child hearsay hearing in Washington

2025Defense counsel also made arguments regarding the child hearsay test under Ryan, pointing out that EO’s statements were unreliable because in the forensic interview KR said she told her mother about the incident after her mother returned from the library, but Wilson said she would be surprised if KR said she was at the library. 3 State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 175-76 , 691 P.2d 197 (1984). 6 No. 59539-7-II The trial court provided an oral ruling that KR was competent to testify.

2025Defense counsel also made arguments regarding the child hearsay test under Ryan, pointing out that EO’s statements were unreliable because in the forensic interview KR said she told her mother about the incident after her mother returned from the library, but Wilson said she would be surprised if KR said she was at the library. 3 State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 175-76 , 691 P.2d 197 (1984). 6 No. 59539-7-II The trial court provided an oral ruling that KR was competent to testify.

2015We therefore decline to address further the alleged error.26 21 State v, Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 665 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990). 22 Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 176 . 23 Brief of Appellant at 17. 24 id at 19-20. 25 Carlson, 61 Wn.

2015We therefore decline to address further the alleged error.26 21 State v, Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 665 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990). 22 Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 176 . 23 Brief of Appellant at 17. 24 id at 19-20. 25 Carlson, 61 Wn.

2015Carlson, 61 Wn.

2015We therefore decline to address further the alleged error.26 21 State v, Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 665 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990). 22 Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 176 . 23 Brief of Appellant at 17. 24 id at 19-20. 25 Carlson, 61 Wn.

2011He says this remark implicated Brousseau's right to counsel and "exacerbated the bolstering of J.R.'s testimony." Appellant's Br. at 22. ¶ 50 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brousseau must show that "(1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and *220 (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

2011He says this remark implicated Brousseau's right to counsel and "exacerbated the bolstering of J.R.'s testimony." Appellant's Br. at 22. ¶ 50 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brousseau must show that "(1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and *220 (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

2011He says this remark implicated Brousseau's right to counsel and "exacerbated the bolstering of J.R.'s testimony." Appellant's Br. at 22. ¶ 50 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brousseau must show that "(1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and *220 (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

2011He says this remark implicated Brousseau's right to counsel and "exacerbated the bolstering of J.R.'s testimony." Appellant's Br. at 22. ¶ 50 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brousseau must show that "(1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and *220 (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

2011Opening Br. at 5 (emphasis added). [2] While the trial court's competency determination predated the publication of S.J.W., the trial court ultimately adhered to the standard we subsequently announced in S.J.W., placing the burden on the defense to prove that J.R. was incompetent to testify. [3] Brousseau did not offer J.R.'s testimony during the child hearsay hearing. [4] In Ryan , we adopted the five factors we had set forth in State v. Parris to determine whether a child hearsay statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability under RCW 9A.44.120: "`(1) whether there is an apparent motive t

2011Opening Br. at 5 (emphasis added). [2] While the trial court's competency determination predated the publication of S.J.W., the trial court ultimately adhered to the standard we subsequently announced in S.J.W., placing the burden on the defense to prove that J.R. was incompetent to testify. [3] Brousseau did not offer J.R.'s testimony during the child hearsay hearing. [4] In Ryan , we adopted the five factors we had set forth in State v. Parris to determine whether a child hearsay statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability under RCW 9A.44.120: "`(1) whether there is an apparent motive t

2011In State v. Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d 472, 481 , 939 P.2d 697 (1997), we concluded that "`testifies,' as used in RCW 9A.44.120(2)(a) means that the child takes the stand and describes the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay" statement.

2011In State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472, 481 , 939 P.2d 697 (1997), we concluded that “ ‘testifies,’ as used in RCW 9A.44.120(2)(a), means that the child takes the stand and describes the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay” statement.

2011Bowman v. State, 162 Wash.2d 325, 335 , 172 P.3d 681 (2007). ¶ 48 In sum, we conclude that RCW 9A.44.120 does not mandate that a child witness testify at a child hearsay hearing as a prerequisite to admitting those statements at trial. ¶ 49 Finally, Brousseau claims that his attorney was ineffective in failing to move to strike an unresponsive answer by Deputy Nichols referencing defense counsel as appointed counsel.

2011Bowman v. State, 162 Wn.2d 325, 335 , 172 P.3d 681 (2007). ¶48 In sum, we conclude that RCW 9A.44.120 does not mandate that a child witness testify at a child hearsay hearing as a prerequisite to admitting those statements at trial. ¶49 Finally, Brousseau claims that his attorney was ineffective in failing to move to strike an unresponsive answer by Deputy Nichols referencing defense counsel as appointed counsel.

2011In State v. Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d 472, 481 , 939 P.2d 697 (1997), we concluded that "`testifies,' as used in RCW 9A.44.120(2)(a) means that the child takes the stand and describes the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay" statement.

2011In State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472, 481 , 939 P.2d 697 (1997), we concluded that “ ‘testifies,’ as used in RCW 9A.44.120(2)(a), means that the child takes the stand and describes the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay” statement.

2011Bowman v. State, 162 Wash.2d 325, 335 , 172 P.3d 681 (2007). ¶ 48 In sum, we conclude that RCW 9A.44.120 does not mandate that a child witness testify at a child hearsay hearing as a prerequisite to admitting those statements at trial. ¶ 49 Finally, Brousseau claims that his attorney was ineffective in failing to move to strike an unresponsive answer by Deputy Nichols referencing defense counsel as appointed counsel.

2011Bowman v. State, 162 Wn.2d 325, 335 , 172 P.3d 681 (2007). ¶48 In sum, we conclude that RCW 9A.44.120 does not mandate that a child witness testify at a child hearsay hearing as a prerequisite to admitting those statements at trial. ¶49 Finally, Brousseau claims that his attorney was ineffective in failing to move to strike an unresponsive answer by Deputy Nichols referencing defense counsel as appointed counsel.

2011He says this remark implicated Brousseau's right to counsel and "exacerbated the bolstering of J.R.'s testimony." Appellant's Br. at 22. ¶ 50 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brousseau must show that "(1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and *220 (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

2011He says this remark implicated Brousseau's right to counsel and "exacerbated the bolstering of J.R.'s testimony." Appellant's Br. at 22. ¶ 50 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brousseau must show that "(1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and *220 (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

2006NOTES [1] D.S. did not tell Dawson about the particulars of the assault in words, but instead wrote them down. [2] The parties agreed that King's May 1, 2003 arrest for failure to register would be referred to only as an arrest on a warrant. [3] Before trial, the court held a child hearsay hearing and ruled that all witnesses were allowed to testify as to what D.S. told them, except Grant, who was allowed to testify under the "hue and cry" doctrine only to the generic fact that D.S. had disclosed abuse to her. [4] While defense counsel thought a firmer instruction would be better than no furth

2006NOTES [1] D.S. did not tell Dawson about the particulars of the assault in words, but instead wrote them down. [2] The parties agreed that King's May 1, 2003 arrest for failure to register would be referred to only as an arrest on a warrant. [3] Before trial, the court held a child hearsay hearing and ruled that all witnesses were allowed to testify as to what D.S. told them, except Grant, who was allowed to testify under the "hue and cry" doctrine only to the generic fact that D.S. had disclosed abuse to her. [4] While defense counsel thought a firmer instruction would be better than no furth

2025The trial court stated that this was a “normal childlike response to when you’re caught with being [in] a fib,” and concluded that OJ was “just an eccentric, happy five-year-old with way too much energy.” Id.

2022Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, “a judicial proceeding is valid if a reasonably prudent, disinterested observer would conclude that the parties received a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.” State v. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d 535, 540 , 387 P.3d 703 (2017).

2022Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, “a judicial proceeding is valid if a reasonably prudent, disinterested observer would conclude that the parties received a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.” State v. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d 535, 540 , 387 P.3d 703 (2017).

2019A court abuses its discretion “‘only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable reasons or grounds.’” Borboa, 157 Wn.2d at 121 (quoting State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672, 686 , 63 P.3d 765 (2003)). 4 50750-1-II We review challenges to findings of fact supporting the admission to determine whether substantial evidence supports each challenged finding and review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo to determine whether the findings support the challenged conclusions.

2019Notwithstanding the above, we have taken it upon ourselves to review the record and we conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s challenged findings of fact from the child hearsay hearing. “[W]e review the trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Borboa, 157 Wn.2d 108, 121 , 135 P.3d 469 (2006).

2019A court abuses its discretion “‘only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable reasons or grounds.’” Borboa, 157 Wn.2d at 121 (quoting State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672, 686 , 63 P.3d 765 (2003)). 4 50750-1-II We review challenges to findings of fact supporting the admission to determine whether substantial evidence supports each challenged finding and review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo to determine whether the findings support the challenged conclusions.

2019A court abuses its discretion “‘only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable reasons or grounds.’” Borboa, 157 Wn.2d at 121 (quoting State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672, 686 , 63 P.3d 765 (2003)). 4 50750-1-II We review challenges to findings of fact supporting the admission to determine whether substantial evidence supports each challenged finding and review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo to determine whether the findings support the challenged conclusions.

2019Percer, 111 Wn.

2019Notwithstanding the above, we have taken it upon ourselves to review the record and we conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s challenged findings of fact from the child hearsay hearing. “[W]e review the trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Borboa, 157 Wn.2d 108, 121 , 135 P.3d 469 (2006).

2017App. 582, 588-89 , 105 P.3d 1022 (2005). 5 No. 74030-0-1/6 Here, the trial court conducted a child hearsay hearing before trial, and found the recording admissible under RCW 9A.44.120.

2015Whether statements are admissible pursuant to the child hearsay exception is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, id.

2014In a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review SAG), Carson further asserts that ( 1) inconsistent testimony during the child hearsay hearing 1 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P. 2d 173 ( 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 405 -06, 756 P. 2d 105 ( 1988). 2 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995).

2014In a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review SAG), Carson further asserts that ( 1) inconsistent testimony during the child hearsay hearing 1 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P. 2d 173 ( 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 405 -06, 756 P. 2d 105 ( 1988). 2 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995).

2014In a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review SAG), Carson further asserts that ( 1) inconsistent testimony during the child hearsay hearing 1 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P. 2d 173 ( 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 405 -06, 756 P. 2d 105 ( 1988). 2 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995).

2014In a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review SAG), Carson further asserts that ( 1) inconsistent testimony during the child hearsay hearing 1 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P. 2d 173 ( 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 405 -06, 756 P. 2d 105 ( 1988). 2 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995).

2014In a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review SAG), Carson further asserts that ( 1) inconsistent testimony during the child hearsay hearing 1 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P. 2d 173 ( 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 405 -06, 756 P. 2d 105 ( 1988). 2 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995).

2014In a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review SAG), Carson further asserts that ( 1) inconsistent testimony during the child hearsay hearing 1 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P. 2d 173 ( 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 405 -06, 756 P. 2d 105 ( 1988). 2 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995).

2011The law requires only “reasonable,” efforts — not “futile acts.” See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 ; Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 172 . ¶50 By its terms, Smith, 148 Wn.2d at 137 , is limited to circumstances in which affirmative evidence suggests that a child may be able to testify via alternative means.