competent evidence standard in Oklahoma

2012In Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 1984 OK 53 , 684 P.2d 548 , the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that while the three-judge panel reviews the trial judge's findings to determine if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, the Supreme Court applies the any competent evidence standard when reviewing the panel's decision.

2012In Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 1984 OK 53 , 684 P.2d 548 , the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that while the three-judge panel reviews the trial judge's findings to determine if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, the Supreme Court applies the any competent evidence standard when reviewing the panel's decision.

2010Under the any competent evidence standard, this Court must simply "canvass the facts, not with an object of weighing conflicting proof to determine where the preponderance lies, but only for the purpose of ascertaining whether those facts support the tribunal's decision." Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Black, 1995 OK 38, ¶ 6 , 894 P.2d 1105, 1107 (citation omitted).

2010Under the any competent evidence standard, this Court must simply "canvass the facts, not with an object of weighing conflicting proof to determine where the preponderance lies, but only for the purpose of ascertaining whether those facts support the tribunal's decision." Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Black, 1995 OK 38, ¶ 6 , 894 P.2d 1105, 1107 (citation omitted).

2012The Supreme Court of Oklahoma applied the any competent evidence standard of review in Nomac Drilling LLC v. Mowdy, 2012 OK 45 , 277 P.3d 1282 , and Evans & Assocs.

2012The Supreme Court of Oklahoma applied the any competent evidence standard of review in Nomac Drilling LLC v. Mowdy, 2012 OK 45 , 277 P.3d 1282 , and Evans & Assocs.

1993See, e.g., Hughes v. City of Oklahoma City, 771 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Okl.1989) ("The competent evidence test does not require that such evidence 'rise to the degree of certainty which would exclude every reasonable conclusion other than the conclusion reached by the trial court.’”) Accord, Riley v. Cimarron-Empire Const. Co., 420 P.2d 550 (Okl.1966). . 20 O.S.1991 § 15.1.

1989The competent evidence test does not require that such evidence “rise to the degree of certainty which would exclude every reasonable conclusion other than the conclusion reached by the trial court.” Riley v. Cimarron-Empire Construction Company, 420 P.2d 550 (Okla.1966).

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012Utility Servs. v. Espinosa, 2011 OK 81 , 264 P.3d 1190 .

2012Utility Servs. v. Espinosa, 2011 OK 81 , 264 P.3d 1190 .

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2012See Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga.App. 289 , 469 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996) ("'The statute is procedural, there is no vested right in preserving appellate review of the ALJ's decision under the [statute] which existed at the time the ALJ [heard] the case."); Pospisil's Case, 402 Mass. 820 , 525 N.E.2d 646, 647 (1988) (holding that statute relating to standard of review had no impact on the merits questions involved in determining the amount of compensation or the parties' substantive rights to receive or not to pay compensation and so was procedural and had to be applied retroactiv

2011See, Dunlap v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2011 OK 14 , 249 P.3d 951 . %8 Employer's first contention deals with the presumption her injury was not work related.

2011See, Dunlap v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2011 OK 14 , 249 P.3d 951 . %8 Employer's first contention deals with the presumption her injury was not work related.

1995Co. v. Berkley, 341 P.2d 249 (Okla. 1959), we stated in the syllabus: "Where the contract or arrangement of employment was made is a question of fact, and if there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the finding of the State Industrial Commission as to where such contract or arrangement was made, an award based thereon will not be disturbed on review by the Supreme Court." The next year, in Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Gardner, 353 P.2d 695, 697 (Okla. 1960), we applied the any competent evidence standard of review utilized in Berkley , to review whether an employment contract wa

1995Co. v. Berkley, 341 P.2d 249 (Okla.1959), we stated in the syllabus: “Where the contract or arrangement of employment was made is a question of fact, and if there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the finding of the State Industrial Commission as to where such contract or arrangement was made, an award based thereon will not be disturbed on review by the Supreme Court.” The next year, in Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Gardner, 353 P.2d 695, 697 (Okla.1960), we applied the any competent evidence standard of review utilized in Berkley , to review whether an employment contract was

1995Exchange, 451 P.2d 3, 5 (Okla. 1969) to the extent they applied the competent evidence standard of review.

1995Exchange, 451 P.2d 3, 5 (Okla.1969) to the extent they applied the competent evidence standard of review.

1995Recently, we reviewed the Workers' Compensation Court's determination that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the workers' compensation claim of a worker who was injured outside of Oklahoma in Cherokee Lines, Inc. v. Bailey, 859 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Okla. 1993).

1995Recently, we reviewed the Workers’ Compensation Court’s determination that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the workers’ compensation claim of a worker who was injured outside of Oklahoma in Cherokee Lines, Inc. v. Bailey, 859 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Okla.1993).

1993See, e.g., Hughes v. City of Oklahoma City, 771 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Okl.1989) ("The competent evidence test does not require that such evidence 'rise to the degree of certainty which would exclude every reasonable conclusion other than the conclusion reached by the trial court.’”) Accord, Riley v. Cimarron-Empire Const. Co., 420 P.2d 550 (Okl.1966). . 20 O.S.1991 § 15.1.

1993See also, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Pratt, 795 P.2d 115 (Okl.App.1990) (where employer challenged factually unassailable finding of lower court); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guthrie, 773 P.2d 769 (Okl.App.1989) (where employer attacked sufficiency of evidence without adducing contrary evidence); Lee Way Mtr.