vested rights doctrine in Washington

2025See, e.g., Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wn.2d 269, 278 , 943 P.2d 1378 (1997) (“The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to provide a measure of certainty to developers and to protect their expectations against fluctuating land use policy.”); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 868 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) (“This court rejected the reliance-based majority rule, instead embracing a vesting principle which places great emphasis on certainty and predictability in land use regulations.”), overruled in part by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019);

2021“The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to provide a measure of certainty to developers and to protect their expectations against fluctuating land use policy.” Noble Manor, 133 Wn.2d at 278 .

2025See, e.g., Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wn.2d 269, 278 , 943 P.2d 1378 (1997) (“The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to provide a measure of certainty to developers and to protect their expectations against fluctuating land use policy.”); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 868 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) (“This court rejected the reliance-based majority rule, instead embracing a vesting principle which places great emphasis on certainty and predictability in land use regulations.”), overruled in part by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019);

2025See, e.g., Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wn.2d 269, 278 , 943 P.2d 1378 (1997) (“The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to provide a measure of certainty to developers and to protect their expectations against fluctuating land use policy.”); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 868 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) (“This court rejected the reliance-based majority rule, instead embracing a vesting principle which places great emphasis on certainty and predictability in land use regulations.”), overruled in part by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019);

2025See, e.g., Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wn.2d 269, 278 , 943 P.2d 1378 (1997) (“The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to provide a measure of certainty to developers and to protect their expectations against fluctuating land use policy.”); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 868 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) (“This court rejected the reliance-based majority rule, instead embracing a vesting principle which places great emphasis on certainty and predictability in land use regulations.”), overruled in part by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 , 451 P.3d 694 (2019);

2011In extending the vested rights doctrine "to include short and long plat applications," our legislature "made the policy decision that developers should be able to develop their property according to the laws in effect at the time they make completed application for subdivision or short subdivision of their property." Noble Manor, 133 Wash.2d at 280 . 943 P.2d 1378 . ¶ 14 As for the "completeness" determination, RCW 36.70B.070 additionally provides in pertinent part: (1) Within twenty-eight days after receiving a project permit application, [10] a local government . . . shall mail or provide in

1997In West Main, this Court stated that under the vested rights doctrine, "developers who file a timely and complete building permit application obtain a vested right to have their application processed according to the zoning and building ordinances in effect at the time of the application.” West Main Assocs., Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 50-51 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Vashon Island, 127 Wn.2d at 767 -68 (citing Friends, 123 Wn.2d at 522 (a land use application will be considered under the laws in effect at the time of the application’s submission)).

1997In West Main, this Court stated that under the vested rights doctrine, "developers who file a timely and complete *1386 building permit application obtain a vested right to have their application processed according to the zoning and building ordinances in effect at the time of the application." West Main Assocs., Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 50-51 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Vashon Island, 127 Wash.2d at 767-68 , 903 P.2d 953 (citing Friends, 123 Wash.2d at 522 , 869 P.2d 1056 (a land use application will be considered under the laws in effect at the time of

2025Int’l Union Loc. 925 v. Dep’t of Early Learning, 194 Wn.2d 546 , 553, 450 P.3d 1181 (2019) (“The vested right doctrine is a constitutional protection for property rights.”); cf. Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 180 Wn.2d 165, 173 , 322 P.3d 1219 (2014) (“While it originated at common law, the vested rights doctrine is now statutory.”), overruled in part by Chong Yim, 194 Wn.2d 682 .

2025Int’l Union Loc. 925 v. Dep’t of Early Learning, 194 Wn.2d 546 , 553, 450 P.3d 1181 (2019) (“The vested right doctrine is a constitutional protection for property rights.”); cf. Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 180 Wn.2d 165, 173 , 322 P.3d 1219 (2014) (“While it originated at common law, the vested rights doctrine is now statutory.”), overruled in part by Chong Yim, 194 Wn.2d 682 .

2016See State v. Carneh, 153 Wn.2d 274 , 286 n.3, 103 P.3d 743 (2004) (noting that because the court in a prior case mentioned a statute only in passing and did not specifically analyze it, the case could not be relied on for its conclusions regarding the statute).

2016See State v. Carneh, 153 Wn.2d 274 , 286 n.3, 103 P.3d 743 (2004) (noting that because the court in a prior case mentioned a statute only in passing and did not specifically analyze it, the case could not be relied on for its conclusions regarding the statute).

2016The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the vested rights doctrine excuses compliance with the storm water regulations because they are "land use control ordinances." Snohomish County v. Pollution Control Hr'gs Bd., 192 Wn.

2016The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the vested rights doctrine excuses compliance with the storm water regulations because they are “land use control ordinances.” Snohomish County v. Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 192 Wn.

2016See State v. Carneh, 153 Wn.2d 274 , 286 n.3, 103 P.3d 743 (2004) (noting that because the court in a prior case mentioned a statute only in passing and did not specifically analyze it, the case could not be relied on for its conclusions regarding the statute).

2016See State v. Carneh, 153 Wn.2d 274 , 286 n.3, 103 P.3d 743 (2004) (noting that because the court in a prior case mentioned a statute only in passing and did not specifically analyze it, the case could not be relied on for its conclusions regarding the statute).

2016The proper resolution of that conflict depends on the source of the vested rights doctrine. ¶77 In West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 51, 52 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986), our Supreme Court struck down Bellevue’s local vesting ordinance because it did not meet the due process standards of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2016The proper resolution of that conflict depends on the source of the vested rights doctrine. ¶77 In West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 51, 52 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986), our Supreme Court struck down Bellevue’s local vesting ordinance because it did not meet the due process standards of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2005Thus, we hold that the hearing examiner erred by accepting East’s selective waivers and by failing to review East’s application under the regulations and law in effect at the time it chose to file its initial application. ¶13 The vested rights doctrine is “based on constitutional principles of fundamental fairness, reflecting an acknowledgement that development rights are valuable and protectable property rights.” Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov’t v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd. for King County, 127 Wn.2d 759, 768 , 903 P.2d 953 (1995).

2005Thus, we hold that the hearing examiner erred by accepting East’s selective waivers and by failing to review East’s application under the regulations and law in effect at the time it chose to file its initial application. ¶13 The vested rights doctrine is “based on constitutional principles of fundamental fairness, reflecting an acknowledgement that development rights are valuable and protectable property rights.” Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov’t v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd. for King County, 127 Wn.2d 759, 768 , 903 P.2d 953 (1995).

2025See Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 873 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) (noting that municipalities may develop vesting schemes “[w]ithin the parameters of the doctrine established by statutory and case law”). 2 A preliminary plat is “a neat and approximate drawing of a proposed subdivision showing the general layout of streets and alleys, lots, blocks, and other elements of a subdivision consistent with the requirements of this chapter.” RCW 58.17.020(4). -7- No. 86285-5-I proposal, the PUD ordinance is one of the laws in effect at the time of application to which the vested right

2024See Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 873 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) (noting that municipalities may develop vesting schemes “[w]ithin the parameters of the doctrine established by statutory and case law”). 2 A preliminary plat is “a neat and approximate drawing of a proposed subdivision showing the general layout of streets and alleys, lots, blocks, and other elements of a subdivision consistent with the requirements of this chapter.” RCW 58.17.020(4). -7- No. 86285-5-I proposal, the PUD ordinance is one of the laws in effect at the time of application to which the vested right

2010See, e.g., Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish County, 73 Wash.2d 343 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968). ¶ 15 The hearing examiner concluded that the vested rights doctrine did not apply to the Phase II application because a complete building permit application had not been submitted before October 3, 2006, when the proposed use of the site had been prohibited by the County's zoning code.

2010See, e.g., Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish County, 73 Wash.2d 343 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968). ¶ 15 The hearing examiner concluded that the vested rights doctrine did not apply to the Phase II application because a complete building permit application had not been submitted before October 3, 2006, when the proposed use of the site had been prohibited by the County's zoning code.

2025App. 191, 203-24 , 334 P.3d 1143 (2014) (declining to extend doctrine to shoreline substantial development permits because “the legislature was aware of the then-existing common law regarding the vested rights doctrine” when it enacted RCW 19.27.095(1) but “only codified the vested rights doctrine to the extent of building permits in this section of the session laws”); see also Total Outdoor Corp. v. City of Seattle Dep’t of Planning and Dev., 187 Wn.

2025App. 337 , 354 n.53, 348 P.3d 766 (2015) (“The vested rights doctrine applies only to a narrow set of circumstances prescribed by statute for building permit applications, RCW 19.27.095(1), and subdivision applications, RCW 58.17.033(1).”).

2025After issuing Kitsap County, our Supreme Court issued Abbey Road Group, LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, which acknowledged that the legislature has codified the vested rights doctrine into statute to “strike a balance between the public’s interest in controlling development and the developers’ interest in being able to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty.” 167 Wn.2d 242, 251 , 218 P.3d 180 (2009).

2024After issuing Kitsap County, our Supreme Court issued Abbey Road Group, LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, which acknowledged that the legislature has codified the vested rights doctrine into statute to “strike a balance between the public’s interest in controlling development and the developers’ interest in being able to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty.” 167 Wn.2d 242, 251 , 218 P.3d 180 (2009).

2016The Final Bill Report on the bill enacting RCW 19.27.095 and RCW 58.17.033 states: Washington State has adhered to the current vested rights doctrine since the Supreme Court case of State ex rei. [City oj] Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492 [, 275 P .2d 899] (1954).

2016The Final Bill Report on the bill enacting RCW 19.27.095 and RCW 58.17.033 states: Washington State has adhered to the current vested rights doctrine since the Supreme Court case of State ex rei. [City oj] Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492 [, 275 P .2d 899] (1954).

2021The vested rights doctrine specifically does not concern usage because “the doctrine applies only to permit applications.” Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wn.2d at 16 .

2009Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 136 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 959 P.2d 1024 (1998) (the vested rights doctrine “applies only to permit applications,” not whether the development of lots is subject to later enacted regulations).

2025After issuing Kitsap County, our Supreme Court issued Abbey Road Group, LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, which acknowledged that the legislature has codified the vested rights doctrine into statute to “strike a balance between the public’s interest in controlling development and the developers’ interest in being able to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty.” 167 Wn.2d 242, 251 , 218 P.3d 180 (2009).

2024After issuing Kitsap County, our Supreme Court issued Abbey Road Group, LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, which acknowledged that the legislature has codified the vested rights doctrine into statute to “strike a balance between the public’s interest in controlling development and the developers’ interest in being able to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty.” 167 Wn.2d 242, 251 , 218 P.3d 180 (2009).

2016In Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., we stated that "[w ]e did use the 'then existing' language, but only because [Phillips] involved the vested rights doctrine." 176 Wn.2d 909, 930 , 296 P.3d 860 (2013) (citing Phillips, 136 Wn.2d at 961 ).

2016In Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., we stated that “[w]e did use the ‘then existing’ language, but only because [Phillips] involved the vested rights doctrine.” 176 Wn.2d 909, 930 , 296 P.3d 860 (2013) (citing Phillips, 136 Wn.2d at 961 ).

2014While some of Abbey Road's arguments could support a change in the law, instituting such broad reforms in land use law is a job better suited to the legislature.^ Most recently, in Town of Woodwav v. Snohomish County, the supreme court reiterated that "[w]hile it originated at common law, the vested rights doctrine is now statutory."48 This statement is fully consistent with the case law and statutes that we have discussed in tracing the development of the vested rights doctrine. 44 id at 253 n.8 (emphasis added). 45 id at 253. 46 id at 254 (citing Victoria Tower P'ship v. City of Seattle. 49

2014While some of Abbey Road's arguments could support a change in the law, instituting such broad reforms in land use law is a job better suited to the legislature.^ Most recently, in Town of Woodwav v. Snohomish County, the supreme court reiterated that "[w]hile it originated at common law, the vested rights doctrine is now statutory."48 This statement is fully consistent with the case law and statutes that we have discussed in tracing the development of the vested rights doctrine. 44 id at 253 n.8 (emphasis added). 45 id at 253. 46 id at 254 (citing Victoria Tower P'ship v. City of Seattle. 49

2010The vested rights doctrine is instead based on “[t]he need for a ‘date certain’ ... to avoid tactical maneuvering between parties and that need would appear equally strong whether the act is discretionary or ministerial.” Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wn.2d 680, 684 , 649 P.2d 103 (1982).

2010The vested rights doctrine is instead based on “[t]he need for a ‘date certain’ ... to avoid tactical maneuvering between parties and that need would appear equally strong whether the act is discretionary or ministerial.” Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wn.2d 680, 684 , 649 P.2d 103 (1982).

2016Had the fee “affect [ed] the physical aspects of development (i.e., building height, setbacks, or sidewalk widths) or the type of uses allowed (i.e., residential, commercial, or industrial),” it would have been “subject to the vested rights doctrine.” Id. at 237 . ¶36 The court in Westside adopted the definition of “land use control ordinance” from New Castle. 100 Wn.

2016Given this language, the court in Westside concluded that “even if dicta, because the Phillips court plainly considered whether surface water drainage ordinances are within the ambit of the vested rights doctrine ... we are not prepared to say that storm water drainage ordinances are not subject to the vesting rule.” 100 Wn.

2014App. 807, 811 , 525 P.2d 801 (1974) (shoreline permit) We agree with Erickson that our prior cases apply the vested rights doctrine in other contexts besides building permits.1761 But, as previously discussed, the supreme court also explained in those cases that the legislature "codified these judicially recognized principles" in 1987.77 And most recently the supreme court expressly stated that "the vested rights doctrine is now statutory,"78 Given the supreme court's statements in these cases, we reject Potala Village's arguments to the contrary. 73 Respondents' Opening Brief at 27 (citing We

1985The vested rights doctrine has been applied to building permits, Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958); shoreline development permits, Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wn.