reasonable likelihood standard in California

2014(McNeil, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 438 .) The court in McNeil, analyzing the state court’s ruling under the deferential AEDPA standard, held only that the ruling was not an “objectively unreasonable” application of the reasonable likelihood standard.

2014(McNeil, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 438 .) The court in McNeil, analyzing the state court’s ruling under the deferential AEDPA standard, held only that the ruling was not an “objectively unreasonable” application of the reasonable likelihood standard.

2014(Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 341 .) The language of the instructions properly limited their application to the respective counts, and the instructions were not in conflict.

2014(Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 341 .) The language of the instructions properly limited their application to the respective counts, and the instructions were not in conflict.

2014Gates v. Woodford (2003) 334 F.3d 803, 815 ]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [court is not required to use the “reasonable likelihood” standard when jury instruction is not merely ambiguous, but flatly erroneous].) The United States Supreme Court set forth the reasonable likelihood standard in Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 .

2014Gates v. Woodford (2003) 334 F.3d 803, 815 ]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [court is not required to use the “reasonable likelihood” standard when jury instruction is not merely ambiguous, but flatly erroneous].) The United States Supreme Court set forth the reasonable likelihood standard in Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 .

2026(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) We assess whether the instruction accurately states the law, consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the instruction caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution, and view the challenged instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.) Incorrect, ambiguous, or conflicting instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are harmless unless i

2025(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) We assess whether the instruction accurately states the law, consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the instruction caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution, and view the challenged instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.) Further, if there is error, its prejudicial nature depends on 10 whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the

2026(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) We assess whether the instruction accurately states the law, consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the instruction caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution, and view the challenged instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.) Incorrect, ambiguous, or conflicting instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are harmless unless i

2025(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) We assess whether the instruction accurately states the law, consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the instruction caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution, and view the challenged instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.) Further, if there is error, its prejudicial nature depends on 10 whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the

2024(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202 .) In the People’s view, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted defendants of murder solely as aider-and-abettors without finding they acted with “at least implied malice” given the jury instructions and the prosecutor’s closing argument.

2023(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202 .) In the People’s view, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted defendants of murder solely as aider-and-abettors without finding they acted with “at least implied malice” given the jury instructions and the prosecutor’s closing argument.

2024(See Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 [rejecting “standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical ‘reasonable’ juror could or might have interpreted the instruction”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 73, fn. 4 [“[W]e now disapprove the standard of review language in” two intervening cases that used “could have understood” and “would have understood” “and reaffirm the standard set out in Boyde”]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [adopting the reasonable likelihood standard for assessing instructions under California law]; People v. Covarrubias

2023(See Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 [rejecting “standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical ‘reasonable’ juror could or might have interpreted the instruction”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 73, fn. 4 [“[W]e now 16 disapprove the standard of review language in” two intervening cases that used “could have understood” and “would have understood” “and reaffirm the standard set out in Boyde”]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [adopting this reasonable likelihood standard for assessing instructions under California law].) To satisfy the r

2023On the one hand, “the prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is limited” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 ), and the threshold for establishing a prima facie case for resentencing is “‘very low’” (id. at p. 972).

2023(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244 , 1256; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 , 107.) We need not, and do not, decide whether or to what extent the standard applies in section 1172.6 cases. 15 p. 1257] [no reasonable likelihood jury construed aiding and abetting instruction to permit conviction based on imputed malice because, in light of other instructions and jury’s true finding as to a special circumstance requiring the defendant had the intent to kill, “the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates” the defendant is ineligible for resentencing]; Boyde, supra, 494 U.S

2026(People v. Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 942 .) But violations of the federal constitution are evaluated under the standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2026(People v. Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 942 .) But violations of the federal constitution are evaluated under the standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2023As an initial matter, the contention is forfeited. “ ‘It is well settled that arguments ... cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.’ ” 7Whether such knowledge is an element of aiding and abetting a lying- in-wait murder is not before us, and we express no opinion on the matter. 14 (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1092 , abrogated on another ground by Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 .) In any event, assuming the reasonable likelihood standard applies, it is met here. 8 “Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to h

2023As an initial matter, the contention is forfeited. “ ‘It is well settled that arguments ... cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.’ ” 7Whether such knowledge is an element of aiding and abetting a lying- in-wait murder is not before us, and we express no opinion on the matter. 14 (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1092 , abrogated on another ground by Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 .) In any event, assuming the reasonable likelihood standard applies, it is met here. 8 “Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to h

2023(See, e.g., Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 ; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 873 .) Here, we are concerned with the different issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie case for resentencing under an ameliorative sentencing law.

2015(People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 939 .) A court’s failure to so instruct is prejudicial only where there is a reasonable likelihood the error caused juror misunderstanding.

2014When presented with a claim of instructional ambiguity, “we review the challenged language to inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the instruction caused the jury to misconstrue or misapply the law.” (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 436 .) Each of the instructions that Jones believes were ordered incorrectly involves what a reasonable person would do or believe under the circumstances.

2013(Waddington v. Sarausad, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 191 ; Cupp v. Naughten (1973) 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 368 , 94 S.Ct. 396 ].) Only after a reasonable likelihood the instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof must an appellate court engage in harmless error analysis.

2013(Waddington v. Sarausad, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 191 ; Cupp v. Naughten (1973) 414 U.S. 141, 147 .) Only after a reasonable likelihood the instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof must an appellate court engage in harmless error analysis.

2009(Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 6 .) While observing that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is “an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system” (id. at p. 5), the court recognized that it is a standard that “defies easy explication” (ibid).

2007And, as evidenced by the trial court’s ruling in Craemer v. Superior Court, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at page 218 , courts faced with issues of prejudicial pretrial publicity have, even before the establishment of the reasonable likelihood standard, sealed postindictment transcripts where necessary to protect the fair trial rights of the *656 defendant.

2005But this apparently false argument, inconsistent with the arguments made in Sakarias's trial, was not prejudicial to Waidla as to penalty, even under the reasonable likelihood standard of United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at page 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 .

2005But this apparently false argument, inconsistent with the arguments made in Sakarias's trial, was not prejudicial to Waidla as to penalty, even under the reasonable likelihood standard of United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at page 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 .

1994The Press-Enterprise filed opposition to the motion, contending that the reasonable likelihood standard of section 938.1 is constitutionally infirm and that it must be replaced by the substantial probability of prejudice standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 1 , 106 S.Ct. 2735 ] (Press-Enterprise II).

1994The Press-Enterprise filed opposition to the motion, contending that the reasonable likelihood standard of section 938.1 is constitutionally infirm and that it must be replaced by the substantial probability of prejudice standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 1 , 106 S.Ct. 2735 ] (Press-Enterprise II).