John Doe defendant in New York

2024First, inasmuch as the City of Buffalo Police Department is merely an administrative unit of defendant City of Buffalo, it cannot be independently sued ( see generally Village of Brockport v County of Monroe Pure Waters Div ., 75 AD2d 483, 486-487 [4th Dept 1980], affd 54 NY2d 678 [1981]), and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

2024First, inasmuch as the City of Buffalo Police Department is merely an administrative unit of defendant City of Buffalo, it cannot be independently sued ( see generally Village of Brockport v County of Monroe Pure Waters Div ., 75 AD2d 483, 486-487 [4th Dept 1980], affd 54 NY2d 678 [1981]), and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

2024However, section 1024 does not toll the statute of limitations except to the extent that it affords plaintiffs an additional 120 days to identify and serve the defendants (Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261, 261 [I st Dept 2002 ]); Luckern v Lyonsdale Energy Limited Partnership, 229 AD2d 249, 254 [4 1h Dept 1997]).

2006Partnership, supra at 254, 255; see Opiela v May Indus.

2024However, section 1024 does not toll the statute of limitations except to the extent that it affords plaintiffs an additional 120 days to identify and serve the defendants (Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261, 261 [I st Dept 2002 ]); Luckern v Lyonsdale Energy Limited Partnership, 229 AD2d 249, 254 [4 1h Dept 1997]).

2018Auth. , 66 AD3d 26 , 29—30 [2d Dept 2009]; see Tucker v Lorieo , 291 AD2d 261, 262 [1st Dept 2002]).

2024Defendants [*2]established that plaintiff did not identify and effect service upon the John Doe defendants within the relevant statute of limitations period, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response ( see Lepore v Town of Greenburgh , 120 AD3d 1202, 1204 [2d Dept 2014]).

2024Defendants [*2]established that plaintiff did not identify and effect service upon the John Doe defendants within the relevant statute of limitations period, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response ( see Lepore v Town of Greenburgh , 120 AD3d 1202, 1204 [2d Dept 2014]).

2023"The moving party [*2]seeking to apply the relation-back doctrine to a later-identified 'Jane Doe' or 'John Doe' defendant has the burden, inter alia, of establishing that diligent efforts were made to ascertain the unknown party's identity prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations" ( Holmes v City of New York , 132 AD3d 952, 954 ; see Temple v New York Community Hosp. of Brooklyn , 89 AD3d 926, 927 ).

2023Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to name Krieff as a defendant in place of John Doe since the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in identifying Krieff before the expiration of the statute of limitations ( see Walker v Hormann Flexon, LLC , 153 AD3d 997, 998 ; Holmes v City of New York , 132 AD3d at 954 ; Temple v New York Community Hosp. of Brooklyn , 89 AD3d at 927-928 ; Hall v Rao , 26 AD3d 694, 695 ).

2013As plaintiff demonstrated that it had not discovered any unknown parties who had an interest in the subject property, Supreme Court should have granted the portion of plaintiffs motion that sought to amend the caption to delete the John Doe defendants (see CPLR 1024; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, 1046 [2012]; US Bank, N.A. v Boyce, 93 AD3d 782, 783 [2012]).

2013As plaintiff demonstrated that it had not discovered any unknown parties who had an interest in the subject property, Supreme Court should have granted the portion of plaintiffs motion that sought to amend the caption to delete the John Doe defendants (see CPLR 1024; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, 1046 [2012]; US Bank, N.A. v Boyce, 93 AD3d 782, 783 [2012]).

2013As plaintiff demonstrated that it had not discovered any unknown parties who had an interest in the subject property, Supreme Court should have granted the portion of plaintiffs motion that sought to amend the caption to delete the John Doe defendants (see CPLR 1024; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, 1046 [2012]; US Bank, N.A. v Boyce, 93 AD3d 782, 783 [2012]).

2013As plaintiff demonstrated that it had not discovered any unknown parties who had an interest in the subject property, Supreme Court should have granted the portion of plaintiffs motion that sought to amend the caption to delete the John Doe defendants (see CPLR 1024; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 AD3d 1044, 1046 [2012]; US Bank, N.A. v Boyce, 93 AD3d 782, 783 [2012]).

2023Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to name Krieff as a defendant in place of John Doe since the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in identifying Krieff before the expiration of the statute of limitations ( see Walker v Hormann Flexon, LLC , 153 AD3d 997, 998 ; Holmes v City of New York , 132 AD3d at 954 ; Temple v New York Community Hosp. of Brooklyn , 89 AD3d at 927-928 ; Hall v Rao , 26 AD3d 694, 695 ).

2018Footnote 4: Plaintiffs' assertion that the proposed causes of action relate back to the first amended complaint because it named John Doe defendants is unavailing, in light of plaintiffs' failure to establish that they made a diligent effort to "ascertain the unknown part[ies'] identit[ies] prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations" ( Walker v Hormann Flexon, LLC , 153 AD3d 997, 998 [2017]).

2026In view of this determination, we need not reach the issue of whether plaintiff described the John Doe defendants in his original complaint in such a way as to fairly apprise the officer defendants that they were the intended defendants ( see Lebowitz v Fieldston Travel Bureau, 181 AD2d 481, 482 [1st Dept 1992]).

2025Further, while unopposed, the Court notes that dismissal must be granted as against the John Doe defendants as such claims are now time barred and plaintiff has made no diligent efforts to identify the defendants (see CPLR 1024; Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 519 [2d Cir. 2013]). 156038/2019 WRIGHT, OMAR vs.

2024Still, the Appellate Division, First Department, recognized in Figdor v. City of New York, that monetary sanctions are sometimes warranted to address discovery abuses when "the cavalier attitude of defendant, resulting ... in substantial and gratuitous delay and expense, should not escape adverse consequence" ( 33 AD3d 560, 561 [1st Dept 2006]).

2017The death of the John Doe defendant, the tenant named Kip Konigsberg, does not require a stay of this action. “[W]here a party’s demise does not affect the merits of a case, there is no need for strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution” (U.S. Bank N.A. v Esses, 132 AD3d 847, 848 [2d Dept 2015]).

2016“Pursuant to RPAPL 1311, the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action is required to join, as a party defendant, any person ‘whose interest is claimed to be subject and subordinate to the plaintiffs lien,’ including ‘[e]very person having an estate or interest in possession ... in the property as tenant in fee.’ Accordingly, tenants are necessary parties to a foreclosure action” (1426 46 St., LLC v Klein, 60 AD3d 740, 742 [2009] [citation omitted], quoting RPAPL 1311 [1]), including a foreclosure action based on a tax lien (see generally Administrative Code § 11-335; NYCTL 1999-1 Trust v 573

2016Plaintiff adequately alleges that it has been damaged by Glass and Stern’s breaches (Fielding v Kupferman, 65 AD3d 437, 442 [1st Dept 2009]).

2011Here, the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to discover the identity of the John Doe defendants prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations (see Comice v Justin’s Rest., 78 AD3d 641, 642 [2010]; Bumpus v New York City Tr.

2011Auth., 66 AD3d at 29-30; Misa v Hossain, 42 AD3d 484, 486 [2007]; see also Karagiannis v North Shore Long Is.

2006The statute of limitations, which was to expire in three days, was thus tolled until the date of entry of the order granting plaintiffs leave to amend the verified complaint (see Perez v Paramount Communications, 92 NY2d 749, 754-756 [1999]; see also Long v Sowande, 27 AD3d 247, 248 [2006]).

2006The statute of limitations, which was to expire in three days, was thus tolled until the date of entry of the order granting plaintiffs leave to amend the verified complaint (see Perez v Paramount Communications, 92 NY2d 749, 754-756 [1999]; see also Long v Sowande, 27 AD3d 247, 248 [2006]).