20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coates v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Holt v. Calchas, LLC , 155 So.3d 499 , 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). 2019See Holt v. Calchas, LLC , 155 So.3d 499 , 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). | 3 | 3 |
Katrina R. Phillips v. Stategreen2 sentences2019F.T. v. State , 146 So. 3d 1270 , 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ; see also Phillips v. State , 141 So. 3d 702 , 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (noting: "[T]he victim's reliance on hearsay evidence from websites resembles a witness's reliance on hearsay evidence from a catalog or contacts with non-witnesses ....") 4 The victim's testimony was therefore inadmissible hearsay and Gonzalez's objection should have been sustained. 2019F.T. v. State , 146 So. 3d 1270 , 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ; see also Phillips v. State , 141 So. 3d 702 , 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (noting: "[T]he victim's reliance on hearsay evidence from websites resembles a witness's reliance on hearsay evidence from a catalog or contacts with non-witnesses ....") 4 The victim's testimony was therefore inadmissible hearsay and Gonzalez's objection should have been sustained. | 2 | 2 |
cluster 757055green2 sentences2004See United States v. $515,060.42 in United States Currency, 152 F.3d 491 , 501 (6th Cir.1998) ("[T]he Government does not even suggest any conceivable alternative owners of the currency.") (footnote omitted). ... 2002See United States v. $515,060.42 in United States Currency, 152 F.3d 491 , 501 (6th Cir.1998) ("[T]he Government does not even suggest any conceivable alternative owners of the currency.") (footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Rodgers v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing 2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing | 1 | 1 |
Engle v. Stategreen1 sentence2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing | 1 | 1 |
Harrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing 2022The Sentencing Hearing: Gonzalez’s Confrontation Clause Claims Finally, we dispose of Gonzalez’s claim that the trial court fundamentally erred by conducting the sentencing hearing remotely resulting in a violation of Gonzalez’s rights under the confrontation clause. 5 While the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the confrontation clause applies in sentencing hearings for capital cases, 6 the confrontation clause’s applicability in sentencing hearings for non-capital cases is less certain. 7 We need not reach or decide the clause’s applicability in this case, 5 “In addition to allowing | 1 | 1 |
Seay v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Seay v. State , 286 So.2d 532 , 535 (Fla. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Smith, 598 So.2d at 1066 (“To benefit from the change in law, the defendant must have timely objected at trial if an objection was required to preserve the issue for appellate review.”). | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See also Martinez v. State, 24 So.3d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (finding remand necessary because the trial court failed to consider defendant’s request for appointment of counsel at post-conviction hearing using the factors outlined in Graham). | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 1 |
Shepherd v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Gonzalezgreen1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 1 |
| Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Elliottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzalez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ward v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
F.T. v. State
green
2 sentences2019F.T. v. State , 146 So. 3d 1270 , 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ; see also Phillips v. State , 141 So. 3d 702 , 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (noting: "[T]he victim's reliance on hearsay evidence from websites resembles a witness's reliance on hearsay evidence from a catalog or contacts with non-witnesses ....") 4 The victim's testimony was therefore inadmissible hearsay and Gonzalez's objection should have been sustained. 2019F.T. v. State , 146 So. 3d 1270 , 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ; see also Phillips v. State , 141 So. 3d 702 , 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (noting: "[T]he victim's reliance on hearsay evidence from websites resembles a witness's reliance on hearsay evidence from a catalog or contacts with non-witnesses ....") 4 The victim's testimony was therefore inadmissible hearsay and Gonzalez's objection should have been sustained. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Burkhart v. Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
green
1 sentence2023The court denied Gonzalez’s motion for rehearing. -4- jurisdiction.” (citing Burkhart v. Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 1 So. 2d 872 (1941))); Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577 , 580 (Fla. 2022) (discussing scope of writ of prohibition). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
James Ernest Hitchcock v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2018This Court stayed Gonzalez's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka
green
1 sentence2018As a result, the Proposal is not structured to permit either Pacheco or the Corporation to “independently evaluate or settle his . . . respective claim by accepting the proposal.” See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 647 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Allen v. United States
green
1 sentence2018This Court stayed Gonzalez's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sedlak v. Smith
green
1 sentence2018This Court stayed Gonzalez's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gonzalez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State(Hurst) , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gonzalez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State(Hurst) , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gary Czajkowski v. State of Florida
red
1 sentence2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gonzalez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State(Hurst) , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cleveland v. Sharp
green
1 sentence2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gonzalez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State(Hurst) , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Florida v. Hurst
red
1 sentence2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gonzalez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State(Hurst) , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hale v. State
green
1 sentence2016Gonzalez also asserted an issue not raised in his underlying motion — that pursuant to Hale, 630 So.2d at 521 , “where crimes occur in a single criminal episode and one or both counts have been increased by HO enhancement, it is a manifest injustice to impose the sentences to run consecutively.” On November 14, 2014, the trial court denied Gonzalez’s motion for rehearing, and granted his motion for belated appeal of the order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence entered on September 30, 2014. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Graham v. State
green
1 sentence2011The Florida Supreme Court, in Graham v. State, 372 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1979), explains the factors that a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel. 1 The State’s suggestion of harmless error relies on cases where the trial court determined that the issues did not warrant appointment of counsel. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lockhart v. Fretwell
green
2 sentences2009Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). 2009Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Huff v. State
green
1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008He contends (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the new penalty phase; (3) the circuit court erred in summarily denying Gonzalez's claim that newly discovered evidence of a life sentence imposed on Fernando Fernandez requires that Gonzalez receive a life sentence; (4) the circuit court erred in failing to disclose records allegedly exempt from production under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852; (5) the circuit court erred in striking Gonzalez's original postconviction motion without p 2008He contends (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the new penalty phase; (3) the circuit court erred in summarily denying Gonzalez's claim that newly discovered evidence of a life sentence imposed on Fernando Fernandez requires that Gonzalez receive a life sentence; (4) the circuit court erred in failing to disclose records allegedly exempt from production under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852; (5) the circuit court erred in striking Gonzalez's original postconviction motion without p | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Williams v. Bowers
green
1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Johnson v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
green
1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Chapman v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence2008See Florida v. Gonzalez, 523 U.S. 1145 , 118 S.Ct. 1856 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998); Gonzalez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1062 , 118 S.Ct. 1393 , 140 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). [3] The five issues raised were: (1) this Court improperly used a harmless error analysis based on the hearsay rule rather than one based on the Confrontation Clause to determine whether or not the admission of codefendant statements was proper during Gonzalez's trial; (2) using the victim's status as a police officer as an aggravator as well as increasing the penalty for homicide from twenty-five years without eligibility for release | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Palm Beach Cty. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| New York Times Co. v. PHH M. HEALTH SERVICES green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.