nondeferential standard in California

2021(See People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-896, 900-903 [discussing standards of appellate review and concluding that appellate courts should independently review a trial court’s determination that the prosecution’s failed efforts to locate an absent witness are sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation at trial]; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800-801 [observing traditional notion that questions of fact are reviewed by giving deference to the trial court’s decision, while questions of law are reviewed under a no

2020Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, affording plenary review.’” (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800 , quoting People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 985 .) We are especially mindful here of the need to apply the correct standard based on the question being resolved.

2013Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 11 P.3d 956 ] [a court’s statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law that is examined de novo]; McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 809 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ] [“Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard . . . .”].) Similarly, the trial court’s construction of the language of *1498 the settlement agreement between the Underwriters and Brandwein is reviewed de novo, inasmuch as there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence as to its meaning.

2013Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 11 P.3d 956 ] [a court’s statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law that is examined de novo]; McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 809 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ] [“Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard . . . .”].) Similarly, the trial court’s construction of the language of *1498 the settlement agreement between the Underwriters and Brandwein is reviewed de novo, inasmuch as there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence as to its meaning.

2020Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, affording plenary review.’” (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800 , quoting People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 985 .) We are especially mindful here of the need to apply the correct standard based on the question being resolved.

1994Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, affording plenary review. ( People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d [969] at p. 985 [ 232 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 728 P.2d 180 ].) However, as to the third step, the application of law to fact, difficulty is encountered and views as to the correct approach are mixed.... [¶] `"In our view, the key to the resolution of this question is the nature of the inquiry that is required to decide `whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.' [Citation.] If application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquir

2013(See, e.g., Citizens for Goleta Valley v. HT Santa Barbara (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1076 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 ] [“The parties agree that, because there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence, we must independently construe the settlement agreement.”], citing Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ] (Parsons).) B.

2013(See, e.g., Citizens for Goleta Valley v. HT Santa Barbara (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1076 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 ] [“The parties agree that, because there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence, we must independently construe the settlement agreement.”], citing Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ] (Parsons).) B.

2013Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 11 P.3d 956 ] [a court’s statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law that is examined de novo]; McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 809 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ] [“Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard . . . .”].) Similarly, the trial court’s construction of the language of *1498 the settlement agreement between the Underwriters and Brandwein is reviewed de novo, inasmuch as there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence as to its meaning.

2013Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 11 P.3d 956 ] [a court’s statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law that is examined de novo]; McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 809 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ] [“Questions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard . . . .”].) Similarly, the trial court’s construction of the language of *1498 the settlement agreement between the Underwriters and Brandwein is reviewed de novo, inasmuch as there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence as to its meaning.

2013(See, e.g., Citizens for Goleta Valley v. HT Santa Barbara (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1076 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 ] [“The parties agree that, because there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence, we must independently construe the settlement agreement.”], citing Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ] (Parsons).) B.

2013(See, e.g., Citizens for Goleta Valley v. HT Santa Barbara (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1076 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 ] [“The parties agree that, because there is no conflicting extrinsic evidence, we must independently construe the settlement agreement.”], citing Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ] (Parsons).) B.

2023“The standards of review for questions of pure fact and pure law are well developed and settled. … [A]n appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard …, but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review.” (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 , 893‒894; see Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 440 [“The reviewing court defers to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts if supported by substantial evidence, but it reviews the trial court’s ultimate finding of due diligence independently, not deferent

2022“The standards of review for questions of pure fact and pure law are well developed and settled. . . . [A]n appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard (substantial evidence under California law, clearly erroneous under federal law), but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review.” ( Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 893–894.) “Selecting the proper standard of appellate review becomes more difficult when the trial court determination under review resolves a mixed question of law and fact.

2001(See People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 507 P.2d 621 .) Selecting the proper standard of appellate review becomes more difficult when the trial court determination under review resolves a mixed question of law and fact.

2001(See People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 507 P.2d 621 .) Selecting the proper standard of appellate review becomes more difficult when the trial court determination under review resolves a mixed question of law and fact.

2023“The standards of review for questions of pure fact and pure law are well developed and settled. … [A]n appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard …, but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review.” (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 , 893‒894; see Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 440 [“The reviewing court defers to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts if supported by substantial evidence, but it reviews the trial court’s ultimate finding of due diligence independently, not deferent

2023“The standards of review for questions of pure fact and pure law are well developed and settled. … [A]n appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard …, but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review.” (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 , 893‒894; see Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 440 [“The reviewing court defers to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts if supported by substantial evidence, but it reviews the trial court’s ultimate finding of due diligence independently, not deferent

2022Mixed questions are those in which the 14 ‘ “historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” ’ ” (Cromer, at p. 894 [ appellate court independently reviews trial court’s finding the prosecution used due diligence to locate missing witness.]; see Winslow, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 471 [applies Cromer where witness’s unavailability results from “existing menta

2022Mixed questions are those in which the 14 ‘ “historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” ’ ” (Cromer, at p. 894 [ appellate court independently reviews trial court’s finding the prosecution used due diligence to locate missing witness.]; see Winslow, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 471 [applies Cromer where witness’s unavailability results from “existing menta

2021(See People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-896, 900-903 [discussing standards of appellate review and concluding that appellate courts should independently review a trial court’s determination that the prosecution’s failed efforts to locate an absent witness are sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation at trial]; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800-801 [observing traditional notion that questions of fact are reviewed by giving deference to the trial court’s decision, while questions of law are reviewed under a no

2020Traditionally, therefore, an appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard (substantial evidence under California law, clearly erroneous under federal law), but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review." (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , fn. omitted.) "Mixed questions of fact and law 'are those "in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant legal] standard, or to put it another way, whether

2020Traditionally, therefore, an appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard (substantial evidence under California law, clearly erroneous under federal law), but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review." (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , fn. omitted.) "Mixed questions of fact and law 'are those "in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant legal] standard, or to put it another way, whether

2007As the majority emphasizes, however, our decision to review this new trial order under a nondeferential standard is "a narrow one" (maj. opn., ante, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 646 , 161 P.3d at p. 161 ) in that the trial court's failure to file a statement of reasons made it impossible for us to determine "whether the trial court's ruling was based on the bias of Joseph A., the misconduct of Linda H., or both." ( Id at p. 646, 161 P.3d at p. 161 .) Different situations may invoke a different standard of review, in accordance with our prior observation that "any determination underlying any [new tria

2007As the majority emphasizes, however, our decision to review this new trial order under a nondeferential standard is "a narrow one" (maj. opn., ante, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 646 , 161 P.3d at p. 161 ) in that the trial court's failure to file a statement of reasons made it impossible for us to determine "whether the trial court's ruling was based on the bias of Joseph A., the misconduct of Linda H., or both." ( Id at p. 646, 161 P.3d at p. 161 .) Different situations may invoke a different standard of review, in accordance with our prior observation that "any determination underlying any [new tria

2006Questions of law “are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, affording plenary review.” (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 , 883 P.2d 960 ].) Although the trial court’s determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a settlement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 581 ]), whether a determination of a good faith settlement applies to a party or claim is a question of law that we review de novo.

2006Questions of law “are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, affording plenary review.” (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 , 883 P.2d 960 ].) Although the trial court’s determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a settlement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 581 ]), whether a determination of a good faith settlement applies to a party or claim is a question of law that we review de novo.

1999However, where, as here, the question implicates constitutional rights necessitating consideration of legal concepts in the mix of fact and law, and an exercise of judgment about the values that animate legal principles, the factors favoring de novo review predominate. {Id. at pp. 800-801; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 987 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 728 P.2d 180 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ]; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 40, 47.) Plaintiff’s suit challenges the c

1999However, where, as here, the question implicates constitutional rights necessitating consideration of legal concepts in the mix of fact and law, and an exercise of judgment about the values that animate legal principles, the factors favoring de novo review predominate. {Id. at pp. 800-801; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 987 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 728 P.2d 180 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ]; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 40, 47.) Plaintiff’s suit challenges the c