defendant cannot claim in Ohio

2026Wood asserts in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred when it concluded that it was bound to sentence her to 6-9 years in prison as it was an agreed sentence. {¶10} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” “It follows that, [g]enerally speaking, a defendant cannot challenge a jointly-recommended sentence on appeal.” (Internal quotations omitted.) S

2026For the following reasons, this Court overrules Carner’s first assignment of error. {¶6} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” “It follows that, ‘[g]enerally speaking, a defendant cannot challenge a jointly-recommended 3 sentence on appeal.’” State v. Ortiz, 2020-Ohio-4013, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Zazzara, 2019-Ohio-662, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). {¶7} In State v

2025“The defendant cannot claim evidence was undiscoverable simply because no one made efforts to obtain the evidence sooner.” State v. Bethel, 2020-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.).

2025“The defendant cannot claim evidence was undiscoverable simply because no one made efforts to obtain the evidence sooner.” State v. Bethel, 2020-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.). {¶51} Conversely, if evidence of Mr. Martin’s intellectual disability was not reasonably discoverable, then even effective trial counsel could not have discovered it.

2025State v. Wallen, 2007-Ohio-2129, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). {¶ 35} Peeples contends that his plea was not voluntary because the trial court did not follow the recommended sentence.

2024State v. Wallen, 2007-Ohio-2129, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). {¶ 23} Ringer filed his motion to withdraw his plea before he was sentenced.

2026Wood asserts in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred when it concluded that it was bound to sentence her to 6-9 years in prison as it was an agreed sentence. {¶10} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” “It follows that, [g]enerally speaking, a defendant cannot challenge a jointly-recommended sentence on appeal.” (Internal quotations omitted.) S

2026For the following reasons, this Court overrules Carner’s first assignment of error. {¶6} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” “It follows that, ‘[g]enerally speaking, a defendant cannot challenge a jointly-recommended 3 sentence on appeal.’” State v. Ortiz, 2020-Ohio-4013, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Zazzara, 2019-Ohio-662, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). {¶7} In State v

2025Instead, he seeks to challenge the order’s constitutionality in a criminal case involving his prosecution for -10- violating it. . . . [W]e conclude that Allen’s argument constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the order.”); State v. Phipps, 2022-Ohio-1188, ¶ 11, fn. 1 (2d Dist.) (recognizing that a defendant cannot challenge the validity of a protection order in a criminal case involving his prosecution for violating it); State v. Hall, 2022-Ohio-3455, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.) (“Hall admittedly had been served with and signed a court-issued protection order prohibiting him from engaging in ce

2023Montgomery No. 29199, 2022-Ohio-1188, ¶ 11, fn. 1 (recognizing that a defendant cannot challenge the validity of a protection order in a criminal case involving his prosecution for violating it); State v. Hall, 2d Dist.

2024See, e.g., McFarland, 2022-Ohio-4638, at ¶ 25 (“‘A defendant cannot claim that evidence was undiscoverable merely because the defendant or his defense counsel made no effort to obtain the evidence sooner.’”), quoting Hubbard, 2020-Ohio-2726 , at ¶ 56; Hale, 2023-Ohio-3894, at ¶ 31 (same); State v. Collins, 8th Dist.

2024See, e.g., McFarland, 2022-Ohio-4638, at ¶ 25 (“‘A defendant cannot claim that evidence was undiscoverable merely because the defendant or his defense counsel made no effort to obtain the evidence sooner.’”), quoting Hubbard, 2020-Ohio- 2726, at ¶ 56; Hale, 2023-Ohio-3894, at ¶ 31 (same); State v. Collins, 8th Dist.

2024See, e.g., McFarland, 2022-Ohio-4638, at ¶ 25 (“‘A defendant cannot claim that evidence was undiscoverable merely because the defendant or his defense counsel made no effort to obtain the evidence sooner.’”), quoting Hubbard, 2020-Ohio-2726 , at ¶ 56; Hale, 2023-Ohio-3894, at ¶ 31 (same); State v. Collins, 8th Dist.

2024See, e.g., McFarland, 2022-Ohio-4638, at ¶ 25 (“‘A defendant cannot claim that evidence was undiscoverable merely because the defendant or his defense counsel made no effort to obtain the evidence sooner.’”), quoting Hubbard, 2020-Ohio- 2726, at ¶ 56; Hale, 2023-Ohio-3894, at ¶ 31 (same); State v. Collins, 8th Dist.

2003See State v. Williams (1978), 51 Ohio St.2d 112 , 364 N.E.2d 1364 .

2003See State v. Williams (1978), 51 Ohio St.2d 112 , 364 N.E.2d 1364 .

2024Cuyahoga No. 103105, 2016-Ohio-2722, ¶ 23 , quoting State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 , 2010-Ohio-2 , 922 N.E.2d 182 , ¶ 12 (“For the purposes of R.C. 2941.25, a ‘conviction’ consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty.”) (Emphasis sic.) A defendant cannot challenge a conviction that was merged because “[t]he counts that merged with the aggravated murder conviction are not convictions, and therefore, we cannot individually review the evidence supporting those findings of guilt.” Worley at ¶ 23 . {¶ 67} Therefore, this court reviews the sufficiency of the evide

2024Cuyahoga No. 103105, 2016-Ohio-2722, ¶ 23 , quoting State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 , 2010-Ohio-2 , 922 N.E.2d 182 , ¶ 12 (“For the purposes of R.C. 2941.25, a ‘conviction’ consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty.”) A defendant cannot challenge a conviction that was merged because “[t]he counts that merged with the aggravated murder conviction are not convictions, and therefore, we cannot individually review the evidence supporting those findings of guilt.” Worley at ¶ 23.

2019That is, “[i]f in separate trials the state could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as ‘other acts’ under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.” Id., citing State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 259-260 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001).

2019That is, “[i]f in separate trials the state could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as ‘other acts’ under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.” Id., citing State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 259-260 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001).

2018Wilson at ¶ 40. {¶ 40} Furthermore, [i]n State v. Diar , 120 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2008-Ohio-6266 , 900 N.E.2d 565 , the Ohio Supreme Court explained that there are two ways that the state may rebut a defendant's claim of prejudicial joinder: "First, if in separate trials the state could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as 'other acts' under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.

2018Wilson at ¶ 40. {¶ 40} Furthermore, [i]n State v. Diar , 120 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2008-Ohio-6266 , 900 N.E.2d 565 , the Ohio Supreme Court explained that there are two ways that the state may rebut a defendant's claim of prejudicial joinder: "First, if in separate trials the state could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as 'other acts' under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.

2023“If in separate trials the state -11- could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as ‘other acts’ under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767N.E.2d 166, ¶ 50.

2016State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2005-Ohio-1507 , 824 N.E.2d 959 , ¶ 29, citing Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340 , 421 N.E.2d 1288 , at syllabus; see also State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166 (holding that a trial court’s decision to deny severance will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion). {¶41} In State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2008-Ohio-6266 , 900 N.E.2d 565 , the Ohio Supreme Court explained that there are two ways that the state may rebut a defendant’s claim of prejudicial joinder: First, if in separate trials the

2023“If in separate trials the state -11- could introduce evidence of the joined offenses as ‘other acts’ under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot claim prejudice from the joinder.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767N.E.2d 166, ¶ 50.

2016State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2005-Ohio-1507 , 824 N.E.2d 959 , ¶ 29, citing Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340 , 421 N.E.2d 1288 , at syllabus; see also State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166 (holding that a trial court’s decision to deny severance will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion). {¶41} In State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2008-Ohio-6266 , 900 N.E.2d 565 , the Ohio Supreme Court explained that there are two ways that the state may rebut a defendant’s claim of prejudicial joinder: First, if in separate trials the

2019See State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114,118 , 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990). {¶ 56} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present witnesses on his or her own behalf and to use the power of the court to compel the -30- attendance of those witnesses, if necessary.

2011Id. {¶35} The trial court’s in camera examination of the sealed records was in accordance with the law and revealed that they did not contain any exculpatory or impeachment evidence.

2001I reviewed with him subsections under the sexual battery statute, and after so reviewing, he has indicated to me that he does not wish me to request a sexual battery instruction to the jury. * * * [Tr.p. 1205-1206] "Where a defendant fails, based upon tactical considerations, to object to the instructions of the trial court, the defendant cannot claim plain error on appeal." State v. Harris (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 527 , 533 , 718 N.E.2d 488 , 492 , dismissed (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 1469 , 704 N.E.2d 578 ; see State v. Edwards (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 199 , 201 , 499 N.E.2d 352 , 354 .

2001I reviewed with him subsections under the sexual battery statute, and after so reviewing, he has indicated to me that he does not wish me to request a sexual battery instruction to the jury. * * * [Tr.p. 1205-1206] "Where a defendant fails, based upon tactical considerations, to object to the instructions of the trial court, the defendant cannot claim plain error on appeal." State v. Harris (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 527 , 533 , 718 N.E.2d 488 , 492 , dismissed (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 1469 , 704 N.E.2d 578 ; see State v. Edwards (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 199 , 201 , 499 N.E.2d 352 , 354 .

2026Regardless of whether Jones and his counsel actually knew of Taylor’s identity and potential testimony prior to trial, “[i]t is the duty of the criminal defendant and his trial counsel to make a serious effort, on their own, to discover potential, favorable evidence.” State v. Collins, 2020-Ohio-918 , ¶ 45 (8th Dist.); State v. Miller, 2022-Ohio-378, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). “‘A defendant cannot claim that evidence was undiscoverable merely because the defendant or his defense counsel made no effort to obtain the evidence sooner.’” McFarland, 2022-Ohio- 4638, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), quoting Hubbard, 202