rear-end doctrine in Missouri

1965Appellant contends that Instruction No. 1 is not error because it is virtually the same as approved for a submission of following too dosely in Gooch v. Avsco, Inc., Mo., 337 S.W.2d 245, 250 [5], and that Instruction No. 2 is patterned after the instruction submitting the rear end doctrine in Witherspoon v. Guttierez, Mo., 327 S.W. 2d 874, 877 , and in Croney v. Pence, Mo.App., 346 S.W.2d 574, 575-6 [1].

1964Spears, supra, 357 Mo. loc. cit. 691, 210 S.W.2d loc. cit. 70(2); Gooch v. Lake, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 132, 134 (3); Witherspoon v. Guttierez, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 874, 880 (5)], the rear-end doctrine being defined as the “rule” recognizing that “if one person has his vehicle in a portion of the highway where he should have it or is entitled to have it in view of the course in which he is proceeding, and some other person traveling behind him in the same direction overtakes him and permits his vehicle to run into the rear of the one ahead, the proof of a collision under such circumstances makes out a pri

1965Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 251 S.W.2d 360, 362 [3]; Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 350 Mo. 91 , 164 S.W.2d 914, 917 [2]. *813 The fallacy of defendant’s argument is that the evidence does not conclusively show that plaintiff stopped suddenly, or that she stopped without visible, timely or adequate signal.

1960Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 251 S.W.2d 360 , in which the plaintiff had not pleaded the rear-end doctrine initially but was permitted to amend the petition to conform to the proof.

1989Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Mo. banc 1976).

1984In Mueller , the court pointed out that the earlier Missouri cases regarded the submission of the rear end doctrine as a submission of specific negligence but that, in recent cases, the doctrine “has been interpreted more broadly.” The court quoted with approval the following language from Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412, 421 (Mo. banc 1976): “A rear-end submission may be justified in automobile collision cases under circumstances warranting an inference of defendant’s negligence.

1979Appellants have cited numerous cases discussing the elements and theory of the rear end doctrine, such as Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 350 Mo. 91 , 164 S.W.2d 914 (1942); State ex rel.

1979Appellants have cited numerous cases discussing the elements and theory of the rear end doctrine, such as Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 350 Mo. 91 , 164 S.W.2d 914 (1942); State ex rel.

1964Spears, supra, 357 Mo. loc. cit. 691, 210 S.W.2d loc. cit. 70(2); Gooch v. Lake, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 132, 134 (3); Witherspoon v. Guttierez, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 874, 880 (5)], the rear-end doctrine being defined as the “rule” recognizing that “if one person has his vehicle in a portion of the highway where he should have it or is entitled to have it in view of the course in which he is proceeding, and some other person traveling behind him in the same direction overtakes him and permits his vehicle to run into the rear of the one ahead, the proof of a collision under such circumstances makes out a pri

1961And see, § 509.500 RSMo 1959 and V.A.M.S.; Civil Rule 55.54 V.A.M.R.; Gooch v. Lake, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 132, 134 .

2013Ms. Leftwich-Kitchen argues in response that the trial court’s denial of Ms. Garcia’s motion for directed verdict was not erroneous because Ms. Leftwich-Kitchen presented evidence to rebut Ms. Garcia’s claim of negligence, specifically showing that Ms. Leftwich-Kitchen “immediately applied the brakes at the crest of the hill, faced oncoming traffic on the left, did not have a shoulder to veer right, and the accident was unavoidable.” “[A] directed verdict is a drastic action and should be granted only when reasonable persons could not differ on the correct disposition of the case.” Duvall v. S

2005When applicable, the rear-end collision doctrine “only establishes a prima facie case; it does not compel a directed verdict.” Gilleylen v. Surety Foods, Inc., 963 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo.App.1998).

1990It has been cited for that proposition in the rear-end case of Stanziale v. Musick, 370 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Mo.1963).

1984As said in Lichtenberg v. Hug, 481 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Mo.App.1972), ‘... the doctrine approaches — if it does not reach — that of res ipsa loquitur in that under the circumstances in Jones [v. Central States Oil Co.] the fact of collision bespeaks the defendant’s negligence.’ ” (Emphasis added.) The court in Mueller said, at p. 182: “It follows from the recent developments of the rear-end ‘doctrine’ that its applicability is determined at trial in much the same manner courts approach the use of res ipsa loquitur in other situations.

1984The Notes on Use to MAI 17.16 state: “The rear end doctrine is limited in scope and this instruction should not be used except where the facts show the instruction is clearly applicable.” (Emphasis added.) In Mueller, supra, the court held that MAI 17.16 was not erroneous in failing to contain language requiring an express finding that the driver of the lead vehicle was operating it with the highest degree of care.

1984Further the court held that MAI 17.16 was not erroneous in failing to require an express finding that the lead vehicle was “in a place where it had the right to be.” 583 S.W.2d at 185 .

1983See, for example, Cosens v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.App.1975).

1976For example a modified MAI 17.16 instruction was used without challenge in Scheele v. American Bakeries Company, 427 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Mo.1968), to submit the issue of a storekeeper’s negligence in pushing a hand truck into an oblivious customer standing in his path.

1965Appellant contends that Instruction No. 1 is not error because it is virtually the same as approved for a submission of following too dosely in Gooch v. Avsco, Inc., Mo., 337 S.W.2d 245, 250 [5], and that Instruction No. 2 is patterned after the instruction submitting the rear end doctrine in Witherspoon v. Guttierez, Mo., 327 S.W. 2d 874, 877 , and in Croney v. Pence, Mo.App., 346 S.W.2d 574, 575-6 [1].

1965Appellant contends that Instruction No. 1 is not error because it is virtually the same as approved for a submission of following too dosely in Gooch v. Avsco, Inc., Mo., 337 S.W.2d 245, 250 [5], and that Instruction No. 2 is patterned after the instruction submitting the rear end doctrine in Witherspoon v. Guttierez, Mo., 327 S.W. 2d 874, 877 , and in Croney v. Pence, Mo.App., 346 S.W.2d 574, 575-6 [1].

1964Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 251 S.W.2d 360, 362 (3); Branch v. Gordon’s Transports, Inc., Mo.App., 375 S.W.2d 418, 421 (1); Glowczwski v. Foster, Mo.App., 359 S.W.2d 406, 408-409 (1); Doggendorf v. St.

1964Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 251 S.W.2d 360, 362 (3); Branch v. Gordon’s Transports, Inc., Mo.App., 375 S.W.2d 418, 421 (1); Glowczwski v. Foster, Mo.App., 359 S.W.2d 406, 408-409 (1); Doggendorf v. St.