ability to pay inquiry in Texas

2024Compare Cruz, 2023 WL 3236888 , at *4 (concluding “that a defendant’s right to an ability-to-pay inquiry is ‘fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory system’ [and holding that an] appellant was not required to preserve this complaint for appeal through objection” (quoting Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 799 (Tex. Crim.

2024Compare Cruz, 2023 WL 3236888 , at *4 (concluding “that a defendant’s right to an ability-to-pay inquiry is ‘fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory system’ [and holding that an] appellant was not required to preserve this complaint for appeal through objection” (quoting Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 799 (Tex. Crim.

2024In Cruz, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the ability-to-pay inquiry was “not fundamental to the functioning of our adjudicatory system” and, thus, the appellant in that case forfeited his complaint that the trial court failed to conduct the inquiry on the record when he did not object in the trial court. 698 S.W.3d at 266, 268–69, 271 (conducting a Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim.

2021Appellant further contends the statutory language directing trial courts to perform an ability-to-pay inquiry is an absolute requirement under Marin v. State, not requiring error preservation in the trial court. 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim.

2025The Cruz court reasoned that because the ability-to-pay inquiry is “not fundamental to the adjudicatory process,” “[r]equiring an objection to enforce it would not undermine ‘the public’s perception of the fairness of our judicial system’ or engender ‘suspicions’ about the system’s ‘fairness and accuracy.’” Id. at 269, 271 (quoting Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. Crim.

2025The Cruz court reasoned that because the 3 ability-to-pay inquiry is “not fundamental to the adjudicatory process,” “[r]equiring an objection to enforce it would not undermine ‘the public’s perception of the fairness of our judicial system’ or engender ‘suspicions’ about the system’s ‘fairness and accuracy.’” Id. at 269 (quoting Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. Crim.

2025See id. art. 42.15(a-2) (“A defendant may waive the requirement for the inquiry described by Subsection (a-1) to be on the record.”); 15 see also TEX.

2024The State did not have the benefit of this Court’s opinion in Bruedigam v. State, No. 07- 23-00429-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3644 , at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 28, 2024, no pet. h.), in which we agreed with Appellant, based on Cruz, that no objection was required to preserve a complaint on assessed costs. 5 See Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1978) (“[T]he Legislature did not intend to do a useless thing by putting a meaningless provision in a statute.”). 4 requirement for the inquiry to be on the record but did not provide for waiver of the requirement that there be an abilit

2024Further, the court found that the trial court’s ability-to-pay inquiry that she was to be charged for her appointed attorney fee, as evidenced by the multiple admonishments that she signed, but she forfeited her claim by foregoing her initial appeal.”); Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 321 (Tex. Crim.

2023See id. art. 42.15(a-1).

2023See State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2012), but a plea of true to not paying restitution does not trigger an ability-to-pay inquiry, see Gipson v. State, 428 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Tex. Crim.