core of one defense in Texas

2001A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants’ defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants’ respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that, “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (in dicta) (quoting United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.1984), citing DeGrate v. State, 518 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1975)); see King, 17 S.W.3d at 17-18 ; Silva, 933 S.W.2d at 719 . 2 In Lee , the

1999"Instead, the codefendants' positions must be 'mutually exclusive' in the sense that 'the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.'" Silva , 933 S.W.2d at 719 (citing Goode v. State , 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex. Crim.

2001A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants’ defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants’ respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that, “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (in dicta) (quoting United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.1984), citing DeGrate v. State, 518 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1975)); see King, 17 S.W.3d at 17-18 ; Silva, 933 S.W.2d at 719 . 2 In Lee , the

2000To be entitled to a severance, the co-defendants’ respective positions must be mutually exclusive in the sense that “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Id.; see also Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (quoting United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) and DeGrate v. State, 518 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1975)).

2009A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants' defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants' respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that "the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other." Aguilar v. State, 39 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2001, pet ref’d.).

2009A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants' defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants' respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that "the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other." Aguilar v. State , 39 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet ref'd.).

2001A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants’ defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants’ respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that, “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (in dicta) (quoting United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.1984), citing DeGrate v. State, 518 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1975)); see King, 17 S.W.3d at 17-18 ; Silva, 933 S.W.2d at 719 . 2 In Lee , the

2000To be entitled to a severance, the co-defendants’ respective positions must be mutually exclusive in the sense that “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Id.; see also Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (quoting United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) and DeGrate v. State, 518 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1975)).

2004Mendoza v. State , 61 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001), aff'd on other grounds , 88 S.W.3d 236 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); see Silva , 933 S.W.2d at 719 .

2004Mendoza v. State , 61 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2001), aff’d on other grounds , 88 S.W.3d 236 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); see Silva , 933 S.W.2d at 719 .

2005A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants’ defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants’ respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Aguilar, 39 S.W.3d at 702 (citing Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citations omitted).

2001A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants' defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants' respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that, "the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other." Goode v. State , 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex. Crim.

2001A showing of clear prejudice based on an allegation that the co-defendants’ defenses are inconsistent is apparently established if the co-defendants’ respective positions are mutually exclusive to the extent that, “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Goode v. State, 740 S.W.2d 453 , 455 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (in dicta) (quoting United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir.1984), citing DeGrate v. State, 518 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1975)); see King, 17 S.W.3d at 17-18 ; Silva, 933 S.W.2d at 719 . 2 In Lee , the

2001Thus, the co-defendants’ defenses were not mutually exclusive in *703 the sense that “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted) (quote taken from Goode and Lee).

2024However, a defendant may show prejudice where co-defendants have such “mutually exclusive” defenses that “the jury in order to believe the core of one defense must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other.” Adams v. State, 180 S.W.3d 386, 400 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no pet.) (citations omitted).

2024However, “[t]he mere allegation that prejudice will result is not evidence of, or a sufficient showing of, prejudice under article 36.09, particularly when the severance is discretionary with the trial judge.” Id. (citing Patterson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d)).

2024However, “[t]he mere allegation that prejudice will result is not evidence of, or a sufficient showing of, prejudice under article 36.09, particularly when the severance is discretionary with the trial judge.” Id. (citing Patterson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d)).