception Permit until its natural expiration on February 28, 2015. 5 PJD argues that in Turner v. Martz, 42 Pa.Cmwlth. 328 , 401 A.2d 585 (1979), this Court held that a landowner could not have his sewer permit revoked even though improperly issued because he had relied on the permit in good faith and had expended monies based

2003Id. [7] In evaluating a vested rights claim, courts look to five factors to determine whether a property owner has a vested right in a permit: (1) due diligence in attempting to comply with the law; (2) good faith throughout the proceedings; (3) expenditure of substantial unrecoverable funds; (4) expiration without appeal of the period during which an appeal could have been taken from the issuance of the permit; (5) insufficiency of evidence to prove that individual property rights or the public health, safety or welfare would be adversely affected by the use of the permit.

2001We conclude that the city’s cause of action against the Commonwealth is barred and the respondents’ demurrer in that regard must be sustained.” 112 Pa. Commw. at 191-92 , 535 A.2d at 682 . (citations omitted) Also, see Marriott Corp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Montgomery County, 63 Pa. Commw. 622, 628 , 438 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1982). (“If the vested rights claim be regarded as a constitutional one, it is barred because a municipal corporation cannot invoke constitutional protections against its sovereign, the state.”) In Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Di

2001We conclude that the city’s cause of action against the Commonwealth is barred and the respondents’ demurrer in that regard must be sustained.” 112 Pa. Commw. at 191-92 , 535 A.2d at 682 . (citations omitted) Also, see Marriott Corp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Montgomery County, 63 Pa. Commw. 622, 628 , 438 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1982). (“If the vested rights claim be regarded as a constitutional one, it is barred because a municipal corporation cannot invoke constitutional protections against its sovereign, the state.”) In Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Di

2001We conclude that the city’s cause of action against the Commonwealth is barred and the respondents’ demurrer in that regard must be sustained.” 112 Pa. Commw. at 191-92 , 535 A.2d at 682 . (citations omitted) Also, see Marriott Corp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Montgomery County, 63 Pa. Commw. 622, 628 , 438 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1982). (“If the vested rights claim be regarded as a constitutional one, it is barred because a municipal corporation cannot invoke constitutional protections against its sovereign, the state.”) In Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Di

2001We conclude that the city’s cause of action against the Commonwealth is barred and the respondents’ demurrer in that regard must be sustained.” 112 Pa. Commw. at 191-92 , 535 A.2d at 682 . (citations omitted) Also, see Marriott Corp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Montgomery County, 63 Pa. Commw. 622, 628 , 438 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1982). (“If the vested rights claim be regarded as a constitutional one, it is barred because a municipal corporation cannot invoke constitutional protections against its sovereign, the state.”) In Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Di

1991In order to qualify for a variance based on the vested rights doctrine, appellants must show they relied to their detriment on the Borough’s allowing their renovations, as well as establish the following elements of the five-prong test, originally set forth in Department of Environmental Resources v. Flynn, 21 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 264, 344 A.2d 720 (1975), adopted in Petrosky v. Zoning Board of Upper Chichester Township, 485 Pa. 501 , 402 A.2d 1385 (1979) and reaffirmed in Highland Park Community Club v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 509 Pa. 605 , 506 A.2d 887 (1986): (1

1991In order to qualify for a variance based on the vested rights doctrine, appellants must show they relied to their detriment on the Borough’s allowing their renovations, as well as establish the following elements of the five-prong test, originally set forth in Department of Environmental Resources v. Flynn, 21 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 264, 344 A.2d 720 (1975), adopted in Petrosky v. Zoning Board of Upper Chichester Township, 485 Pa. 501 , 402 A.2d 1385 (1979) and reaffirmed in Highland Park Community Club v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 509 Pa. 605 , 506 A.2d 887 (1986): (1

1986Whether the vested rights claim of the present owner be regarded as an entitlement legally surviving the revocation of a valid permit, Klein Appeal, 395 Pa. 157 , 149 A.2d 114 (1959), or as a claim based upon an invalidly issued permit, Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Chichester Township, 485 Pa. 501 , 402 A.2d 1385 (1979), the determinative question is whether the applicant ever expended substantial funds in reliance upon the permit.

1986Whether the vested rights claim of the present owner be regarded as an entitlement legally surviving the revocation of a valid permit, Klein Appeal, 395 Pa. 157 , 149 A.2d 114 (1959), or as a claim based upon an invalidly issued permit, Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Chichester Township, 485 Pa. 501 , 402 A.2d 1385 (1979), the determinative question is whether the applicant ever expended substantial funds in reliance upon the permit.

1982Cf. Bogush v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Coplay, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 280 , 437 A.2d 1086 (1981) (application for permit to build a “home” when an unlawful twin home was intended negated the inference, necessary to support a vested rights claim under Petroshy, that the applicant had acted with unsullied good faith).

1982Cf. Bogush v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Coplay, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 280 , 437 A.2d 1086 (1981) (application for permit to build a “home” when an unlawful twin home was intended negated the inference, necessary to support a vested rights claim under Petroshy, that the applicant had acted with unsullied good faith).

1981Recently, our Superior Court has applied the retroactivity test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) 7 as set forth below: “In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors.