20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pasco Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Florida Public Emp. Rel. Comm.green2 sentences1980Compare Pasco County School Board v. PERC, 353 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), in which PERC relied upon a special master’s report, not introduced into evidence before the DOAH hearing officer, to buttress its conclusion that the school board was guilty of an unfair labor practice. 1980Compare Pasco County School Board v. PERC, 353 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), in which PERC relied upon a special master’s report, not introduced into evidence before the DOAH hearing officer, to buttress its conclusion that the school board was guilty of an unfair labor practice. | 1 | 3 |
Dept. of Environmental Reg. v. Leon Countygreen2 sentences1983Sarasota County v. Boyer, 360 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1978); and Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). [4] We note that in rulemaking proceedings, rule challenges, and requests authorizing continued involuntary placement under the Baker Act (and perhaps other proceedings), the DOAH hearing officer's order is final agency action and reviewable. 1983Sarasota County v. Boyer, 360 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1978); and Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). [4] We note that in rulemaking proceedings, rule challenges, and requests authorizing continued involuntary placement under the Baker Act (and perhaps other proceedings), the DOAH hearing officer's order is final agency action and reviewable. | 1 | 2 |
STATE, DEPT. OF ENV. REGULATION v. Puckett Oil Co., Inc.green2 sentences2006In Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So.2d 988, 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we concluded that DOAH had discretion under the authority delegated it by statute to extend the time for the filing of a responsive pleading, notwithstanding that the particular DOAH rule governing the filing of such pleadings employed mandatory language as to the time required for a party's reply. 2006In Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So.2d 988, 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we concluded that DOAH had discretion under the authority delegated it by statute to extend the time for the filing of a responsive pleading, notwithstanding that the particular DOAH rule governing the filing of such pleadings employed mandatory language as to the time required for a party's reply. | 1 | 1 |
Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services v. Sggreen2 sentences1994See Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.G., 613 So.2d 1380 , 1384 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). 1994See Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.G., 613 So.2d 1380 , 1384 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Department of Ins.green1 sentence1994See Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla.1987) (Tort Reform and Insurance Act does not violate article III, section 6 even though seventy-act section dealt with five different areas, as all areas rationally connected to central goal). | 1 | 1 |
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REG., ETC. v. Hymangreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering v. Hyman, 417 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1982). [4] We note that rule 28-5.108, Florida Administrative Code, requires that motions for the disqualification of a "presiding officer" be made at least "five days prior to the date scheduled for the final hearing." "Presiding officer" is defined in rule 28-5.102 to mean "an agency head, or member thereof, who conducts a hearing on behalf of the agency, a Hearing Officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings, or any other person authorized to conduct administrative hea 1994See, e.g., Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering v. Hyman, 417 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1982). [4] We note that rule 28-5.108, Florida Administrative Code, requires that motions for the disqualification of a "presiding officer" be made at least "five days prior to the date scheduled for the final hearing." "Presiding officer" is defined in rule 28-5.102 to mean "an agency head, or member thereof, who conducts a hearing on behalf of the agency, a Hearing Officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings, or any other person authorized to conduct administrative hea | 1 | 1 |
Vey v. Bradford Union Guidance Clinic, Inc.green1 sentence1993See Vey v. Bradford Union Guidance Clinic, Inc., 399 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (DOAH hearing officer has power to rehear and reconsider an earlier denied motion). | 1 | 1 |
DEPT. OF PROFESSIONAL REG. v. Hallgreen2 sentences1983See Department of Professional Regulation v. Hall, 398 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 1983See Department of Professional Regulation v. Hall, 398 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). | 1 | 1 |
STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERV. v. Framat Realty, Inc.green1 sentence1983In State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238, 241-2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court reversed a DOAH hearing officer's order invalidating a rule as beyond the agency's statutory authority, saying: Whether the Department's interpretation of section 381.272(7) is the only possible interpretation of the statute, or the most desirable one, we need not say. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
STATE, DEPT. OF ADMINSTRATION v. Stevens
green
2 sentences1981Citing State Dept. of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), a DOAH hearing officer in this Section 120.56 rule challenge proceeding held that the Highway Patrol's general order 40, prescribing standards of physical fitness for patrolmen, and general order 43, prescribing guidelines for supervisors in assessing discipline for deficiencies in patrolmen's conduct, are illicit rules and hence invalid, because they were not subjected to formal rulemaking under Section 120.54. 1 Fla. Admin.L.Repts. 1981Citing State Dept. of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), a DOAH hearing officer in this Section 120.56 rule challenge proceeding held that the Highway Patrol's general order 40, prescribing standards of physical fitness for patrolmen, and general order 43, prescribing guidelines for supervisors in assessing discipline for deficiencies in patrolmen's conduct, are illicit rules and hence invalid, because they were not subjected to formal rulemaking under Section 120.54. 1 Fla. Admin.L.Repts. | 3 | 1977–1981 |
Sarasota County Public Hosp. Bd. v. Dhrs
green
2 sentences1996In a two-page order, issued following a non-evidentiary hearing, the DOAH hearing officer summarily granted the respondent hospitals' petitions to intervene and remanded the cause to AHCA for comparative review, citing as authority Sarasota County Public Hospital Board v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 553 So.2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). 1996In a two-page order, issued following a non-evidentiary hearing, the DOAH hearing officer summarily granted the respondent hospitals' petitions to intervene and remanded the cause to AHCA for comparative review, citing as authority Sarasota County Public Hospital Board v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 553 So.2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hambley v. DEPT. OF PRO. REGULATION, DIV. OF REAL ESTATE
neutral
2 sentences1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i 1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i | 1 | 1991–1991 |
DEPT. OF PRO. REGULATION v. Bernal
green
2 sentences1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i 1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i | 1 | 1991–1991 |
O'Connor v. Dept. of Pro. Regulation, Const. Industry Licensing Bd.
neutral
2 sentences1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i 1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine
green
2 sentences1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i 1991Although the increase here is not as obvious as the penalty increases in cases such as Department of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla.1988); Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 568 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); O’Connor v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 566 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), it is nonetheless an increase in penalty for which the Department did not state with particularity i | 1 | 1991–1991 |
School Bd. of Leon County v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). 1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Communities Fin. Corp. v. FLORIDA, ETC.
green
2 sentences1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). 1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Greynolds Park Manor, Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
green
2 sentences1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). 1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Tampa Port Authority v. Deen
neutral
2 sentences1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). 1989The Court said: “. . . in light of the ready acceptance of a DOAH hearing in order to resolve such legal and factual disputes between the parties, CFC’s and Coquina’s argument is unconvincing.” Communities Financial Corporation v Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 416 So.2d 813 , (1st DCA 1983.) See also The School Board of Leon County v Mutual, 346 So.2d 562 (1st DCA 1977); Tampa Port Authority v Dine, 179 So.2d 416 (2d DCA 1965), Greynolds Park Manor v Department of HRS, 491 So.2d 1157 (1st DCA 1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. FLA. PUB. SERV. COM'N
green
2 sentences1984Section 403.087, Florida Statutes (1981), provides specific statutory authority which allows DER to "adopt, amend, or repeal rules, regulations, and standards for the issuance, denial, and revocation of permits." Also, section 403.061(7), Florida Statutes (1981), provides DER with authority to "adopt, modify, and repeal rules and regulations to carry out the intent and purposes of this act." We think that the proper standard of review concerning rules promulgated pursuant to these sections, such as the rules sub judice, is set forth in General Telephone Co. of Florida v. Florida Public Service 1984Section 403.087, Florida Statutes (1981), provides specific statutory authority which allows DER to "adopt, amend, or repeal rules, regulations, and standards for the issuance, denial, and revocation of permits." Also, section 403.061(7), Florida Statutes (1981), provides DER with authority to "adopt, modify, and repeal rules and regulations to carry out the intent and purposes of this act." We think that the proper standard of review concerning rules promulgated pursuant to these sections, such as the rules sub judice, is set forth in General Telephone Co. of Florida v. Florida Public Service | 1 | 1984–1984 |
STATE EX REL. SARASOTA CTY. v. Boyer
green
2 sentences1983Sarasota County v. Boyer, 360 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1978); and Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). [4] We note that in rulemaking proceedings, rule challenges, and requests authorizing continued involuntary placement under the Baker Act (and perhaps other proceedings), the DOAH hearing officer's order is final agency action and reviewable. 1983Sarasota County v. Boyer, 360 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1978); and Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). [4] We note that in rulemaking proceedings, rule challenges, and requests authorizing continued involuntary placement under the Baker Act (and perhaps other proceedings), the DOAH hearing officer's order is final agency action and reviewable. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rice v. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative
green
2 sentences1981Rice, supra, 386 So.2d at 850 . 1981Rice, supra, 386 So.2d at 850 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Askew v. Cross Key Waterways
green
2 sentences1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha 1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew
green
2 sentences1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha 1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cross Key Waterways v. Askew
green
2 sentences1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha 1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Coulter v. Davin
green
2 sentences1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha 1980Every Department's organizational rules, in "stating the general course and method of its operations," Section 120.53(1)(a), should reliably identify any agency within the Department, and any agency head other than the Department head, who is responsible for final agency action of a certain character. [2] Section 382.16(5)(a) provides: If the mother was married at the time of conception, the name of her husband at such time shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child, and the surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of the husband, unless paternity ha | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.