12 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stukas v. Streitergreen2 sentences2013Since Gonzalez failed to meet her prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 24 [2011]). 2013Since Gonzalez failed to meet her prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 24 [2011]). | 2 | 2 |
Frenk v. Frederickgreen2 sentences2013Gonzalez’s motion papers failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claim, clearly set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury to her left elbow (see Fudol v Sullivan, 38 AD3d 593, 594 [2007]). 2013Gonzalez’s motion papers failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claim, clearly set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury to her left elbow (see Fudol v Sullivan, 38 AD3d 593, 594 [2007]). | 2 | 2 |
McGee v. Dunngreen2 sentences2012Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied, as untimely, that branch of Gonzalez’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him (see Holubar v Holubar, 89 AD3d 802 [2011]; McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624, 625 [2010]). 2012Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied, as untimely, that branch of Gonzalez’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him (see Holubar v Holubar, 89 AD3d 802 [2011]; McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624, 625 [2010]). | 2 | 2 |
Schwab v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2012However, in light of the fact that the plaintiff, inter alia, provided various affirmations and affidavits wherein it made a certain representation that proved to be false, and persisted in making that representation after it knew or should have known it to be false, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of Gonzalez’s motion which was for the imposition of sanctions upon the plaintiff (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [3]; Schwab v Phillips, 78 AD3d 1036, 1036-1037 [2010]). 2012However, in light of the fact that the plaintiff, inter alia, provided various affirmations and affidavits wherein it made a certain representation that proved to be false, and persisted in making that representation after it knew or should have known it to be false, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of Gonzalez’s motion which was for the imposition of sanctions upon the plaintiff (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [3]; Schwab v Phillips, 78 AD3d 1036, 1036-1037 [2010]). | 2 | 2 |
GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Guccionegreen1 sentence2017Thus, as we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of Supreme Court, we decline to disturb its denial of McCrae and Gonzalez’s motion to vacate (see GMAC Mtge., LLC v Guccione, 127 AD3d 1136, 1138 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
Hecht v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2012Since the Gonzalez defendants had not filed a notice of appeal, we would not have had the power to grant them affirmative relief on this issue even if they had requested it (see e.g. 61 W. 62 Owners Corp. v CGM EMP LLC, 16 NY3d 822 , 823 n [2011]; Hecht v City of New York, 60 NY2d 57, 61-62 [1983]). . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2002Defendant Gonzalez’s challenge to the hearing court’s probable cause determination involves a mixed question of law and fact (see People v Brown, 95 NY2d 942, 943 [2000]), and therefore our review is limited to whether there is record support for the lower courts’ determinations (see People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 524 [2001]). 2002Defendant Gonzalez's challenge to the hearing court's probable cause determination involves a mixed question of law and fact ( see People v Brown, 95 NY2d 942, 943 [2000]), and therefore our review is limited to whether there is record support for the lower courts' determinations ( see People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 524 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. McIntoshgreen2 sentences2002Defendant Gonzalez’s challenge to the hearing court’s probable cause determination involves a mixed question of law and fact (see People v Brown, 95 NY2d 942, 943 [2000]), and therefore our review is limited to whether there is record support for the lower courts’ determinations (see People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 524 [2001]). 2002Defendant Gonzalez's challenge to the hearing court's probable cause determination involves a mixed question of law and fact ( see People v Brown, 95 NY2d 942, 943 [2000]), and therefore our review is limited to whether there is record support for the lower courts' determinations ( see People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 524 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Longgreen2 sentences1985It is axiomatic that State courts cannot suppress evidence on Federal constitutional grounds by reading the Federal Constitution more expansively than the Supreme Court has (Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714, 719 ; see, Florida v Meyers, 466 US 380 , 104 S Ct 1852 ; Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 ) and absent a “plain statement” that the result was posited on State grounds, it will be presumed that the determination rests on Federal grounds (Michigan v Long, supra, at p 1041; Florida v Meyers, supra). 1985It is axiomatic that State courts cannot suppress evidence on Federal constitutional grounds by reading the Federal Constitution more expansively than the Supreme Court has (Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714, 719 ; see, Florida v Meyers, 466 US 380 , 104 S Ct 1852 ; Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 ) and absent a “plain statement” that the result was posited on State grounds, it will be presumed that the determination rests on Federal grounds (Michigan v Long, supra, at p 1041; Florida v Meyers, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Meyersgreen2 sentences1985It is axiomatic that State courts cannot suppress evidence on Federal constitutional grounds by reading the Federal Constitution more expansively than the Supreme Court has (Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714, 719 ; see, Florida v Meyers, 466 US 380 , 104 S Ct 1852 ; Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 ) and absent a “plain statement” that the result was posited on State grounds, it will be presumed that the determination rests on Federal grounds (Michigan v Long, supra, at p 1041; Florida v Meyers, supra). 1985It is axiomatic that State courts cannot suppress evidence on Federal constitutional grounds by reading the Federal Constitution more expansively than the Supreme Court has (Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714, 719 ; see, Florida v Meyers, 466 US 380 , 104 S Ct 1852 ; Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 ) and absent a “plain statement” that the result was posited on State grounds, it will be presumed that the determination rests on Federal grounds (Michigan v Long, supra, at p 1041; Florida v Meyers, supra). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holubar v. Holubar
green
2 sentences2012Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied, as untimely, that branch of Gonzalez’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him (see Holubar v Holubar, 89 AD3d 802 [2011]; McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624, 625 [2010]). 2012Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied, as untimely, that branch of Gonzalez’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him (see Holubar v Holubar, 89 AD3d 802 [2011]; McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624, 625 [2010]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Edwards
green
2 sentences2018Here, we agree with defendant that he " sustain[ed] [his] initial burden of showing that the opposing party[, i.e., the People] ha[d] failed to call a witness who could be expected to have knowledge regarding a material issue in the case and to provide testimony favorable to the opposing party' " ( Edwards , 14 NY3d at 734 ). 2018Here, we agree with defendant that he " sustain[ed] [his] initial burden of showing that the opposing party[, i.e., the People] ha[d] failed to call a witness who could be expected to have knowledge regarding a material issue in the case and to provide testimony favorable to the opposing party' " ( Edwards , 14 NY3d at 734 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
61 West 62 Owners Corp. v. CGM EMP LLC
green
1 sentence2012Since the Gonzalez defendants had not filed a notice of appeal, we would not have had the power to grant them affirmative relief on this issue even if they had requested it (see e.g. 61 W. 62 Owners Corp. v CGM EMP LLC, 16 NY3d 822 , 823 n [2011]; Hecht v City of New York, 60 NY2d 57, 61-62 [1983]). . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Bolling
green
1 sentence1998Defendant Lorenzo’s challenge pursuant to Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 ) was properly denied since that defendant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination (see, People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 325 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Perez
neutral
1 sentence1998The court properly denied defendant Gonzalez’s motion to suppress his admission to a police officer that he possessed a gun (see, People v Perez, 224 AD2d 313, 314 , affd 88 NY2d 1059 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence1998Defendant Lorenzo’s challenge pursuant to Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 ) was properly denied since that defendant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination (see, People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 325 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Perez
green
1 sentence1998The court properly denied defendant Gonzalez’s motion to suppress his admission to a police officer that he possessed a gun (see, People v Perez, 224 AD2d 313, 314 , affd 88 NY2d 1059 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Alvino
green
1 sentence1991In this regard they point out that evidence of Gonzalez’s activities on the 23rd might have been received as an exception to the prohibition against evidence of uncharged offenses since the evidence would have been relevant to rebut Gonzalez’s claim that he acted innocently (cf., People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-247 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Oregon v. Hass
green
1 sentence1985It is axiomatic that State courts cannot suppress evidence on Federal constitutional grounds by reading the Federal Constitution more expansively than the Supreme Court has (Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714, 719 ; see, Florida v Meyers, 466 US 380 , 104 S Ct 1852 ; Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 ) and absent a “plain statement” that the result was posited on State grounds, it will be presumed that the determination rests on Federal grounds (Michigan v Long, supra, at p 1041; Florida v Meyers, supra). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Morris v. Slappy
green
1 sentence1985In short, the Dodt/Gonzalez rule penalizes the victim by requiring his or her presence at a second suppression hearing and a second trial without affording any meaningful protection to the accused, a result the Supreme Court has said ¿should be eschewed (United States v Hasting, 461 US 499 ; Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. Hasting
green
1 sentence1985In short, the Dodt/Gonzalez rule penalizes the victim by requiring his or her presence at a second suppression hearing and a second trial without affording any meaningful protection to the accused, a result the Supreme Court has said ¿should be eschewed (United States v Hasting, 461 US 499 ; Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In re the Arbitration between Allstate Insurance & Ness
neutral
1 sentence1984Co. [Ness], 32 AD2d 912 , 913), State-Wide decided to settle Ms. Gonzalez’ claim for uninsured motorist benefits for $6,500 prior to the scheduled arbitration hearing. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.