rejection of an affirmative defense in Texas

2009See Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d).

2009See Naasz v. State , 974 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd).

2024App. 1990), discussed the standard of review for factual sufficiency challenges to the rejection of an affirmative defense of insanity. 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. Crim.

2018We use “traditional Texas civil burdens of proof and standards of review in the context of affirmative defenses where the rejection of an affirmative defense is established by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. 17 In determining legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on an affirmative defense, we look to: When an appellant asserts that there is no evidence to support an adverse finding on which she had the burden of proof, we construe the issue as an assertion that the contrary was established as a matter of law.

2019Id. at 671 (citing Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 149, 153-55 (Tex. Crim.

2015Id. at 671 (citing Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 149 , 153–55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)).

2006See Hernandez v. State , 127 S.W.3d 206, 211-12 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd).

2006See Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 206, 211-12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d).

2004See Smith v. State, 2000 WL 108136 at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Feb. 1, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Naasz, 974 S.W.2d at 421, 423 ; see also Wilson v. State, 15 S.W.3d 544 , 549 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d) (dictum).

2003See Smith v. State , 2000 WL 108136 at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 1, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Naasz , 974 S.W.2d at 421 , 423 ; see also Wilson v. State , 15 S.W.3d 544 , 549 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d) (dictum) .

2014See also Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004) (“In sum, we think that whenever the standard of proof at trial is elevated, the standard of appellate review must likewise be elevated.”). 74 See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 667, 670 (“Prior to Brooks, we used the traditional Texas civil burdens of proof and standards of review in the context of affirmative defenses where the rejection of an affirmative defense is established by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ Our decision in Brooks did not affect that line of cases. * * * A criminal defendant might also raise a

2014The State does not take issue with the court of appeals's formulation of the difference, under current law, between legal- and factual-sufficiency analyses; "Under a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence favorable to the challenged finding and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject the evidence. * * * Under a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence presented to determine if the [juvenile] court’s finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust.” Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 3

2014MOON — 30 with respect to Section 52.04(f)(4).75 Having said that, we do agree with the State’s contention to the limited extent that it may argue that sufficiency review should not apply to appellate review of the ultimate question under Section 54.02(a)(3), that is, whether “because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.” The discretion of the juvenile court is at its apex when it makes this largely normative judgment.76 As long as the appellate court can determine that the juvenile court’s judgment

2013Matlock Page 7 of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.12 The Jackson standard ofreview is that required for criminal cases when the standard ofproof is that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." That constitutional standard of review applies to the elements of an offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not apply to elements of an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.13 Prior to Brooks, we used the traditional Texas civil burdens ofproofand standards ofreview in the conte

2013Matlock Page 7 of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.12 The Jackson standard ofreview is that required for criminal cases when the standard ofproof is that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." That constitutional standard of review applies to the elements of an offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not apply to elements of an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.13 Prior to Brooks, we used the traditional Texas civil burdens ofproofand standards ofreview in the conte

2013Matlock Page 7 of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.12 The Jackson standard ofreview is that required for criminal cases when the standard ofproof is that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." That constitutional standard of review applies to the elements of an offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not apply to elements of an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.13 Prior to Brooks, we used the traditional Texas civil burdens ofproofand standards ofreview in the conte

2012Bradshaw v. State, 244 S.W.3d 490, 502 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).