totality of the cireumstances test in Colorado

2013Polander, 41 P.3d at 703 . ¶ 12 As with probable cause, the totality-of-the-cireumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986), has also replaced the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), for purposes of evaluating reasonable articulable suspicion.

2000See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.1986). 2 The totality of the cireumstances analysis also may include the *482 depth of detail provided by the informant, as courts have inferred reliability from an informant's ability to provide details that could not be obtained easily.

2016See People v. Pacheco, 175 P.3d 91, 95 (Colo. 2006) ("If only non-eriminal activity is corroborated, the question whether probable cause exists focuses on 'the degree of suspicion that attaches to [the] particular types of corroborated non-criminal acts....'" (quoting People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 1994))); People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231 , 1237-38 & n. 9 (Colo. 1994) (holding that probable cause does not require specific information that a particular crime has been committed, and stating that the possibility of an innocent alternative explanation is merely a factor in the total

2013Polander, 41 P.3d at 703 . ¶ 12 As with probable cause, the totality-of-the-cireumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986), has also replaced the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), for purposes of evaluating reasonable articulable suspicion.

2016See People v. Pacheco, 175 P.3d 91, 95 (Colo. 2006) ("If only non-eriminal activity is corroborated, the question whether probable cause exists focuses on 'the degree of suspicion that attaches to [the] particular types of corroborated non-criminal acts....'" (quoting People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 1994))); People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231 , 1237-38 & n. 9 (Colo. 1994) (holding that probable cause does not require specific information that a particular crime has been committed, and stating that the possibility of an innocent alternative explanation is merely a factor in the total

2010Pacheco, 175 P.3d at 94-95 . "[An informant's account of criminal activities need not establish the informant's basis of knowledge, so long as the informants statement is sufficiently detailed to allow a judge to reasonably conclude that the informant had access to reliable information about the illegal activities reported to the police." People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324, 1327 (Colo.1990).

2009See People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo.2003) (whether information is current or stale plays an important role in the totality of the cireumstances analysis used to determine probable cause); Fortune, 930 P.2d at 1345 (when information relied on to establish probable cause originates from a person from a criminal environment acting out of self-interest, there must be evidence of adequate circumstances to justify the officer's belief in the informer's credibility or the reliability of the information); People v. Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 151 (Colo.1994) (police lacked probable cause to believ

2009Id. at 1118 .

2016See People v. Pacheco, 175 P.3d 91, 95 (Colo. 2006) ("If only non-eriminal activity is corroborated, the question whether probable cause exists focuses on 'the degree of suspicion that attaches to [the] particular types of corroborated non-criminal acts....'" (quoting People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 1994))); People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231 , 1237-38 & n. 9 (Colo. 1994) (holding that probable cause does not require specific information that a particular crime has been committed, and stating that the possibility of an innocent alternative explanation is merely a factor in the total

2016See People v. Pacheco, 175 P.3d 91, 95 (Colo. 2006) ("If only non-eriminal activity is corroborated, the question whether probable cause exists focuses on 'the degree of suspicion that attaches to [the] particular types of corroborated non-criminal acts....'" (quoting People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 1994))); People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231 , 1237-38 & n. 9 (Colo. 1994) (holding that probable cause does not require specific information that a particular crime has been committed, and stating that the possibility of an innocent alternative explanation is merely a factor in the total

2013Polander, 41 P.3d at 703 . ¶ 12 As with probable cause, the totality-of-the-cireumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986), has also replaced the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), for purposes of evaluating reasonable articulable suspicion.

2013Polander, 41 P.3d at 703 . ¶ 12 As with probable cause, the totality-of-the-cireumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986), has also replaced the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), for purposes of evaluating reasonable articulable suspicion.

2012People v. Canton, 951 P.2d 907, 910 (Colo.1998).

2011See People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 888-84 , 518 P.2d 446, 451 (19783) (where witness was granted use immunity, prosecutor acted in good faith by calling the witness to the stand). 2, Automatic Reversal Rule Defendant nevertheless contends that the totality of the cireumstances test is inapplicable here because the trial court erred in determining that A.A. did not have a right to refuse to testify.

2011See id. (holding that the pattern self-defense instruction, standing alone, was insufficient, but when read in conjunction with a totality of the cireumstances instruction, the instructions sufficiently communicated the law of self-defense to the jury); see also People v. Cuevas, 740 P2d 25, 27 (Colo.App.1987) (holding that the self-defense jury instruction should be "more clearly stated on retrial in order to address the fact that multiple assailants were involved"). 1 The majority holds that the "apparent necessity" instruction given by the trial court was sufficient to satisfy the requireme

2011See Newton, 966 P.2d at 570 .

2011See id. (holding that the pattern self-defense instruction, standing alone, was insufficient, but when read in conjunction with a totality of the cireumstances instruction, the instructions sufficiently communicated the law of self-defense to the jury); see also People v. Cuevas, 740 P2d 25, 27 (Colo.App.1987) (holding that the self-defense jury instruction should be "more clearly stated on retrial in order to address the fact that multiple assailants were involved"). 1 The majority holds that the "apparent necessity" instruction given by the trial court was sufficient to satisfy the requireme

2011See People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 888-84 , 518 P.2d 446, 451 (19783) (where witness was granted use immunity, prosecutor acted in good faith by calling the witness to the stand). 2, Automatic Reversal Rule Defendant nevertheless contends that the totality of the cireumstances test is inapplicable here because the trial court erred in determining that A.A. did not have a right to refuse to testify.

2010Pacheco, 175 P.3d at 94-95 . "[An informant's account of criminal activities need not establish the informant's basis of knowledge, so long as the informants statement is sufficiently detailed to allow a judge to reasonably conclude that the informant had access to reliable information about the illegal activities reported to the police." People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324, 1327 (Colo.1990).

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2009Moreover, as we stressed in our opinion in Beckeft, the jury's primary consideration is the defendant's "reasonable belief." 800 P.2d at 78 (upholding the trial court's decision not to give a separate apparent necessity instruction}.

2009See People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo.2003) (whether information is current or stale plays an important role in the totality of the cireumstances analysis used to determine probable cause); Fortune, 930 P.2d at 1345 (when information relied on to establish probable cause originates from a person from a criminal environment acting out of self-interest, there must be evidence of adequate circumstances to justify the officer's belief in the informer's credibility or the reliability of the information); People v. Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 151 (Colo.1994) (police lacked probable cause to believ

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2009See People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1113 (Colo.2003) (whether information is current or stale plays an important role in the totality of the cireumstances analysis used to determine probable cause); Fortune, 930 P.2d at 1345 (when information relied on to establish probable cause originates from a person from a criminal environment acting out of self-interest, there must be evidence of adequate circumstances to justify the officer's belief in the informer's credibility or the reliability of the information); People v. Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 151 (Colo.1994) (police lacked probable cause to believ

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2009Seq e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.1999) (finding the officers' discussion of the evidence against the defendant before they re-mirandized him was a "misstep" but did not constitute a violation of Mosley); see also Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (differentiating between the totality of the cireumstances test to be applied in the context of the right to remain silent and the bright-line test of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), subsequently known as the Edwards rule, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 18

2008See Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d at 780 ; People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1993). 2.

2008See Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d at 780 ; People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1993). 2.