rear-end presumption in Florida

2019See Servello & Sons Inc. v. Sims , 922 So.2d 234 , 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ; see also Birge , 107 So.3d at 361 .

2019See Servello & Sons Inc. v. Sims , 922 So.2d 234 , 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ; see also Birge , 107 So.3d at 361 .

2019"The rear-end presumption is not a substantive rule of law that supersedes Florida's comparative negligence system of tort recovery." Id. at 359 . *273 Further, the rear-end presumption does not completely insulate a negligent lead driver from liability for any comparative negligence, and issues of disputed fact regarding negligence and causation should be submitted to the jury.

2019"The rear-end presumption is not a substantive rule of law that supersedes Florida's comparative negligence system of tort recovery." Id. at 359 . *273 Further, the rear-end presumption does not completely insulate a negligent lead driver from liability for any comparative negligence, and issues of disputed fact regarding negligence and causation should be submitted to the jury.

2010Cf. McCloud v. Swanson, 681 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (finding “[a] reasonable inference” from the evidence was that “the [lead driver] defendant overtook the [rear driver] plaintiffs vehicle, quickly pulled into the lane in front of her, and then came to a sudden stop” and that such evidence precluded the entry of a directed verdict, based on the rear-end presumption, in favor of the defendant lead driver).

1997See Eppler, 695 So.2d at 777 ; McCloud v. Swanson, 681 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Liriano v. Gonzalez, 605 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So.2d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

2012See, e.g., Van Dyke, 590 So.2d at 1024 (explaining that introduction of evidence that lead driver was negligent in causing rear-end collision raises a question of comparative fault to be resolved by the jury, notwithstanding the presumption of negligence that might have attached to rear driver); Pollock v. Goldberg, 651 So.2d 721, 722-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding where rear driver counter-plaintiff did not "dissipate” presumption of her negligence, verdict could not be directed against rear driver where evidence established a basis for jury to conclude that front driver was comparatively

2012See, e.g., Van Dyke, 590 So.2d at 1024 (explaining that introduction of evidence that lead driver was negligent in causing rear-end collision raises a question of comparative fault to be resolved by the jury, notwithstanding the presumption of negligence that might have attached to rear driver); Pollock v. Goldberg, 651 So.2d 721, 722-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding where rear driver counter-plaintiff did not "dissipate” presumption of her negligence, verdict could not be directed against rear driver where evidence established a basis for jury to conclude that front driver was comparatively

2012This type of presumption, like the rear-end presumption at issue, is established to facilitate a particular type of legal action, and once the presump tion is rebutted, it “disappears and the jury is not told of it.” See id. (quoting Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bonanno, 568 So.2d 24, 31 (Fla.1990)) (emphasis omitted).

2012Nevertheless, this Court has consistently held that the presumption of negligence imposed on the rear driver in a rear-end collision case is a rebuttable presumption, one that vanishes and loses its legal effect where evidence is produced from which a jury could conclude that the “real fact is not as presumed.” 16 Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 ; see also Clampitt, 786 So.2d at 573 ; Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that the rear-end presumption “disappear[s]” when facts appear, and “facts are deemed to appear” when evidence is produced from which such facts “may be found.”).

2012See Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 (explaining that the rear-end presumption is a rebuttable presumption constructed by law to give effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence); see also Gulle, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that “[pjresumptions disappear when facts appear; and facts are deemed to appear when evidence is [produced] from which [facts] may be found” by the trier of fact).

2012See, e.g., Van Dyke, 590 So.2d at 1024 (explaining that introduction of evidence that lead driver was negligent in causing rear-end collision raises a question of comparative fault to be resolved by the jury, notwithstanding the presumption of negligence that might have attached to rear driver); Pollock v. Goldberg, 651 So.2d 721, 722-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding where rear driver counter-plaintiff did not "dissipate” presumption of her negligence, verdict could not be directed against rear driver where evidence established a basis for jury to conclude that front driver was comparatively

2012See Charron, 37 So.3d at 297 (“The presumption clearly does not apply where a passenger of the following vehicle sues the lead driver for his negligence.”).

2012See, e.g., Van Dyke, 590 So.2d at 1024 (explaining that introduction of evidence that lead driver was negligent in causing rear-end collision raises a question of comparative fault to be resolved by the jury, notwithstanding the presumption of negligence that might have attached to rear driver); Pollock v. Goldberg, 651 So.2d 721, 722-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding where rear driver counter-plaintiff did not "dissipate” presumption of her negligence, verdict could not be directed against rear driver where evidence established a basis for jury to conclude that front driver was comparatively

2012Nevertheless, this Court has consistently held that the presumption of negligence imposed on the rear driver in a rear-end collision case is a rebuttable presumption, one that vanishes and loses its legal effect where evidence is produced from which a jury could conclude that the “real fact is not as presumed.” 16 Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 ; see also Clampitt, 786 So.2d at 573 ; Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that the rear-end presumption “disappear[s]” when facts appear, and “facts are deemed to appear” when evidence is produced from which such facts “may be found.”).

2012See Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 (explaining that the rear-end presumption is a rebuttable presumption constructed by law to give effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence); see also Gulle, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that “[pjresumptions disappear when facts appear; and facts are deemed to appear when evidence is [produced] from which [facts] may be found” by the trier of fact).

2012Nevertheless, this Court has consistently held that the presumption of negligence imposed on the rear driver in a rear-end collision case is a rebuttable presumption, one that vanishes and loses its legal effect where evidence is produced from which a jury could conclude that the “real fact is not as presumed.” 16 Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 ; see also Clampitt, 786 So.2d at 573 ; Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that the rear-end presumption “disappear[s]” when facts appear, and “facts are deemed to appear” when evidence is produced from which such facts “may be found.”).

2012See, e.g., Van Dyke, 590 So.2d at 1024 (explaining that introduction of evidence that lead driver was negligent in causing rear-end collision raises a question of comparative fault to be resolved by the jury, notwithstanding the presumption of negligence that might have attached to rear driver); Pollock v. Goldberg, 651 So.2d 721, 722-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (concluding where rear driver counter-plaintiff did not "dissipate” presumption of her negligence, verdict could not be directed against rear driver where evidence established a basis for jury to conclude that front driver was comparatively

1997See Eppler, 695 So.2d at 777 ; McCloud v. Swanson, 681 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Liriano v. Gonzalez, 605 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So.2d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

1997See Eppler, 695 So.2d at 777 ; McCloud v. Swanson, 681 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Liriano v. Gonzalez, 605 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So.2d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

1997See Eppler, 695 So.2d at 777 ; McCloud v. Swanson, 681 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Liriano v. Gonzalez, 605 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So.2d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).