defendant cannot claim in Kansas

2018This court disagreed: "This contract was also performed within one year upon the part of plaintiff, and the defendant cannot claim protection under the statute of frauds; its protection extends to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts that have been executed by one party ." ( Emphasis added.) 38 Kan. at 117 , 16 P. 82 .

1898Co. v. English, supra, the supreme court of this state says : “ This contract was also performed within one year upon the part of plaintiff, and the defendant cannot claim protection under the statute of frauds ; its protection extends to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts that have been executed by one-party.” And then quotes from Mr. Wood, in his treatise on the Statute of Frauds, as follows : “In England and most.of the states of this country, it is held that the stature only applies to contracts which are not to be performed by either side within a year, and therefore, wh

2024Under the invited error doctrine, a defendant cannot challenge an instruction on appeal, even as clearly erroneous under K.S.A. 22-3414(3), "when there has been an on-the- 3 record agreement to the wording of the instruction at trial." State v. Willis, 312 Kan. 127 , 131, 475 P.3d 324 (2020).

2024Wilkerson v. State, 38 Kan.

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 359 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992).

2021State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 359 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992).

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2021A defendant cannot claim his or her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the first time on appeal because that determination requires "both legal and factual inquiries the district court must determine." State v. Roberts, 293 Kan. 1093, 1096 , 272 P.3d 24 (2012), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85 , 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 320-21 , 227 P.3d 951 (2010); Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161 .

2018A prominent full-performance case in the early 20th century was Meador v. Manlove , 97 Kan. 706 , 156 P. 731 (1916).

2018A prominent full-performance case in the early 20th century was Meador v. Manlove , 97 Kan. 706 , 156 P. 731 (1916).

2017See, e.g., State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 554 , 264 P.3d 461 (2011) (party may not invite error and then complain of that error as ground for reversing); State v. Bailey, 292 Kan. 449, 459 , 255 P.3d 19 (2011) (when district court gives defendants requested instruction to jury, defendant cannot complain the requested instruction was error on appeal); State v. Hargrove, 48 Kan.

2017See, e.g., State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 554 , 264 P.3d 461 (2011) (party may not invite error and then complain of that error as ground for reversing); State v. Bailey, 292 Kan. 449, 459 , 255 P.3d 19 (2011) (when district court gives defendants requested instruction to jury, defendant cannot complain the requested instruction was error on appeal); State v. Hargrove, 48 Kan.

2017See, e.g., State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 535, 554 , 264 P.3d 461 (2011) (party may not invite error and then complain of that error as ground for reversing); State v. Bailey, 292 Kan. 449, 459 , 255 P.3d 19 (2011) (when district court gives defendants requested instruction to jury, defendant cannot complain the requested instruction was error on appeal); State v. Hargrove, 48 Kan.

2012Instruction that Another Trial Would he a Burden on Both Sides Including the language “another trial would be a burden on both sides” in an Allen-type instruction constitutes error, because the language is misleading, inaccurate, and confusing, State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 266 , 200 P.3d 464 (2009), and Peppers argues that his conviction should be reversed because “the evidence against [him] was hardly overwhelming, and the erroneous instruction veiy likely had an impact on the jury’s verdict.” But a defendant cannot challenge an instruction, even as clearly erroneous under K.S.A. 22-3414(3),

2012Instruction that Another Trial Would he a Burden on Both Sides Including the language “another trial would be a burden on both sides” in an Allen-type instruction constitutes error, because the language is misleading, inaccurate, and confusing, State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 266 , 200 P.3d 464 (2009), and Peppers argues that his conviction should be reversed because “the evidence against [him] was hardly overwhelming, and the erroneous instruction veiy likely had an impact on the jury’s verdict.” But a defendant cannot challenge an instruction, even as clearly erroneous under K.S.A. 22-3414(3),

2000Similarly in State v. Vowell, 9 Hawaii App. 307 , 837 P.2d 1308 (1992), the court held that a defendant cannot claim privilege when entering the back rooms of a nightclub open for business.

2000Similarly in State v. Vowell, 9 Hawaii App. 307 , 837 P.2d 1308 (1992), the court held that a defendant cannot claim privilege when entering the back rooms of a nightclub open for business.

1994A motion to arrest judgment is a challenge to the chargng instrument or the jurisdiction of the court to try the offense alleged in the charging document, whereas an insufficiency argument is a challenge to the verdict.” 254 Kan. at 11 .

1992In State v. Dunn, 243 Kan. 414, 422 , 758 P.2d 718 (1988), this court ruled that if the intimidation is not continuous and if there is a reasonable opportunity to escape, the defendant cannot claim he “was compelled to be present when the crimes were committed.” The only witness called on Scott’s behalf was Woods.

1992In State v. Dunn, 243 Kan. 414, 422 , 758 P.2d 718 (1988), this court ruled that if the intimidation is not continuous and if there is a reasonable opportunity to escape, the defendant cannot claim he “was compelled to be present when the crimes were committed.” The only witness called on Scott’s behalf was Woods.

1904This doctrine was announced in the early case of Voss v. Bachop, 5 Kan. 59 , where it was held that a party may be estopped by his own acts from setting up the statute of limitations, and that where the delay in bringing an action is caused by the wrong of the defendant, and not by the laches of the plaintiff, the defendant cannot claim the protection of the statute.

1887(Wood on Frauds, §270; Hill v. Jamieson, 16 Ind. 125 ; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 46 Me. 154 ; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 .) This contract was also performed within one year upon the part of plaintiff, and the defendant cannot claim protection under the statute of frauds; its protection extends to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts that have been executed by one party.

1887Mr. Wood, in his treatise on the Statute of Frauds, in §279, says: “In England and most of the states of this country it is held that the statute only applies to contracts which are not to be performed by either side within a year, and therefore where a contract has been completely performed on one side within the year the case will not come within the statute.” (McClellan v. Sanford, 26 Wis. 595 ; Curtis v. Sage, 35 Ill. 22 ; Berry v. Doremus, 30 N. J.

1887Mr. Wood, in his treatise on the Statute of Frauds, in §279, says: “In England and most of the states of this country it is held that the statute only applies to contracts which are not to be performed by either side within a year, and therefore where a contract has been completely performed on one side within the year the case will not come within the statute.” (McClellan v. Sanford, 26 Wis. 595 ; Curtis v. Sage, 35 Ill. 22 ; Berry v. Doremus, 30 N. J.

1887(Wood on Frauds, §270; Hill v. Jamieson, 16 Ind. 125 ; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 46 Me. 154 ; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 .) This contract was also performed within one year upon the part of plaintiff, and the defendant cannot claim protection under the statute of frauds; its protection extends to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts that have been executed by one party.

1887(Wood on Frauds, §270; Hill v. Jamieson, 16 Ind. 125 ; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 46 Me. 154 ; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208 .) This contract was also performed within one year upon the part of plaintiff, and the defendant cannot claim protection under the statute of frauds; its protection extends to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts that have been executed by one party.

1885Co., 31 id. 761 ; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 1008 to 1018, §§15 to 23, and cases there cited.) Now, holding, as we still do, that the aforesaid contract is void to the extent that it has already been held to be void by this court, we think that the defendant cannot claim anything more favorable to itself under the contract than may rightfully be claimed under the foregoing rule of the common law.