competent evidence rule in Florida

1978One rule, referred to as the substantial competent evidence rule was stated to be "that presence of `substantial competent evidence' and absence of any showing the jury had been deceived about the force and credibility of the evidence or influenced by outside considerations would demonstrate the error of granting a motion for new trial." Id. at 671 .

1966In passing, we note recent cases have cited either the so-called substantial competent evidence rule, or the broad discretion rule of Cloud v. Fallis, supra, or confused the two rules.

2021Petitioner argues that the circuit court violated clearly established law as provided by this Court in Palmer Trinity Private School, Inc. v. Village of Palmetto Bay, 31 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

2021A zoning decision will survive where the findings made by the zoning authority are “fairly debatable” based on the evidence presented, requiring reversal only where “arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.” Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476 .

2008McMaster v. State, 780 So.2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing Lester v. State, 754 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)). *119 Findings of fact made by the trial court are subject to the substantial competent evidence standard.

2003For example, in Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 529 So.2d 693 and rev. denied, 529 So.2d 694 (Fla.1988), this court observed that a zoning staff report that was irrelevant to the issue involved was entitled to no consideration in arriving at a conclusion as to whether the substantial competent evidence test had been met.

2003In Jesus Fellowship, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 752 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), this court concluded, inter alia, that the circuit court, by approving the use of lay opinion testimony where technical expertise was required, failed to apply the correct law. [4] Our review of the circuit court's decision here leads us to the conclusion that the circuit court applied correct law in the process of reaching its conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence.

2003Rather, they are limited to a discussion of the JCC's fact-finding responsibility following the legislature's amendment to section 440.25(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1967), requiring the JCC to set forth "findings of ultimate facts and the mandate." The statutory amendment did *1085 not affect this court's review process, as I explained in my dissent in Above All Drywall v. Shearer, 651 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995): [T]he legislature intended to reduce the unnecessary length of compensation orders "to a concise but complete statement of the findings of fact ... on all factual issues in the case,

2003Rather, they are limited to a discussion of the JCC's fact-finding responsibility following the legislature's amendment to section 440.25(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1967), requiring the JCC to set forth "findings of ultimate facts and the mandate." The statutory amendment did *1085 not affect this court's review process, as I explained in my dissent in Above All Drywall v. Shearer, 651 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995): [T]he legislature intended to reduce the unnecessary length of compensation orders "to a concise but complete statement of the findings of fact ... on all factual issues in the case,

2001As in Garcia and Scott v. State, 485 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), by far the greater weight of the competent evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Mr. Hines made a reasonable endeavor to comply with condition 20, and any failure to comply should not have been deemed willful or substantial in light of his efforts.

1995In Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 292 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1974), after the Industrial Relations Commission was reorganized, the court modified Brown to require even less detail, stating: "We now hold the Judge of Industrial Claims need make only such findings of ultimate material fact upon which he relies, as are sufficient justification to show the basis of an award or a denial of a claim." Id. at 284 . [2] Based upon my examination of the JCC's findings, I conclude that the JCC did all that he was required to do by the statute: he set forth findings of ul

1995In Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 292 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1974), after the Industrial Relations Commission was reorganized, the court modified Brown to require even less detail, stating: "We now hold the Judge of Industrial Claims need make only such findings of ultimate material fact upon which he relies, as are sufficient justification to show the basis of an award or a denial of a claim." Id. at 284 . [2] Based upon my examination of the JCC's findings, I conclude that the JCC did all that he was required to do by the statute: he set forth findings of ul

1995In Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 292 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1974), after the Industrial Relations Commission was reorganized, the court modified Brown to require even less detail, stating: "We now hold the Judge of Industrial Claims need make only such findings of ultimate material fact upon which he relies, as are sufficient justification to show the basis of an award or a denial of a claim." Id. at 284 . [2] Based upon my examination of the JCC's findings, I conclude that the JCC did all that he was required to do by the statute: he set forth findings of ul

1978In Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, supra, the Cloud rule was liberalized when applied to appellate courts reviewing new trial orders in eminent domain proceedings.

1977However, the trial court held, and the appellee contends, that the fairly debatable doctrine established in the aforementioned cases and their progeny has been abrogated by this court and replaced with the substantial competent evidence rule, based on the following cases: Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. County of Dade, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 201 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1970); Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975); Dade County v. Marca, 326 S

1977However, the trial court held, and the appellee contends, that the fairly debatable doctrine established in the aforementioned cases and their progeny has been abrogated by this court and replaced with the substantial competent evidence rule, based on the following cases: Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. County of Dade, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 201 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1970); Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975); Dade County v. Marca, 326 S

1977However, the trial court held, and the appellee contends, that the fairly debatable doctrine established in the aforementioned cases and their progeny has been abrogated by this court and replaced with the substantial competent evidence rule, based on the following cases: Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. County of Dade, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 201 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1970); Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975); Dade County v. Marca, 326 S

1977However, the trial court held, and the appellee contends, that the fairly debatable doctrine established in the aforementioned cases and their progeny has been abrogated by this court and replaced with the substantial competent evidence rule, based on the following cases: Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. County of Dade, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 201 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1970); Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975); Dade County v. Marca, 326 S

1977However, the trial court held, and the appellee contends, that the fairly debatable doctrine established in the aforementioned cases and their progeny has been abrogated by this court and replaced with the substantial competent evidence rule, based on the following cases: Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. County of Dade, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1964); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 201 (Fla.3rd D.C.A. 1970); Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1975); Dade County v. Marca, 326 S

1966The case relied upon by the appellant, Cobb v. Brew, supra, went to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

1961“After discussing a few decisions appearing to adhere to the substantial competent evidence rule, including Hart v. Held, 149 Fla. 33 , 5 So.2d 878 , cited by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the present case, we announced, unequivocally we thought, adherénce ‘to the early rule placing in trial courts broad discretion of such firmness that it (the ruling) would not be disturbed except on clear showing of abuse * * *.’ We elaborated on this announcement by reference to the close contact of the judge with the trial, his opportunity therefore better to understand the ultimate deci

1961“After discussing a few decisions appearing to adhere to the substantial competent evidence rule, including Hart v. Held, 149 Fla. 33 , 5 So.2d 878 , cited by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the present case, we announced, unequivocally we thought, adherénce ‘to the early rule placing in trial courts broad discretion of such firmness that it (the ruling) would not be disturbed except on clear showing of abuse * * *.’ We elaborated on this announcement by reference to the close contact of the judge with the trial, his opportunity therefore better to understand the ultimate deci